The security situation – in the Palestinian arena, in Judea and Samaria and in East Jerusalem – is escalating week by week. The severe riots in East Jerusalem, after less than a week since the attack at Shuafat crossing in which Sergeant Noa Lazar was killed and a security guard was seriously injured, are a bright warning signal. The escalation and the numerous attacks in the Nablus sector, combined with the deterioration in East Jerusalem on the eve of Israeli elections – bring the area to the brink of boiling, a situation that is beginning to remind us of the eve of Operation Wall Guardian.
There are big differences between the foci of escalation in Northern Samaria and East Jerusalem, and it is not possible to tie everything in one package. Nablus and Jenin are not the same as East Jerusalem, which is under the exclusive governmental responsibility of Israel. But when several sectors are lit at the same time, the chance that they will cause other sectors to heat up grows like a contagious wave. Much will be placed in the coming days on the proud shoulders of the Israel Police. The more quickly they manage to take control of the pockets of anarchy and restore order, the less likely it is to escalate in other arenas.
Meanwhile the Gaza Strip is silent. Once again it is proven that when Hamas is interested in it, even Kaptsun is not shot from the Gaza Strip, despite what has been happening in the West Bank for the past few months. Even the killing in recent months of active terrorists affiliated with the Islamic Jihad did not lead to the shooting of the terrorist organization from Gaza.
We can talk about Hamas’ reluctance to enter into a direct confrontation with Israel now, but more than that, Hamas learned from Operation Wall Guard that even before the events spill over into Gaza, it can extract many coupons from a broad security escalation in the West Bank, in East Jerusalem and among the Israeli Arabs, without having to pay A price in the Strip. For months, Hamas has fueled the area with wild incitement. It is true that it is not the leading factor, but it is the one that is now expected to take another step in targeting terrorism and incitement to lead to a more significant escalation.
Hamas will probably try to stay on the fence this time as well, but he knows very well that as someone who claims to be the defender of Jerusalem and the holy places, if the escalation escalates into serious incidents on the Temple Mount, he will be pressured to respond and fire rockets from the Strip. Gaza, as mentioned, is completely quiet, but the change in the situation vis-a-vis the Gaza Strip can be especially fast if the security establishment fails to stop the slippery slope of the last few days.
The IDF’s dilemma
In the past month, three IDF soldiers were killed in shooting attacks and exchanges of fire with terrorists, and an Israeli citizen was murdered in Holon. Between three incidents of different nature – at the crossing in Shuafat, in an open area not far from Jenin, and in the latest attack at the rear entrance gate to Samaria, where the soldiers fell – there are several common points.
In all of the incidents, the terrorists sought to surprise the IDF forces with close-range fire, and with all the difficulty in making early judgments before the investigations were completed, these are three incidents that not only ended in dire consequences, but also raise questions about the quality of the forces’ performance in the field, and the degree of vigilance and vigilance in the face of an operational situation in routine and abrasive security tasks.
Terrorist squads recognize the potential for fame in the Palestinian street by carrying out shooting attacks on IDF soldiers and quickly escaping from the scene of the incident, alongside other terrorist attacks directed against Israelis in the IOSH. Many lessons can be learned from the last three incidents in which IDF soldiers fell, and there is a great deal to learn and improve.
Faced with a changed reality and shooting attacks that become more professional as time goes by, the IDF must quickly make the necessary adjustments. Compared to Jenin, which has been at the center of tensions for the past few months, it has been a few weeks since Nablus took the lead, when the attacks that emanate from it immediately constitute A risk to many Israeli citizens.
The complex reality in Nablus is also loaded with violent incidents between Palestinians and Jews. As the severe wave of terrorism around Nablus continues, the violent confrontations between Jews and Palestinians in the sector increase correspondingly. A landslide in the Nablus region may lead to an escalation in the entire Judea and Samaria region. In the meantime it has not happened yet, but in the security establishment, after a particularly violent month, they understand that we are very close to the point after which it will be very difficult to stop the drift.
From here at least, at the level of the plans, the IDF should be prepared for the fact that after months of activity, with many reinforcements that have stopped training and entered into an abrasive and continuous routine in Judea and Samaria, another escalation that may spill over to the Nablus Gate and the Temple Mount, could also reach the Strip faster than you think Gaza Currently there is no intelligence information and signs on the ground about this, but the recent past has taught us how quickly the Gaza Strip can turn upside down.
This week, for the first time in a long time, Israel placed entry and exit barriers from the city of Nablus. Only three entrances remained open, and very quickly it became a central discourse in the city. Compared to Jenin, in Israel they believe that the Palestinian Authority has lost control there, in Nablus we are giving the security mechanisms of the Palestinian Authority a chance to deal with the situation.
According to military officials, in recent days, actions of the Palestinian security mechanisms have been seen in the area in an attempt to curb the trend of expansion of the so-called terrorist organization of the Lions’ Den. The problem with eradicating the organization is that only a part of it can be marked with preliminary information, because it is an idea that is usually spread on social media in a secular-nationalist narrative, which manages to wink at young people in Nablus who were previously not associated with terrorism.
The dilemma of the IDF and the Central Command is in choosing the dosage for offensive operations in the heart of the city of Nablus. Of course, when there are targeted warnings of an attack on the way, there are no dilemmas and IDF forces enter Nablus. Demands heard in Israel towards the army to crush the abilities of the new organization, and to arrest or eliminate terrorist operatives in Nablus, ignore the fact that a large part of the organization is characterized under a common idea and not under an institution.
To a large extent, the recent successes in the shooting attacks, the resonance and the extensive media exposure of the organization and of the new idea may become a more widespread phenomenon. An extensive operation in Nablus may have consequences that will lead to a security escalation in IOSH. Hence, at this stage in the security establishment, they believe that despite the recent attacks, it is not correct to announce or carry out an extensive operation in northern Samaria, nor in Nablus.
Much depends in the coming days also on developments on the ground, when security incidents and successful attacks will increase public and political pressure to expand military activity. There is agreement between the military and the political echelon that there is currently no room for a large-scale operation in northern Samaria, but the possibility of a significant escalation seems closer this time, when the escalation also continues in East Jerusalem.
Neutralizing a sea mine
Hezbollah is not the biggest beneficiary of the compromise agreement between Israel and Lebanon on the economic waters and the distribution of the profits in the Sidon-Kana reservoir between the parties. The agreement is first of all a distinct interest of both Israel and Lebanon. Hezbollah has traditionally opposed agreements between Lebanon and Israel, as they may restrict its steps and flexibility to use military force when it sees fit.
Peace between Israel and Lebanon has not broken out and there are no hints of normalization, especially when Lebanon is a bankrupt country, but an agreement that requires ongoing dialogue between Israel and Lebanon under American and French guarantee is far from being at the heart of Hezbollah’s interests.
Those who wish to disregard the guarantees provided by the US to Israel and the sponsorship it provides for the agreement, are invited to stand in line to waive the aid budget, the special security grants and the military alliance that is only getting tighter following the Abraham Accords.
Hizbollah admittedly appropriated an apparent achievement with some success, because due to its threats of escalation and the Israeli concern, the agreement was reached. To a large extent, Israel did indeed play into Hassan Nasrallah’s hands, when it claimed that one of the motives for quickly signing the agreement was fear of escalation. But even when Nasrallah can claim an intellectual achievement to his credit, in a long-term view, the removal of the naval mine from the heart of the conflict with Lebanon leaves Hezbollah with the well-known border disputes as a motive to continue fueling the conflict with Israel as someone who seeks to present himself as the defender of Lebanon, and this is a period in which he is not doing this with great success.
Even before Israel gets busy puffing up Nasrallah’s chest, when the discourse is clearly influenced by political campaigns on the eve of elections, it is better to remember that Nasrallah’s public approval of the agreement with Israel does not only express his satisfaction with the feeling of winning the gas lottery. Hezbollah understands that accepting the agreement stems from constraints that require it to prefer the interests of Lebanon over those of Iran, hence the limitations it has in using force.
Former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s claim that the gas money will lead to the strengthening of Hezbollah with rockets and missiles, is strange. Especially in view of the fact that for many years the negotiations were under his responsibility, and this argument never came up on his lips. It should be remembered that even without gas and apparent energy assets, Hezbollah has significantly increased the number of rockets and missiles since the Second Lebanon War, when for most of these years Netanyahu served as head the government.
The further claim that following the agreement Iran will be based in Rosh Hankara is already complete demagoguery. For years, Iran has been taking advantage of Lebanon’s dependence on it, including its energy sources. Lebanese energy independence is far from being part of Iranian economic or political interests.
The agreement with Lebanon appears to be reasonable for Israel as well, although the road to it was less reasonable. Even now, Israel’s sovereign water boundary line with Lebanon, which was previously determined by our unilateral status without international recognition and approval, was not recognized, but a compromise was reached establishing a status quo on the issue.
The agreement reached has a positive strategic potential for the future of the region and for increasing stability in it, but there is also nothing to celebrate. Not the way in which it was achieved, nor the timing of its approval, three weeks before the elections, when any relevant public discussion about it is doomed to failure.
In such a reality, it is no wonder that Nasrallah wrote down every counter statement heard from the political right in Israel that the agreement expresses an unconditional surrender to Hezbollah. Nasrallah has won from the impoverished with achievements that he does not deserve, when an irresponsible, demagogic and full of false details discourse elevates his status.
An agreement of this type, which provokes a very sharp debate in Israel, should have been signed after the elections, and not when the discussion turns into a political boxing ring. Those who in the past came to Netanyahu with allegations about political hijackers on the eve of elections, should remember that he claims to set other standards of state management and orderly decision-making.
tight schedules
The start of pumping from “Shark” is expected in the coming days. American pressure, a last chance with Lebanese President Michel Aoun, who will soon end his term of office, and a special security need, are the reasons presented by the political and security echelon as an explanation for the need for the rapid signing of the agreement.
In the end, no matter how you spin it, it was the fear of a security escalation vis-à-vis Hezbollah due to its threats against the background of the start of pumping from “Shark” that clearly stood as the dominant consideration in the decision making. The security establishment estimated with high probability that the start of pumping without an agreement would lead to an escalation. The idea of avoiding an unnecessary military confrontation is understandable, but the big question is why Israel needs to get back to the game of “chicken” that simulates two cars driving against each other on a collision course, with the winner being the one who continued to gallop without swerving the vehicle, while betting that his opponent will blink first.
From Israel’s point of view, the question is not why it was the first to turn the wheel to avoid a collision. This is not the first time and probably not the last. Under Netanyahu himself as prime minister, decisions were often made to curb a military response in order to avoid military confrontations with Hezbollah. This was the case when Israel refrained from eliminating the Hezbollah squad that had infiltrated the country’s territory with the aim of harming IDF soldiers in Mount Dov, or from killing casualties by the IDF with the approval of Prime Minister Netanyahu in other incidents, in order to provide Hezbollah with a sense of success in a revenge operation. Or even avoiding hitting a vehicle that launched rockets at an Israeli drone over the skies of Lebanon in 2019, in an event that has since changed the way the IDF operates drones in the region.
Israel was careful, in view of logical considerations of reluctance to war, to refrain from further events. The other side, the much weaker one, is no less deterred by war and understands its meaning very well, only that it succeeds time and time again in pitting the strong Israel against the weak on the road stage of the game of chicken, betting that Israel will be the first to turn the wheel.
But the economic water event is different. For years the data was known. The need to reach a settlement was known, but it faded away during negotiations that were conducted lazily for a decade. In a marvelous show of procrastination, Israel was pushed to sign an agreement only after explicit threats from Hezbollah to escalate security. The only thing that was presented on the eve of the signing is an agreement or a military confrontation. There are those in the political-security system who believe that a better agreement could have been reached before Nasrallah’s threats under the pressure of the start of the withdrawal from “Shark”.
To Yair Lapid’s credit, it can be said that the tight schedules converged in a funnel for the time of his tenure as prime minister in a transitional government. The start of pumping from “Shark” on the eve of elections was not a pre-selected timing. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett had more time to deal with the matter, and even more than both of them, Netanyahu had many years in which he could have brought about a much better agreement, according to him.
The claim that Lapid gave up more in the emerging agreement than Netanyahu is true, but on the other hand, the latter also did not solve the problem with an early agreement, which apparently would have greatly reduced the intensity of the latest saga. As prime minister in the past, he too saw the pragmatic importance of signing an agreement and also for Lebanon to have a gas rig as a security stabilizing factor.
A low order of priorities, other issues to deal with and failures in trying to reach understandings between the parties pushed the issue to the margins of the government’s work. Bottom line, Netanyahu, who claims today that a better agreement could have been achieved, did not prove it during his years when he was at the helm of the ship.
The agreement, as mentioned, is reasonable. The way to get to him with his back to the wall and under the threats of Hezbollah is much less, and the timing of the signing is very problematic. All of these are relevant and relevant issues for a legitimate public discussion, but from this to the deliberate distortion of professional concepts, claims of harming Israeli sovereignty while renouncing homeland rights when it comes to economic rights, demands for a referendum and accusations of selling the state – the distance is particularly large and cynical, even for Election days.