The maritime border agreement with Lebanon: what are Netanyahu and Lapid actually arguing about?

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Let’s take them seriously. They are our leaders, and sometimes they deserve to be taken seriously. Or maybe we deserve to take them seriously. Either way, Yair Lapid and Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister and the leader of the opposition, returned to Twitter about an hour after Sukkot. Come back – each with their own tweet.
Lapid returned earlier, with this: “I strongly condemn the Russian attack on the civilian population in Kiev and other cities in Ukraine. I send sincere condolences to the families of the dead and the Ukrainian people.”

Netanyahu came back, a little later, with this: “Behind the backs of the citizens of Israel and the Knesset, Lapid and Gantz surrendered to Hezbollah’s blackmail. They are transferring strategic assets of the State of Israel to Hezbollah in the liquidation sale. Hezbollah will use billions from the gas to arm itself with missiles and rockets against the citizens of Israel, and Iran will position itself against Rosh Hankara and in front of Israel’s gas reserves.”

Two leaders, two tweets, two issues, seemingly different, actually not completely different. Of course, there are also political intentions behind them. This fact cannot be ignored, certainly not two weeks before an election. Lapid wants to deal with what is convenient for him, not what is convenient for Netanyahu. He is a world leader, whose head is in Ukraine. Netanyahu wants to attack what the government is doing. Good, not good, not important right now. After the elections, if and when he becomes prime minister, he will decide what to do regarding the agreement with Lebanon. Maybe even change his mind.

But it is not certain that he will change his mind. Netanyahu has reasons against the agreement, and he presents them. And we have already said, sometimes even cynical politicians deserve to be taken seriously. Lapid also of course has reasons, in his case he is in favor of the agreement, and he has the backing of the security system. Perhaps we should listen to the reasons of both of them, and not treat their every move as just an advance at the expense of the elections (among us, it’s hard to see a single voter changing her vote in a few days because of the signing of an agreement with Lebanon).

What are they actually arguing about? It seems that it is possible to reduce the debate to the big question about the standing of a liberal democracy against the aggression of tyrants and terrorists. Lapid commented on Russian aggression in Ukraine. A stiff response, from those who think it is necessary to stand up to the Russians and tell the truth about what they are doing; Netanyahu commented on Hezbollah’s aggression against Israel. A blunt response, from someone who thinks it is necessary to stand up to the Lapid government and tell the truth about what it is doing.

In both cases – they are right. Russia is an aggressor who has few brakes. Hezbollah is an aggressor that has few brakes. History proves that strength and aggression must be faced with strength. But this is only a general theory, which needs to be detailed according to the circumstances and cases. Perhaps we should return to the tweets of our leaders to deal with the circumstances and cases.

Putin compares and surpasses

A democracy in a military crisis is caught in a whirlwind from the moment the government loses the public’s trust. The Second Lebanon War and its results brought the end of Ehud Olmert’s career as an effective long-term prime minister. The Yom Kippur War hastened the end of the Labor Party’s hegemony in power. Failure has a price, and the price is charged at the polls. Dictatorships in crisis behave differently. At first, it’s easier for them.

Vladimir Putin was not required to think about his voters when he went to war, nor was he required to them when he sent them to the polling stations in the separatist provinces to announce independence. In a dictatorship, the voters do what the leader says, not the other way around. This gives the leader freedom of action that a leader does not have in a democracy, but exposes him to the risk of over-adventurism. This is what happened to the Russians: they went into battle for which they were not prepared, got involved, relied on false assumptions. One of them, that they will win quickly; Another one: that the weak West will not take counter-action. They were wrong on both counts. The Ukrainians fight admirably. The West reacted surprisingly. Not admirable, but not embarrassing either.

Everyone misjudged the West’s response. almost everyone. Putin himself was wrong, but so were many of us. And to make it clear who I’m talking about – I’ll look in the mirror. Here’s what I wrote last February: “Look back to 2014, when Russia invaded the Crimean Peninsula in the face of a flood of condemnations and sanctions. How long did it last? The answer: not long. The event was forgotten, and the peninsula remained in Russia’s hands. Will this continue to happen? In Ukraine? It’s a bit early to predict, but those who want to try are invited to examine three scenarios: one, the sanctions lead Russia to retreat and allow Ukraine to exist in independence similar to its independence before the war; second, a compromise is reached, the Russians leave Ukraine to its own devices, but in practice it becomes a distinct political migration of Moscow; the third, the Russians annex all of Ukraine and remain in control of it.”

Vladimir Putin (Photo: Sputnik/Gavriil Grigorov/Kremlin via REUTERS)

If you bet on the first scenario, it means that Putin made a mistake. If you bet on the second or third, it means that Putin achieved his goal, at least partially. Hand on heart, after we asked how much you care, how many of you are betting on the first script?

Not many bet on him. This is one of the reasons why the majority of Israelis opposed Israel’s full accession to the sanctions against Russia. They assumed Russia would win. They assumed that after she wins, she will be free to settle accounts with those who acted against her, and Israel has an interest in not opening accounts with Russia, whose forces are stationed in Syria. And actually, this should also be said, the script that is realized is not the first script. not for now. The sanctions did not lead Russia to retreat. The Ukrainian fighters, backed by Western precision weapons, forced the Russians into a partial retreat. But the end of the war has not yet come. And Putin, in the manner of leaders of his kind, in the manner of poker players who don’t have much to lose, decided to match and raise the bet amount. He does this in two ways: the threat of nuclear weapons, in order to deter the Western countries from increasing involvement; and destructive bombings inside Ukraine, in order to exact a heavy price from the Ukrainians and encourage them to compromise.

Faced with his decision, the rest of the countries stand at a crossroads that is familiar from previous events: whether to respond with more force, that is, to equalize and increase on their part as well, or to try to reach a compromise, that is, to give Putin something so that he can end the campaign without having to escalate it further. In such cases, it is customary to mention that the West often reacts with weakness and submission in the face of aggression. The West hopes that appeasement will calm the dictator. But it is worth mentioning that more often than not, the biggest mistake is precisely that of the aggressors. They recognize appeasement, and are confused to think that it will continue regardless of what they do. They think that every leader in front of them is a Chamberlain, and forget that sometimes Churchill comes too. Or Volodymyr Zelensky.

Eliot Cohen, who was a special advisor in the Bush administration, and is now the head of the important school of international relations at Johns Hopkins University, wrote this week that the fate of Putin’s regime will be like the fate of the Kerch Bay Bridge, which was bombed by the Ukrainians. This is an interesting claim, when compared to what Cohen – one of America’s most important researchers of military affairs – claimed in 2014, when Putin invaded the Crimean Peninsula. Here, he wrote at the time: “The chaos of Ukraine and the unusual history of Crimea provided the opening signal; Russian skill in the dark arts of provocation and covert operations provided the means; President Obama’s history of issuing warnings that, when adversaries ignore them, simply move on to the next issue – provided a kind of permission”.

And he also wrote about the invasion of Crimea: “The biggest issue here is whether Russia will continue to disrupt the post-Cold War order, including through the open use of force in Europe. In the absence of severe punishment – one that causes pain where Putin can feel it, including Russia’s economy, his personal wealth And his control of the country – the lesson that will be learned will be, ‘You can do it without getting hurt.'”

This week he wrote: “Dictatorships based only on fear and private interests are fragile things, and in Russia you can see the cracks.” What has changed since 2014? Ukraine is no longer chaotic, and it has a leader who managed to unite it. And in America there is another president, who was Barack Obama’s deputy, but does not behave like Obama. Not in this case. Joe Biden can be criticized in many areas, but his handling of this crisis may earn him a historic achievement. Faced with Putin raising the stakes, he refuses to blink. Be careful – but firm. Of course, all of this has not yet met the ultimate test of the realization of Putin’s threat to use nuclear weapons, a move that will destroy all the cards, a move that will raise the stakes to a height from which there is no return.

As in the days of the Cold War, the Americans are also dealing with such questions again: what will be done if and when. Is it nuke against nuke, or is it a widespread attack on strategic facilities of the Russians, but without a nuke?

Cohen draws encouragement from the fact that Putin did not receive a birthday greeting from Xi Jinping. “An especially significant symbolic distancing”, he calls this fact. Pulling the curtain on the support, with encouragement or silence, of countries like China and India will make it difficult for Putin to continue raising the bar. And on the other hand, it’s hard for him to take it down. Any downgrade endangers him, could lead to the end of his regime. Putin’s Russia encountered weakness, and decided to gamble on more power. Suddenly – she encountered a force. Why now and not before? It is not always easy to explain the thin line that runs between an informed bet and aggression that runs into a wall.

Lapid distributes the pot

Let’s return to Netanyahu’s tweet. He is right: Yair Lapid and Gantz surrendered to Hezbollah’s blackmail. at least to some extent. Whoever denies this claim does not live in reality. It is clear that Israel would have insisted on better terms, if the background of the negotiations with Lebanon had not also been the threat of Hezbollah. And on the other hand – there is such a threat. Taking him into account is not a fault, it is rational conduct. Conduct similar to “Netanyahu’s cautious and measured approach in managing foreign relations and security”, as described by Mazel Moalem in her new book “The Netanyahu Code”.

So why is Netanyahu attacking Lapid? You can say “it’s all about the elections”, but we promised to take Netanyahu and Lapid seriously. If we do this, the argument between them, in essence, looks like this. Lapid: We took everything necessary into account, including the threat of Hezbollah (but we won’t talk about that, so as not to appear to be giving in) and we came to the conclusion that with a few more meters in the sea, and a few more percent of pumping, it is not worthwhile for Israel to go to war. True, there is a certain surrender in the face of aggression, but Israel should not jump at every opportunity to go into battle. Battles also have a price, and risks must be managed.

Invasion of Ukraine? It justifies a firm stand, firm condemnation, and an uncompromising fight. That is why Lapid’s Israel stands by the Ukrainians a little more decisively than Naftali Bennett’s Israel. A hundred kilometers, or two hundred, of economic water? It’s not worth a war. This justifies a compromise, as long as it is a reasonable compromise.

So Lapid – and what about Netanyahu? He claims that the “Shark” settlement is the Crimean settlement. Those who are willing to compromise today, because of a threat from Hezbollah, and a little American pressure (the Americans want more gas, to neutralize Russia’s energy power), will find their opponent equal and superior in the next round.
Nasrallah thinks he won this round. If he thinks he won, that the bet on a threat paid off and provided results, that is bad for Israel. Because attackers like him don’t stop after a successful round, they try another round.

Nasrallah's poster (Photo: Reuters)Nasrallah’s poster (Photo: Reuters)

Is the compromise good for Israel? Obviously, there are clear gains that can be identified: the ability to pump without interruption, the ability to move forward to address other issues without an outbreak at the Lebanese border. This – in Netanyahu’s opinion – is a short-term vision. And he knows how to present precedents from the recent Israeli past. Israel withdrew from Gaza to solve a problem, and encouraged Hamas aggression. Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 to solve a problem, and encouraged aggression by the Palestinian Authority (in the Second Intifada) and by Hezbollah (in the Second Lebanon War). If you want to make a simple headline out of this, you can try this: Netanyahu thinks that Israel is behaving like Chamberlain – Lapid thinks that not every debate justifies militant conduct in the style of Churchill.

Data from the Data from the “HaMedad” website (Photo: Maariv Online)

Ask: Who is right? There is no and cannot be an answer to this. In principle – when faced with force, one must respond with force. In principle – when faced with force, one must react wisely. In principle – when faced with a dilemma, one should choose the better option. In principle – a problem that can be solved at a reasonable price should be solved. It may be that if Netanyahu were prime minister, he would choose to delay and insist. It was a choice that could be reasoned with. Lapid, as prime minister, chooses not to delay and less to insist. This is also a choice that can be justified. To use the established language of the court, both decisions are within the range of reasonableness. And it seems that the public as a whole understands this (not the angry tweeters on Twitter. I mean the rest of the public. Israelis who have lives, and use Sukkot for a vacation and to get away from the loudness of the political system).

This is one of the reasons why Lapid will not benefit politically from this agreement, except, perhaps, a shift of voters from within the bloc in his direction. This is one of the reasons why Netanyahu will not benefit politically from his attacks on this agreement. Except, perhaps, a shift of voters from within the bloc in his direction.

And to return to politics, of course the government is not an ordinary government. This is an election eve government. But the opponents of the government, who are well-known governance enthusiasts, will be forced to admit that such a government is also supposed to make decisions, including decisive ones. And on the other hand, the government’s supporters, who insist that they are allowed, will have to admit that they would have reacted a little differently if the Netanyahu government, on the eve of the elections, had announced the annexation of 800 kilometers in dispute. This should also be said: intellectual honesty is a rare commodity in the political arena, and such honesty on the eve of elections is a commodity that has run out of the market. The opponents of the agreement are right: it is a kind of hijack. The supporters of the agreement are right: the criticism of them is far from factual.

Where do we go from here? Here is the almost self-evident: Netanyahu’s early announcement that he will not honor the agreement is nonsense. He will not be able not to respect an international agreement signed under American auspices. Perhaps he is doing this to emphasize that this is a debate about “giving up territories”, which is convenient for him in the run-up to election day. Either way, who would have believed that even on the eve of these elections, Israel would engage in the old debate about territories in exchange for an agreement – just not exactly the same territories and not exactly the same agreement.

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