The Military Campaign in Gaza: Problems, Failures, and Solutions – Reflecting on Operation Tzuk Eitan

“These, then, are the problems of the military campaign in Gaza: an aerial campaign whose effectiveness is questionable; deficient intelligence on several key issues, chief among them the intentions of the enemy and his command and control; The cost and benefit, the main result of which was enormous environmental destruction, which has a heavy international price. All of these pale, of course, in front of the lack of political goals, which resulted in the operation not bringing about any real change in the situation.”

I wrote these things in 2015, in a book called “The Courage to Forever”, about Operation “Tzuk Eitan”. The Prime Minister was Benjamin Netanyahu, the Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, the Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs at that time are today the heads of the opposition, the one who was the Minister of Defense often appears as a commentator in studios. And in the days when the days of the war in Gaza reach exactly double the days of that operation, you could say the same words about her , one by one – except that in the first days of the ground operation, when the IDF did what a modern, protected and firepower army knows how to do (advance and occupy territory) it looked different; But what the army has been doing for a month is “solid rock”, Bull. Everything else, of course, has not changed a millimeter. And how will it change, if the people are the same people and the thinking is the same thinking.

After 102 days, we are based in shuffling and despondency. Shuffling, because the fighting in Gaza is not being waged to achieve any goal but mainly so that it does not stop – even though the army and its mouthpieces, as in every war in the last 40 years, explain to you that in a little while, a little more force and maybe a five kilo hammer, and the light will break out at the end of the tunnel.

Worse than that is the political failure: the stubborn refusal to frame the entire war in the context of a regional confrontation against the Iranian axis of resistance, the victory of which will only be achieved if there is a partnership with countries in the region led by the United States and with the participation of the Palestinian Authority. This refusal not only prevents us from achieving the goals of the war in Gaza, but inevitably degenerates us into a major campaign in Lebanon, the results of which will be devastating, and Israel’s confrontation alone against the Axis, in which we simply cannot win.

The despondency stems from the issue of the abductees. Israel’s refusal to continue the previous deal, with the absurd reasoning of “If we agree to return men before women, we will give up the women”, and without realizing that this is not about the principles of a POW deal, but about literally saving lives, brings an unprecedented tragedy closer every day: they They just won’t come back. There is a danger that the fate of many of them will not be known. Such a betrayal by the state, the citizens it irreparably abandoned on October 7, will break the backbone of the unwritten contract between it and its citizens. For such a country, citizens in the people’s army will not go out to fight, and it doesn’t matter how many times they are told about existential danger.

When the solution becomes a problem

Before the ground operation began, I wrote here that it was necessary and committed, but it should be clear that by itself it will not achieve the goals of the war – the removal of the security threat posed by Hamas to the residents of Israel, the creation of a situation that will ensure (as much as possible) that it will not return and that no one will grow in its place, the safe return of as many of the abductees as possible and information solid on the fate of the others. Such goals have never been achieved in a military operation by itself. Anyone with sense and some historical knowledge knew this; But what are logic and knowledge compared to the considerations of politics, the narrow horizons and the lust for redemption of those responsible for the biggest failure in the country’s history.

In the wars of our time, the occupation of territory and its long-term possession threaten to turn from a solution into a problem, as happened to Israel in Lebanon and the Americans in Iraq; You need to know when to change a pattern of action, to leave most of the area and prepare for defensive lines, and which ones to conduct a prolonged war of attrition, which will prevent the enemy from returning and growing – and by the way, the defensive line that we really needed to capture, the Philadelphia axis, we did not capture because of the linear thinking and the lack of imagination of the military command, and now We will not be caught because of Egypt’s resistance in the face of the danger that a million refugees in Rafah will flow into its territory.

Israel should fight according to its capabilities and strengths, and not conduct a military operation as if we have all the time, means and people in the world, and then discover to our astonishment that we have neither this nor these: time works against us if we continue in the same vector, the armaments run out and we are dependent on the United States In the most essential items for combat, the reserves are not an infinite resource but a depleting resource – especially when an opaque command and an uncomprehending political echelon take them for granted.

And above all, the right security act is only part of a whole political picture, which is not “the day after” but a war goal to which every act must lead. But in Israel there is no such thinking. Netanyahu’s political considerations, the brain troubles of the security system, the media’s squeamish obedience and the lack of any conceivable alternative guarantee that there won’t be.

So what can be done to get out of the mud

lead to a deal for the release of hostages, including a “big” deal that would include a cessation of hostilities and the release of prisoners, and would result in a ceasefire for several months.

If such a deal is not possible, prepare now for the defense lines inside the Strip, establish the security perimeter of the day after, stop the brutal and high-casualty pursuit of shafts and tunnels, and act on intelligence to prevent the recovery of Hamas and pursue its leadership.

In exchange for a “small” abductee deal (adults, sick, women and wounded – all alive of course – and reliable information about the fate of the dead) to allow the return of residents, as controlled as possible, to the north of the Gaza Strip, and to begin a process of rehabilitation there through international organizations, local leadership and officials Gazans of the Palestinian Authority, while assuring the United States and the regional partners that Israel intends to discuss with the unified Palestinian entity, to be established after reforms in the Palestinian Authority and stabilization in Gaza, a two-state solution.

Steps 2 and 3 will also create legitimacy vis-à-vis Egypt for the creation of a security regime, including Israeli forces, on the border of the Gaza Strip with Egypt, in order to prevent the re-arming of Hamas.

To act together with the United States and partners in the region (Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Jordan and Egypt) to create a coalition that will be a counterweight to the axis of resistance led by Iran and will lead to the withdrawal of Hezbollah to the north and the curbing of its threat to Israel. At the same time, to prepare for the campaign in Lebanon under conditions favorable to us.

If the “big” deal in section 1 is realized, to prepare the political and military ground for a quick operation that will stabilize the lines detailed here (Perimeter, Philadelphia) in a few months, from which to continue the hunt for the leaders and capabilities of Hamas in an ongoing manner, until it is decided.

To go to the elections in Israel, centered on real alternatives for our future here.

To begin the process of rebuilding our economy, army and society and strengthening our international status.

It is not too late to get out of the shuffle and discouragement and realize the goals of the war. For this we must first recognize what and why we failed and got stuck, stop hitting the wall and start thinking differently.

>>> Ofer Shelah is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies

Did you find a language mistake?