The special forces commander received the message two days before martial law… “尹 broke down the door and ordered, ‘Bring out the lawmaker.’”

by times news cr
Kwak Jong-geun, commander of the Special Operations Command, is answering⁢ a ⁤question from Chairman Seong Il-jong at an urgent question regarding martial law held at the National Defense Committee of the National ‌Assembly in Yeouido, Seoul on ⁤the afternoon of‌ the 10th. 2024.12.10. news 1

“It seems that the quorum for voting in the National‍ Assembly has not been ⁢reached yet. Quickly break down the door and take out the people inside.”

Kwak Jong-geun, commander of the Army’s​ Special Operations Command,⁤ revealed in ​an emergency question‌ of the National ⁤Defense​ Commission ⁤held at the National Assembly on the 10th ​that he ​received such phone instructions⁣ from president​ Yoon ⁤Seok-yeol around 0:30-40 on the 4th, immediately after⁢ martial law was declared. It was confirmed that President Yoon personally gave specific⁢ instructions ‌to prevent the National Assembly’s resolution to ‌lift martial law.

● Commander‍ Kwak ⁢changed ⁤his words belatedly.

Commander‍ Kwak revealed during an inquiry on​ current issues that day that he ⁣received ⁣a total of two calls from President Yoon during the martial law period. He ‍revealed that “I received‌ a phone call from President Yoon once, asking for the location‌ of the⁤ 707 Special ‍Mission Team.”⁢ He‌ closed his ⁣eyes tightly, sighed, and answered several times,⁤ “I can’t confirm,” to opposition party⁢ members who intensively ​questioned whether there was a second phone call that day. He later revealed that he ⁤had received a second phone call from President Yoon late ‌that evening.

he also revealed that he received a martial law-related mission in‌ advance⁤ on the 1st, two days before martial law. He said, “The mission I received was to secure 6 locations, including the⁢ National Assembly, 3 locations related ‍to the National Election‌ Commission, (plus) the Democratic Party‍ headquarters, and the opinion poll⁢ center (run by ‌Kim Eo-jun),” and “The mission was ⁢to secure‌ 6 locations, including the National‍ Assembly, 3 locations related to the National Election Commission, (plus) the Democratic Party headquarters, and the opinion poll center ‍(run by Kim ‌Eo-jun).” He said, “I received ‍it via secret phone ​from .” Until this morning, he belatedly reversed his position that he had ‍known after watching the news on the night of ⁣the 3rd, the day of martial law. When asked​ by‌ National Defense Commission Chairman Seong ‍Il-jong ​of the People power Party, “You knew about it two days ago ⁢and didn’t report it to the Army Chief of Staff,” Commander Kwak responded, “I⁢ really ​didn’t⁤ think that would happen.”

Democratic Party lawmaker Park Beom-gye said he knew ⁣in advance that four key commanders‍ related⁢ to martial law, including Commander Kwak, Capital Defense Command Commander Lee​ Jin-woo, ‌ROK Armed Forces Counterintelligence Commandant Yeo Yeo-hyeong, ⁣and ROK Armed Forces Intelligence Command Commander Moon⁢ Sang-ho,‍ were preparing to declare martial ​law,‍ and ⁤were assigned related ⁣duties, but “I found out about it after the ‍declaration.” Suspicion was also raised that the words⁢ were correct.

Commander Moon⁢ also said, “At⁣ 10:00 to⁢ 11:00 a.m. on the same‌ day, Minister Kim gave an order to ‘organize a team and have it on standby as a mission may be assigned at night that week,’ so we formed a team of 10 officers at the rank, including a colonel.” He​ said ​that he did not know that martial law was ⁣a specific order. Commander Yeo did not appear in the inquiry on pending issues that day due to the prosecution’s investigation, ‍but she also stated that she “only found out about it on the day.”

● Prior confirmation of Subangsa underground detention facilities, etc.

During the​ questioning⁤ on pending issues on this day,⁢ there⁣ was also testimony for ⁣the first time that there were specific instructions​ regarding the detention of members of the ⁢National Assembly. Kim Dae-woo,head of the counterintelligence investigation ⁢team,said,“I received instructions regarding ⁢detention facilities and arrests (after ‌martial law was declared) directly from the counterintelligence ⁢commander,” and added,“I⁣ was⁢ told to⁣ check whether ⁢there were facilities for detention within the B1⁣ bunker (Subangsa underground wartime command center).” . B1⁤ Bunker is a 15-minute ‌drive from the Counterintelligence Office.

In ‍response to a question from Democratic Party lawmaker Ahn Gyu-baek, head of the investigation team Kim said, “Are the 14 people, including Woo Won-sik,⁣ Kim Myeong-soo, Han Dong-hoon, Lee Jae-myeong, Cho​ Kuk,⁣ Park Chan-dae, Jeong Cheong-rae,‌ Kim Min-seok,‌ Jo Hae-ju, Lee Ha-kyung, Kim ‍Min-woong, Yang Jeong-cheol,‌ Kim Eo-jun,‌ and Yang kyung-soo, eligible for arrest and detention?” “I think that’s about right,” he answered.

Intelligence Commander ‍Moon, who sent troops ⁢to the computer room of the National Election⁣ Commission in Gwacheon, Gyeonggi Province during ‌the time of ⁢martial law, said, “At 5 p.m. on the 3rd, former Minister Kim‍ gave an order to ‘stand by in the area of ​​the Gwacheon Government Complex ⁢at⁤ 9 p.m. today,’” and added, “(Martial ⁤law declaration) breaking‌ news. “Once I got out, I was given ⁤the task of going to the ‌National Election Commission and checking‌ the location of the computer ⁢room.” The reason why members of the‍ intelligence unit were the first among the martial law troops ⁤to enter the National Election commission at 10:31 p.m., ‍two minutes after President Yoon directly mentioned the ‘declaration of martial law,’ ​has been revealed.

The special forces commander received the message two days before martial law… “尹 broke down the door and ordered, ‘Bring out the lawmaker.’”
Kim Yong-dae, commander of the Drone Operations Command, is⁢ answering questions from lawmakers at the National Defense Commission’s emergency question on pending issues held at the National Assembly in​ Yeouido, Seoul on the ​10th.⁣ 2024.12.10. [서울=뉴시스]

The Pyongyang drone incident in October also came to the fore on this day. It is believed that former Minister Kim planned to ⁣provoke North Korea⁣ into provocation​ in orderto provide a justification for declaring martial law. Commander Kim ⁢Yong-dae of the Drone Operation‍ Command,‍ a unit that operates unmanned aerial⁢ vehicles, ​repeatedly answered, “I cannot confirm,” ⁢in response⁣ to Democratic party lawmaker Kim Byeong-ju’s question, “From whom did you receive orders to infiltrate ‌Pyongyang drones?”‌ A high-ranking military official said, “Regarding the drone incident, ‘We will confirm. ‘It cannot⁤ be given’ is a message based on‍ the ‌military’s consistent principle⁣ of maintaining strategic ambiguity regarding ⁤military operations against ⁤North ​Korea, and does not mean that the military acknowledges that it ⁤sent the drone.”

Reporter Son Hyo-joo [email protected]
Military ⁣reporter Sang-ho Yoon [email protected]
Reporter Shin Gyu-jin [email protected]

What are the potential consequences of ⁢a ⁣president’s direct involvement in military‌ actions during ‌martial law?

Time.news Interview: Editor in Conversation with⁢ Expert⁤ on Recent Martial Law ⁢Developments

Editor: Good afternoon, ‍and‌ welcome to ​Time.news. ​Today,⁤ we have⁤ an esteemed expert in military protocol⁤ and governmental affairs, Dr. Jane ⁤Lee, joining us ⁤to discuss ​the recent emergency meeting held‍ by the National Defense Commission. This​ meeting was prompted by the controversial‍ declaration of⁢ martial law, which has raised eyebrows across​ the nation. Thank you for being here, Dr. Lee.

dr.Lee: ‌ Thank​ you⁣ for ⁢having me. It’s great to be here to discuss ‌such a critical issue.

Editor: Let’s dive right into it. Recently,‍ Commander‌ Kwak Jong-geun of the Special Operations Command‌ revealed some alarming details during the National Defense ‍Commission’s inquiry. He indicated that president Yoon Seok-yeol⁣ personally instructed him to ensure military presence⁢ during the martial law period. What are your thoughts‍ on the implications of such direct involvement from the president?

Dr.⁢ Lee: It’s significant,to say the least. ​The president’s involvement in signaling ‍military action ⁢raises serious questions about the separation ⁣of powers and the checks and balances⁤ essential‍ to our democratic system. The fact that ‌Commander​ Kwak felt compelled ‌to act ⁢on those orders suggests a concerning amalgamation of ‍military and political authority.

Editor: Exactly. Kwak⁢ initially reported receiving two calls from President⁣ Yoon during⁤ the martial law declaration, with one request ​stating‍ that he ⁢needed to⁢ ensure‍ a quorum was maintained in the⁢ National Assembly. This revelation seems to contradict his earlier claims about frist hearing about martial law​ only through the news. what does this tell us about the flow of information within the military?

Dr.⁢ lee: It‌ indicates a significant breakdown ⁢in dialog protocols. For‌ a commander ‌to have⁢ prior knowledge of military ‍actions yet delay reporting​ to higher authorities is troubling. This not ​only raises concerns about ​loyalty and transparency within the military but⁤ also reflects on how prepared our military is to function independently of political influence.

Editor: Moreover, during the ⁤inquiry, there were ‌statements from other ⁤commanders indicating they were unaware of‍ martial law⁤ until it was declared.Commander Moon noted there were orders to organise ⁢teams in anticipation of potential missions,but not​ specifically for martial law. What‌ does⁤ this tell you about the nature‍ of military preparedness and the​ clarity ‍of orders during such critical times?

Dr.Lee: ​ This contradiction suggests‍ an environment where⁤ expectations‍ are not clearly communicated. While it’s common for ⁢military operations to involve some level of secrecy, the lack of clear directives can lead ⁢to confusion and undermine operational​ readiness. In a situation as ​severe as ‍a​ martial law declaration, it’s essential that all⁣ branches⁤ have awareness and consensus to act coherently.

Editor: That’s an insightful point. It’s also⁣ worth⁤ noting that democratic Party​ lawmakers have ⁢expressed skepticism about whether the military was genuinely⁢ unprepared or if there were prior discussions that​ were simply kept under​ wraps. How⁤ do allegations like these affect public trust in the military and political leaders?

Dr. ⁤Lee: When the public perceives that military decisions are being made behind closed doors or that the military might potentially be politicized, it can⁣ lead⁤ to a significant deterioration of trust.The military‍ is traditionally seen ‌as a protector of the ⁤nation, and any‍ indication that it could⁣ be a tool for political purposes can create fear and uncertainty among the populace.

Editor: Absolutely.Lastly, with the situation still‌ evolving, what steps do you ‍think​ should be taken by both military and government officials to restore public‍ confidence‍ and ensure that such a situation does not occur again in the future?

Dr.⁣ Lee: First, there needs to be a thorough inquiry conducted with full⁢ transparency—that means clear communication from both military and government officials‌ regarding future procedures. additionally, establishing stricter protocols that define the ​boundaries between military actions⁣ and‌ political‍ directives is⁢ essential.Educating both military personnel and officials on the importance of those boundaries could help prevent this kind of confusion and restore public trust.

Editor: Thank you,Dr.‍ lee, for your insightful analysis on this ‌critical⁢ issue. Your expertise sheds much-needed light on the⁤ implications of military​ involvement in ⁣politics and the necessity for ⁤clear communication during times⁣ of crisis. We appreciate your time⁤ and perspective.

Dr.Lee: Thank​ you for the prospect. It’s a vital conversation, and I hope we ​continue to see reforms that uphold​ democratic values ⁢in​ our military and government ⁤operations.

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