As Russia’s war in Ukraine drags on, the Kremlin has overhauled its domestic security doctrine. The Federal Security Service has shifted from fighting terrorism to hunting spies, deploying sweeping counterintelligence tactics that penetrate private companies and state agencies while deepening a pervasive climate of administrative paralysis.
From Counterterrorism to Spy Hunting in the Security State
For the first two decades of Vladimir Putin’s time in office, Russia’s reigning model of state security centered on fighting terrorism and extremism. The wars in Chechnya at the start of that tenure were framed as a counterterrorism operation,
and political opponents up until 2022 were regularly branded as terrorists or supporters of terrorism. That framework has now undergone a fundamental transformation.
As the conflict in Ukraine has become protracted, the Kremlin has needed a more aggressive strategy to keep both ordinary citizens and perceived opposition figures in line. The Federal Security Service, known as the FSB, has pivoted its core focus from hunting terrorists to rooting out spies. Drawing on tactics perfected during the Soviet era, the security apparatus has penetrated deeper into ordinary society, private-sector companies, and state institutions alike.
This escalation comes against a backdrop of frequent internet shutdowns, draconian new social media restrictions, and expanding repression that stands in stark contrast to the moderate freedoms Russians experienced before the war began in 2022. By treating any perceived political threat as a potential act of treason, Moscow relies less on formal legal standards and increasingly on secret assessments supplied by the security services.
Targeting Ministries and Industries with Selective Repression
To reassert discipline across the political elite and industrial sectors, the security services have deployed selective repression on an unprecedented scale. Officials have been arrested across a wide array of federal bodies, including the ministries of digital development, defense, energy, science and education, industry and trade, internal affairs, transport, culture, emergency situations, and the development of the Far East and the Arctic, alongside members of the Moscow city government.
Federal agencies have faced similar scrutiny. Employees within the Penitentiary Service, the Service for Supervision of Natural Resources, the National Guard, the Deposit Insurance Agency, and the Customs Service have been targeted in prosecutions involving abuse of power, fraud, and embezzlement. The FSB frequently supplies the compromising information for these cases.
A prominent example of this campaign is the case of Maxim Parshin, who served as deputy minister of digital communications and oversaw Russia’s national import-substitution program. Despite his crucial role in the war effort and his strong ties to Defense Minister Andrey Belousov, Parshin was arrested in July 2023. In October 2025, he was tried on bribery charges and sentenced to nine years in jail. The prosecution served as a clear warning that the FSB would tolerate nothing short of complete obedience.
Private companies involved in military projects face intense counterintelligence scrutiny, where cost overruns or delays can trigger treason charges. Research institutions are equally affected, as routine technical findings, research results, and statistics are treated as potential security threats.
Administrative Paralysis and the Costs of Paranoia
Rule by spy hunting and paranoia carries significant institutional costs. Fearing FSB repression, government agencies and private businesses have begun concealing accurate data, avoiding decisions, and operating strictly in survival mode. Civil servants across the country delay effective choices while waiting for instructions from above.
Regional authorities avoid taking initiative until direct orders arrive, while researchers and statistical agencies withhold information that could prove politically unpopular. This systematic dismantling of feedback channels leaves the regime increasingly unable to understand the true state of affairs within the country.
Concern has also grown among members of Russia’s elite that the FSB has spun out of control as the leadership relies on the agency to preserve its rule. Over the long term, the resulting atmosphere of distrust and administrative paralysis threatens to leave the Kremlin significantly more vulnerable to a serious political crisis.
