“The best bet for the Israelis is to avoid tunnel war”

2023-11-05 03:32:06

Israel has completed the siege of Gaza City, a Hamas stronghold, and is fighting hand-to-hand with militants from the group’s armed wing on four different fronts, according to Al Qassam Brigades spokesman Abu Obeida. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant boasted that his troops had killed a dozen Hamas battalion commanders, but the Israeli Army acknowledged 28 casualties in its ranks since the operation began. In the midst of the clashes in Gaza, which have claimed the lives of more than 9,500 people, the American historian James L. Gelvin, author of works such as “The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War” (Cambridge, 2005) , analyzes the implications of the new war escalation in conversation with LA RAZÓN.

Is the Israeli Army prepared to wage an underground war inside Gaza?

According to military experts, no army is well prepared to fight an underground war. Israel has special units trained in tunnel warfare, which it can deploy. You can also use robotics. But the Israeli military will face obstacles: most night vision goggles depend on ambient light to function and electronic equipment requires satellite links, which will not be available; Hamas tunnels are very narrow, limiting offensive maneuvers; the weapons produce concussive effects in the tunnels, which reverberate to the detriment of both sides; Hamas could have human shields in the tunnels. The best bet for the Israelis is to avoid tunnel warfare, even to avoid large-scale urban warfare. Instead, the Americans, who have experienced tunnel warfare in Vietnam and urban warfare in Fallujah, have recommended targeted strikes and commando raids to eliminate Hamas leaders and rescue hostages. For now, it is impossible to know whether the Israelis will follow this advice.

What are the chances of the conflict spreading to the region, perhaps to Lebanon or even Iran?

The conflict is not likely to extend beyond the Palestinian territories; that is, both Gaza and the West Bank. The West Bank could also explode as a result of settlement expansion under Netanyahu’s governments and settler violence. But the conflict is unlikely to spread elsewhere. On October 3, Hasan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, fundamentally declared that his organization will harass Israel, but will not open another front against it. It must be remembered that Hezbollah is a Lebanese organization whose problem with Israel is different from the Palestinian problem with Israel. Iran is also unlikely to become directly involved. For Israel, the events of October 7 affected the very existence of the State; For Iran, any advantage it gained by directly entering the conflict would not provide an equivalent benefit. Iran does not have full control over most of its allies in the region – Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, the Syrian government – ​​who act according to their own interests, which are often aligned with Iran’s. Hezbollah has engaged in a limited exchange of artillery fire and the like with Israel; The Houthis have fired the occasional missile at Israel, but neither of them seems to want to get more involved; both have local problems to solve. Israeli strikes against Iranian targets in Syria have been going on for years and should be seen as a form of communication about what Israelis will and will not tolerate. Other than that, I don’t expect much more.

Do you believe that the Hamas attack had a geopolitical motivation to prevent the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia?

Historically, there have been three reasons why Palestinian groups have launched operations like the one Hamas launched on October 7: to keep the Palestinian issue on the international agenda, to sabotage any agreement they consider does not address core Palestinian demands, and to gain advantage over their adversaries in the Palestinian national movement. All three things were in play on October 7. The Abraham Accords and the possible normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel demonstrate the fact that several Arab states consider good relations with Israel to be more important to them than the Palestinian issue. This is largely due to the polarization of the region into two camps: that of Saudi Arabia and that of Iran. Israel would provide regimes like Saudi Arabia with strategic depth, technology (including the Pegasus spy program for use against their own citizens), and access to the highest echelons of the US Administration. What happened on October 7 was that Hamas demonstrated that the Palestinian issue would continue to be the center of attention in the Arab world. Bahrain has recalled its ambassador from Israel and Saudi Arabia has suspended normalization talks with Israel. As much as regimes like Saudi Arabia would like the Palestinian issue to go away so they can focus on the conflict with Iran, the events of October 7 and Israel’s reaction ignited widespread anger in the Arab world and make that impossible.

What will happen after Israel takes the Gaza Strip? A new Palestinian government?

Israel announced that its objectives are the destruction of Hamas and the release of the hostages. From what I see, there are no plans for the “day after”, only illusions. If Israel destroys Hamas and inflicts further damage on Gaza, no Arab government – ​​neither Egypt nor Israel’s partners in the Abraham Accords – would dare help Israel by policing Gaza or acting as temporary administrators. Nor would the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, which many already consider Israel’s collaborator. Israel left Gaza in 2005 because retaining the territory does not bring any added value to Israel. You don’t want to reoccupy it and manage it yourself. And what does it mean to destroy Hamas? Kill its members? Destroy their infrastructure? Hamas wears two hats: one is military, the other is civilian. Along with its military adventurism against Israel, Hamas provides social services and welfare to Gaza’s occupiers, who may not like Hamas’s repression and corruption, but depend on it. Israel seems to have no realistic plans other than to inflict as much damage as it can. This reminds me of what the United States did in Iraq. It is easy for a powerful nation to invade a territory and destroy its Government. What is not easy is for it to withdraw and leave behind viable and popular governance structures.