2023-10-10 01:59:30
The death of at least 700 Israelis in the Hamas attack makes Saturday the deadliest day in the country’s numerous conflicts, far surpassing the 317 killed on October 7, 1973, in the first 24 hours of the Yom War Kippur – which also began with the enemy achieving a surprise attack to great effect.
Unlike that conflict, when multiple attacks came from Arab states led by Egypt and Syria, what happened this weekend is not an existential threat to the Jewish state.
Hamas, along with other militias that may join the fight, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, are nowhere near a military rival to Israel. An alleged request made by the Taliban in Afghanistan to Iran to allow its fighters to transit to fight Israel is not going to change that balance, even if passage is granted.
But Benjamin Netanyahu’s government faces the most severe security crisis in decades, with the potential prospect of combat on two fronts, Lebanon and Gaza, as well as an escalation in the West Bank, where Palestinian militant groups such as the Jenin Brigade and the Lion’s Den They have already been involved in an increasing number of armed clashes with Israeli security forces.
The images of Hamas’ extraordinary assault, of fighters flying on paragliders to kill and kidnap, civilians being shot in the streets, kidnappings at a music festival and hostages parading in Gaza, have been a seismic shock to the system in Israel. The colossal failure of the country’s renowned intelligence system, which did not prevent Hamas from planning and arming for this operation for months, has been astonishing.
Along with the “humint” (human intelligence) of agents on the ground, communications in Gaza are monitored, as are the movements of people and vehicles on the border, with the most advanced sensors. Israel carries out regular airstrikes on the territory to ensure, it says, that Hamas and Islamic Jihad, another militant group, do not build up stockpiles of weapons such as missiles. A targeted assassination campaign of high-ranking militant figures would supposedly detect command and control. It was not the case.
What went wrong will be examined in the future by commissions of inquiry and will almost certainly lead to resignations and dismissals in the security hierarchy. The magnitude of the failure was summed up by Efraim Halevy, former Mossad chief, who acknowledged: “This attack was beyond imagination. “We didn’t know they had this many missiles and we certainly didn’t expect them to be as effective as they were.”
What happens now? The Israeli government formally declared that it is at war. Netanyahu promised “powerful violence,” threatened to reduce Gaza to “rubble” and told its residents to leave immediately, although it is unclear where they should go. There is now speculation that Israel will launch a large-scale ground offensive in Gaza, adding to the massive airstrikes already underway. But how effective will this be and what is the ultimate purpose?
I covered the 2014 Gaza war, far deadlier than any of the Gaza conflicts before or since, from inside the enclave. Israel sent ground forces along with Merkava tanks. It was a brutal affair. More than 2,205 Palestinians were killed, including 1,483 civilians, according to the UN, and 71 Israelis, 66 of them soldiers, in 50 days of fighting.
I remember subsequently speaking with Israel Defense Forces officers about the effectiveness of using infantry and armored vehicles in densely populated urban areas. Several expressed deep reservations and said that targeted Special Forces operations would have been much preferable.
What makes an all-out ground attack even more problematic this time is the presence of so many hostages in Gaza. There is always the danger of being injured or killed if caught in combat. Special Forces operations to rescue them are possible, although a challenging task, as they are likely to be held in different locations, including, possibly, hospitals.
The tense political and social climate in Israel, with emotions understandably running high, will help shape the nature and scope of the military mission. In the end, the 2014 offensive was limited on the advice of the military and intelligence services, who warned of mounting civilian losses and forces bogged down in months of attritional fighting.
Netanyahu, who was also prime minister at the time, ignored demands from hardliners in his cabinet, including Avigdor Lieberman, the foreign secretary, to reoccupy Gaza, reversing the 2005 unilateral withdrawal. .
The current coalition government is much more right-wing and there is likely to be a greater push for all-out war, it is argued. But Netanyahu has, in the past, shown an aversion to such overt military tactics and, with the backing of the security hierarchy, alarmed by current far-right ministers like Itamar Ben-Gvir, a more tactical and nuanced approach may emerge. .
Armed action is not the only course of punitive action available to Israel today. Energy Minister Israel Katz announced over the weekend that he had ordered the shutdown of Gaza’s power supply. And then he would follow the blockage of fuel and water.
These measures alone will not prevent the bloodshed to come; Too many things happened for that to be the case. In the gathering darkness, the most realistic hope is that the unfolding conflict does not spiral completely out of control.
* From The Independent. Special for PageI12.
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