The message of the head of the CIA concerning the fear of the outbreak of a third intifada is also the message of the security establishment to the government, according to which we are getting closer to a dramatic security escalation in Judea and Samaria.
The IDF announced: the apartment of the terrorist who carried out the attack in Neve Ya’akov will be destroyed
The past week was marked by the leadership of a pragmatic and moderate line by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Galant, in an attempt to neutralize landmines and try to curb the escalation trends. Also to their right, in religious Zionism and Jewish power, the ministers were asked to line up. The eviction of Khan al-Ahmar was postponed, despite the statements, the Shavas conducted a settlement dialogue with the leaders of the security prisoners in the prisons, and the apartment building in East Jerusalem was not evacuated.
In other words, the current government took a series of actions in order to calm the area, which if they had taken place during the previous government, would have been strongly condemned by the ministers of the current coalition. However, it is not recommended to rush and declare that Smotrich and Ben Gvir went a little backwards.
The substantial difficulties in implementing the coalition agreements regarding Bezalel Smotrich’s powers over the Civil Administration, and above all the clear message from the Americans that they will show no tolerance for unilateral Israeli actions, including new construction in the Territories, are already foreshadowing the political explosive charges on the way.
The issue of construction in the territories and the expansion of settlements appears to be Netanyahu’s main minefield, in the form of entanglement with the Americans, or a threat to the stability of his coalition. In front of the Americans, Netanyahu wants to make it clear that there is no change in Israeli conduct and policy in the territories, while in front of the ministers on the right he commits to the changes he promised in the agreements with them. He will have to withdraw from one of the two promises.
In Judea and Samaria, the days after Abu Mazen are already here. In contrast to William Burns, the head of the CIA, who said in a speech at Georgetown University that the tense situation on the ground reminded him of the eve of the second intifada, the security establishment does not yet talk about concepts of a third intifada, but holds a similar position that the potential for another dramatic escalation in the field is high Much more than it was in past years. In preparation for the Ramadan period, which begins at the end of next month, the top of the IDF believe that this time the angle of entry into the tense month of the year is particularly sharp and dangerous.
Burns, beyond his official position, is considered by the senior members of our security establishment to be a first-class professional with extensive experience and knowledge in all matters related to the Middle East, Israel and the Palestinians. Besides his previous role as US Ambassador to Jordan, Burns served as Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs in the US administration.
Burns’ speech was not intended only for an intellectual lecture at the university and a demonstration of knowledge on the subject of the Middle East. It seems that this is a poignant message that the Americans chose to deliver publicly first of all to the Israeli government and perhaps also to the Palestinians, regarding approaching the brink of an abyss, a violent conflict from which it will be very difficult to return. Such a harsh statement, which almost predicts the outbreak of another intifada in the territories, has not been uttered by an American official for many years, certainly not in this sharp manner.
Burns formulated his picture of the situation after the meetings he held here in Israel. In the Central Command, the IDF and the Shin Bet, the semantics are different, and the concept of a third intifada, as mentioned, is not common. To a large extent, Burns is very close in his positions to those of the senior members of the defense establishment, with the head of the CIA largely basing his words on the reviews and conversations he conducted here with the senior members of the establishment.
Activity of IDF forces in Judea and Samaria (photo: IDF spokesperson)
Between the lines, the American message is clear and it was stated in the meetings held by key people in the American government and also in the talks they had here with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense. The tightening of cooperation, a joint campaign against Iran and peace with Saudi Arabia cannot exist together with a significant escalation in the territories and American dissatisfaction regarding Israeli policy in Judea and Samaria.
The postponement of the eviction of Khan al-Ahmar, the curbing of Ben Gabir’s intentions to evacuate the illegal building in Wadi Kadum in the Silwan neighborhood in East Jerusalem, and the dialogue and agreements reached – despite our statements – between the Shin Bet and the leaders of the security prisoners in the Israeli prisons, illustrate the Israeli internalization of the American position , which requires a pragmatic and moderate policy, which is not fundamentally different from the same policy conducted by the previous government which the prime minister harshly criticized.
four central vectors
After weeks in which to a large extent the loose conduct of ministers in the government dictated the agenda and heated up the decrees, this week was marked by an attempt, at least outwardly, to reduce the gaps in the debate within the government and converge on the policy that the prime minister wishes to lead in the political-security field. All this is true until the next crisis that is expected to develop around the issue of construction in the settlements.
From a publication in the “time” newspaper this week, it appears that the Minister of Finance asked the leaders of the Yesha Council to act in their area so that no new illegal outposts are established. On the other hand, he made it clear at the beginning of his faction’s meeting that the government is committed to the regulation and development of settlements and the establishment of new settlements. This matter will be difficult for Netanyahu To provide in the face of the American pressure which demands to avoid unilateral measures.
This is a constant tension that every government in recent years has had to deal with. The decisions of the Supreme Planning Committee regarding construction in the settlements are always approved by a senior politician and discussed with officials in the US. This tension was resolved by the previous government so that, alongside construction in the Jewish settlements, Palestinian construction in Area C was approved.
Netanyahu, most likely, will not freeze construction in the territories as he did in the past during the Obama administration, and he conveyed this message to the Americans. On the other hand, in view of the powers over the civil administration that have not yet been transferred to Smotrich and there is real difficulty in implementing them, the next political crisis is already at hand. Also on this issue it is clear that the Prime Minister will not be able to fully meet the commitments he gave to Smotrich – even if a mechanism is soon found that will increase the Prime Minister’s involvement in approving various issues related to the Civil Administration, as a kind of final arbiter between Gallant and Smotrich.
In this reality, even without further escalation in the Palestinian arena, the main weak point of the Netanyahu government in the security aspect may be Smotrich’s unwillingness to compromise on his ideological principles and his insistence on fulfilling all the promises made to him upon signing the coalition agreement.
Four main vectors are traditionally identified in the security establishment as catalysts for escalation: the first is a high death toll on the Palestinian side; The second is struggles over land in areas C; the third is security prisoners; And the fourth is pranks on the Temple Mount. All indicators identify negative trends in the security system that affect the area.
Since the beginning of the year, the Palestinians count 39 dead. From Israel’s point of view, the absolute majority of the dead are terrorists who carried out an attack or were killed in an exchange of fire with IDF forces in the refugee camps. From the point of view of the Palestinians, of course, the narrative is different and when the numbers are so high, this has something to teach about the situation on the ground.
The terror laboratory in Nablus (Photo: REUTERS/Raneen Sawafta)
For comparison, in the past year, which was also an exception, 160 Palestinians were killed. The figures from the beginning of the year are almost double and stand on average at about one Palestinian killed per day. Most of the Palestinians were killed during the IDF’s activity in the refugee camps. In this regard, Israel made it clear to the Americans that there would be no compromise and that the weakness of the PA and the security mechanisms required the IDF to operate in the refugee camps.
Any unusual event with many casualties is marked by the security establishment as a catalyst to increase the motivation to take revenge and carry out more attacks. Only hours after the terrorists were killed in the refugee camp near Jericho, a car explosion occurred in the refugee camp in Jenin. The identity of the operatives apparently associated with Hamas leaves the security establishment in no doubt that this is a work accident in the assembly of a car bomb that may have been intended to avenge the elimination of the organization’s operatives.
The security establishment estimates that Hamas will try to carry out revenge attacks in Judea and Samaria or on Israeli territory. Despite the high death toll in the organization’s ranks, no rockets were fired from the Strip. The security establishment was not surprised by this, since the escalation in IOS serves the goals of Hamas against Israel and against the Palestinian Authority, and this when its status among the Palestinian public in the West Bank is on the rise after the Wall Guard operation in Gaza.
As far as the Hamas leadership is concerned, now it is the Hegda’s turn to lead the resistance against Israel and a popular uprising. That is where the Hamas leadership directs its incitement efforts on social media and planning terrorist attacks. Hamas prefers that another military conflict in Gaza, if required, will only take place after the area has been cleared in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the cities involved in Israel.
find the balances
In the face of the growing trend of terrorism, the IDF will continue to operate in the refugee camps, and this, as mentioned, was also told to the Americans. However, in the other sensitive issues, including the Temple Mount, Area C and the security prisoners, the security establishment wants to lower the level of tensions and not light fires as it has done several times in the weeks The latter Minister Ben Gabir in East Jerusalem and the security prisons, precisely in the midst of security tensions.
Beneath the surface, the rage of the young Palestinians who do not trust the leadership of the Palestinian Authority and who believe that a violent uprising should return is flickering. To this must be added the complete disconnection at the political level between Jerusalem and Ramallah and the security coordination that is conducted in a very partial manner below the surface. This explosive cocktail may be manifested already in the coming month of Ramadan both in terrorist attacks and in a popular uprising, although as of now the Palestinian crowd is not taking to the streets.
In the security system, including the minister himself, they are trying to find the balances in the complexity to lower the level of pressure and release the economic pressure valves as much as possible. But when there is a complete disconnect between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, this becomes a particularly complex task. When there is no dialogue between the parties and at least officially there is no working relationship, the tools at the disposal of the security establishment to try to reduce the tension are very limited, hence the pessimistic assessments.
It is important to note that for years the security system has been warning of the deteriorating situation in the territories. The holiday period – Ramadan for Muslims and Passover for Jews – is almost always considered a test point for security stability. As every year, in the security establishment they are accused that the period will pass in relative silence