Was the order to activate the sabotage network in Egypt in 1954 by then Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, a provocation designed to convince the American administration to support a British-French-Israeli plan to occupy the Suez Canal, as they did two years later in Operation Kadesh in 1956?
Was the order to activate the sabotage network in Egypt in 1954 by Dayan a provocation intended to convince the American administration to support the plan to occupy the Suez Canal?
Parshat Alexis – this world, Pesach eve issue 1964
Uri Avneri wrote in 1980 that the sources for his publication in 1964 of the Alexis case were Zvi and Ruth Swett. Avneri says that a young and impressive boy, Yair, knocked on his door one evening and asked him to come down to meet his father Zvi who was waiting in his car. Avneri heard Merot and Mtvi Swet The third person’s version of the Esek HaBish case, the Levon case.
The third person was imprisoned for 10 years under a total ban on the publication of his name or any other details from the security affair, which shocked the political and security elite of the country. The third person was sentenced to a long prison term with a complete publication restriction. Not because of the charge that was not proven and was not raised at all in his trial of his alleged responsibility for the downfall of the network – but because of the possession of classified documents without permission. The third person was Ruth’s brother, Avery Seidenberg.
After Avnery was convinced that Avery’s version, including his claim that senior army officers (the Chief of Army Staff and the Chief of Staff, Benjamin Ghibli and Dayan) forged a document to cover up their part in the affair – was a reasonable version, he thought about how he could publish the unbelievable story, when A complete ban on publication of the affair.
Avneri’s solution was bold and brilliant. Avneri formulated the shocking story of the Esek HaBish affair as an imaginary espionage story, which he called the Alexis Affair (He’s World, issue 1786, pages 15-19). Avneri described an imaginary Greek espionage network that carried out acts of sabotage in Turkey against the background of the conflict between the countries on the island of Cyprus that symbolized the Suez Canal.
Avneri’s solution to the absolute gag order on the affair was bold and brilliant. Avneri formulated the shocking story of the Esek HaBish case as an imaginary spy story, which he called the Alexis case
Avneri gave fake names to the heroes of the espionage case. The Greek Minister of Defense was called Alexis Stabridaki (in the role of Minister Pinchas Levon), the outgoing Greek Prime Minister was called Papadopoulos the Elder (in the role of outgoing Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion), the Greek Chief of Staff was called Sipakas Hagidam (in the role of Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan), the head of the Intelligence Division The Greek called George (in the role of the head of the CIA Benjamin Ghibli), the Greek agent in Turkey the operator of the network called Nikos “Mr. Stone” (in the role of the third person), the network recruiter was called Dimitrios Metzalak (in the role of Avraham Der), the head of the Greek intelligence organization Called the redhead (as Iser Harel), and the members of the spy network recruited in Turkey were Tatabaros (as Dr. Marzok), Rika Manolakas (as Marcel) and Stefanos Haralambo (as Philip Nathanson) (This World, issue 1787, pages 22-25) .
In 1971, after the publication ban was lifted, Avnery published again the two articles of the Alexis affair in the issues of this world 1786 and 1787 with the original names quoted above.
According to Avery’s version, the spy network in Egypt was used as a sabotage network to conflict between Egypt and the US and to stop the evacuation of British military bases from the Suez Canal.
Avneri describes the forgery of the document by the head of AMN Ghibli, which was intended to accuse Defense Minister Lavon of giving the order to activate the alleged sabotage network on July 16, 1954, while Chief of Staff Dayan was abroad.
Avneri describes the forgery of the document by the head of AMN Ghibli, which was intended to accuse Defense Minister Levon of giving the order to activate the alleged sabotage network on July 16, 1954, while Chief of Staff Dayan was abroad
The third person said that Ghibli retrospectively added to the letter sent to Chief of Staff Dayan a sentence incriminating Minister Lavon and stating that the order to activate the network was given on July 16. In practice, the sabotage operations began on July 2, 1954. The third person knew about this because he received the instructions to act In Egypt, Minister Levon denied that he gave an order to operate the network.
From the version of the third person, according to Avneri, it can be understood that the order to activate the network was made by the head of AMN Ghibli and Chief of Staff Dayan without the knowledge of Defense Minister Lavon and Prime Minister Moshe Sharett.
It can also be understood that the third person could have disproved the false version of Chief of Staff Dayan and the head of AMN Ghibli. Avery knew that the letter Ghibli gave to the inspection committee was fake and that’s what he told Ruth and Zvi and the court.
Avneri concludes the Alexis affair by stating that the Greek agent Nikos (the third person) met with Chief of Staff Sipakas (Chief of Staff Dayan) before testifying to the investigation committee of the affair, and at this meeting Sipakas (Dayan) asked to confirm with Nikos (the third person) that he would say that the instruction The operation of the network was given on July 16, 1954. Nikos (Avery) confirmed to Sipakas (Dane) that he would tell the committee this, even though he knew that the network’s sabotage operations in Egypt began at the beginning of July and before July 16, when he received the order to carry out a sabotage operation at a British institution.
The testimonies of Dalia Carmel and Benjamin Ghibli confirm the testimony of the third person
Dalia Carmel, who was the secretary of the head of the National Security Agency at the time, Binyamin Ghibli, testified before the Attorney General who was specially sent to collect testimony from her in Paris. To her testimony, Ghibli asked her to add retrospectively to a copy of a letter she sent to Chief of Staff Dayan on July 19 The trial that indicted Minister Pinchas Levon, regarding giving the order to activate the network on July 16.
Dalia Carmel, the secretary of the head of the National Security Agency at the time Ghibli, testified before the ombudsman who was specially sent to collect testimony from her in Paris. For her testimony, Ghibli asked her to retroactively add to the copy of a letter she sent to Chief of Staff Dayan the sentence that incriminated Levon
Benjamin Ghibli, at the end of his life, decided to tell his version of the affair in the book Shanganz, written for him by the journalist Aryeh Krishak. In the book he claimed that Dayan gave the order to activate the network.
A new look at the business case in Bish
The claims of the third person that the IDF officers forged a document and gave false testimony in the Esek HaBish case, seem to be true today. The testimony of Dalia Carmel, the secretary of the head of AMN Ghibli, confirms his version.
But it seems that the Lavon affair was much more serious than the forgery of a false testimony committee document by the head of the AMN and the Chief of Staff at the time. It seems that Dayan initiated a provocation in Egypt that would be a pretext for occupying the Suez and Sinai Canals, as was done two years later in Operation Kadesh, in cooperation with Britain and France, behind the backs of Defense Minister Pinchas Levon and Prime Minister Moshe Sharet.
In order to escape their responsibility for the affair, Dayan and Ghibli forged a document that incriminated Defense Minister Levon that he had given the order to operate the sabotage network in Egypt and also imprisoned the third person for 12 years under a blanket of complete secrecy, because he knew when he received the instructions to operate the network and knew that the letter given to the committee was fake.
Ben-Gurion demanded the establishment of a state commission of inquiry, but the party leadership prevented this and it is a shame. If Dayan had stood trial for his central part in the Esk Bish case, the Yom Kippur War would not have broken out in the conditions it broke out in 1973.
In 1980, Avneri wrote how much he appreciated the courage of Zvi and Ruth, who took upon themselves the risk of meeting him and exposing Avery’s version of the affair and the injustice done to him. But Avneri writes that even more than that, Zvi, who was a man of principles, was disturbed by the dark world where immoral things are done. A world he was exposed to when he tried to help Avery.
A lot of respect goes to Uri Avneri for writing the Alexis case, and also to the third person, Avery Zeidenberg, who was defamed and imprisoned and despite this revealed his version of the case and the briefing session Dayan gave him before testifying in the committee during his trial to Judge Binyamin Halevi and Ruth Vazvi.
Ben-Gurion demanded the establishment of a state commission of inquiry, but the party leadership prevented this and it is a shame. If Dayan had stood trial for his central part in the Esek HaBish case, the Yom Kippur War would not have broken out under the conditions it broke out in 1973
Whoever prevented the establishment of a state commission of inquiry in the Esek HaBish affair is responsible for what Dayan did as the Minister of Defense in the Yom Kippur War, and whoever prevented or delayed Netanyahu’s investigations regarding the submarines and the other cases, will be responsible for what Netanyahu will do if he returns to power.