Politics, especially the leadership of a party, is not a simple first-degree equation. Until September 2, 2023, and the ongoing Congress of SYRIZA, Stefanos Kasselakis was just an unknown factor submitting a candidacy for the presidency without being measurable. Since then, he has become a player in a complex intra-party condition with changing parameters, functions, and derivatives.
Polakis and the First Signatures
Apart from his fellow Chaniote, Pavlos Polakis, who had already begun to appear alongside him in person or via associates, no one had revealed intentions to support him by that morning. The thirty signatures collected to approve, at the last moment, his participation in the race for the leadership revealed his initial “allies.” Among them were Giorgos Tsipras, Theodora Tzakri, and Eleni Avlonitou.
Subsequently, an experienced “staff chief” and excellent “captain,” Admiral Evangelos Apostolakis, joined them. He was the one who ensured that Kasselakis had access to Makronisos by participating in the spot he created in the blood-soaked lands.
Pavlos Polakis worked as his backstage guide, undoubtedly contributing with his mechanisms to his election after the two rounds of the internal battle. In the meantime, the inability to coexist with the Umbrella trends and the 6+6 that spoke of post-politics focused exclusively on image and for a plan without beginning, middle, and end became apparent. Automatically, Euclid Tsakalotos, along with the old, radical guard, sided with Efi Achtsioglu and the governmental generation of those in their 40s.
The Alliance with Papas and the Opponents Who Left
Of course, at the same time, Stefanos Kasselakis found in Nikos Papas a “sub-general” he needed to remain first and to protect the secured difference. The agreement that preceded and embraced them after the announcement of the result marked the start of a fairly close cooperation of mutual support that was validated in the choices of sector leaders and the distribution of key roles.
Through this, Stefanos Kasselakis managed to penetrate the parliamentary group of SYRIZA, represented by Socrates Famellos. Kasselakis chose to keep the Thessaloniki MP in his position after their first introduction, meeting another open door to parliament.
In general, a fairly large section of party officials, among them those who traditionally identified with Alexis Tsipras, seemed to accept Kasselakis’ election and give him time to adapt to his new duties. Even when, at the dramatic Central Committee of November, the new president raised his tone against those who publicly described him as Trump or Grillo, demanding with disgust their expulsion, there were quite a few faces that did not respond negatively to the inevitable “divorce” with comrades. They understood that this coexistence would lead to a deadlock, so they themselves did not impede it.
When Kasselakis Lost Polakis
The rift that occurred within SYRIZA, which ultimately led to the “birth” of the New Left (with seats in parliament), began to widen from early 2024. After a question of party discipline was raised regarding the voting on the bill for the marriage of same-sex couples, but later there were no sanctions for Pavlos Polakis, “leaks” from the strong presidential bloc began.
The same MP from Sfakia did not view the criticism he received favorably and began to rethink his choice. He blamed Kasselakis for misguided maneuvers, but initially, his stance was mainly defensive. On the other hand, Dionysis Tempboneras and his companions, who had expressed reservations early on while maintaining their autonomy, took their own initiatives in the center-left space.
The First “Point” at Tsipras
A fatal, according to many, arrogant mistake of the president was sending a questionnaire to the members of isyriza to investigate reactions and collect conclusions, which even included potential changes to the name or symbol. In this case, it seemed that Kasselakis was attempting the “storming” of a party that he found and did not create himself.
The polls of that period showed SYRIZA quite low in percentages, and its leader, betting on a direct connection with the base, seemed to want to break free from the past, planting roots in fresh soil. He was cultivating a climate of disconnection from anything old and charting a new course. Within and outside the organs, the first serious reservations about the change of direction emerged. Ragkousis, Zachariadis, and Theoharopoulos did not remain indifferent, expressing a part of the center-left wing.
Who Helped Kasselakis at the Congress
The February Congress confirmed that the internal party blocs had shifted and changed their stance entirely. From the moment the -invisible- Alexis Tsipras intervened, calling for a return to the polls, a huge wave of questioning arose against his successor. The trigger was what the former prime minister developed, and those who had for a reasonable period left him unassailable suddenly found themselves against him. Olga Gerovasili declared her candidacy, and the informal bras de fer with the Tsipras group would cast doubt on Kasselakis’ future on the 7th floor of Koumoundourou.
The “triumvirate” of N. Papas, S. Famellos, G. Tsipras, proposing the compromise solution of keeping Kasselakis in the presidency at least until the European elections, offered him a friendly “lifeline” at a time with incalculable consequences. The three chose to maintain the internal party balances and not allow SYRIZA to be dragged into a new internal conflict of attrition. Essentially, Kasselakis was “cashing in” on his good relationship with the three of them before ultimately encountering -at least two of them- in a knife fight.
Striking Cleansings
The first, after he had replaced him as director of the Parliamentary Group handing the baton to Thanos Moraitis, dismissed him from his advisory role in Parliament, triggering his explosion (as he had other issues on his mind), while he relieved the second, long after what he had in mind, from responsibilities as president of the Parliamentary Group to appoint the new Niko Papas.
These were two of the striking and sweeping changes that from early March Kasselakis imposed on the party’s organizational chart, sometimes abruptly. Previous replacements had occurred in various key offices within Koumoundourou, mainly in the economic sector, but also a “reshuffling” of sector heads with Polakis being “dismissed.”
Meanwhile, Kasselakis had definitively “lost” Deputy Secretary George Vasiliadis, who after the congress handed in his portfolio, responding to constant accusations of leaking practices from the meetings of the organs. He was forced to remain solely with the secretary Rania Svingou in such a decisive role in view of organizing the European ballot.
The “Extra-Party” Allies and the End of the Truce
The pre-election campaign showed that the president of SYRIZA has built his own base on the “ground floor” of SYRIZA. At the same time, he found allies in areas foreign to the party (Ev. Antonaros, Ar. Spiliotopoulos, Kat. Papakosta). Allies who are available to be activated in the stage of Kasselakis’ counteroffensive.
The major problem for him was internal. And if the three-month truce, until the fall of SYRIZA in the electoral result was confirmed, calmed the “anti-Kasselakis” current, the low 14.9% activated every pocket of his. As did the words or actions of the president.
Christos Spirtzis, one of Kasselakis’ sworn internal “enemies”, first raised the battle flag against the leadership. Tough language on one side and threats for expulsion on the other. The Central Committee in early July would show that SYRIZA was cut in two, especially after the presidential ideas for sweeping changes to the statutes, and there was no turning back, even though some, now few in number, struggled to share the spoils equally. Giannis Dragasakis’ departure from the party overall was another wound for the presidential group.
Who “Brought Down” Kasselakis
After August 15 and the return to the daily routine of the party, nothing was the same anymore. The expulsion of Pavlos Polakis from the Parliamentary Group at the end of July divided rather than benefited the president’s profile. It definitively destroyed any form of communication between the Cretan MP and the leadership side, although before 40 days had passed, it was lifted as a mistake that needed to be corrected.
Stefanos Kasselakis was vulnerable within the organs and, as it turned out, unable to control the Central Committee, which at the end of the two days withdrew its confidence in him, declaring him deposed. His proposal even forced some who were considered “neutral” to vote in favor of the motion of censure. Of course, the bloc of 87 (Gerovasili, Flambouraris, Notopoulos, Ragkousis, etc.) was organized to continually increase its strengths.
As it turned out, the update of the alliance with Nikos Papas was not enough. He himself expressed discontent, eventually critiquing the president’s style from the floor of the Central Committee. Even though he disagreed with the recourse to the polls, he spoke of the respectable result of a democratic and statutory procedure. Nor did Rena Dourou “protect” him openly, only asking for unity within the faction.
Nonetheless, Kasselakis still has steady supporters in the Parliamentary Group (Apostolakis, Tzakri, Kasimati, Petros Papas, Akrita, Christidou, etc.), as well as within prefectural/local organizations. This is an element of significance that affects the next step he will ultimately decide to take after the confirmation of his deposition from the Political Secretariat late Thursday night.