“By giving the Ukrainians the tools they need to consolidate and perhaps expand on recent gains, Washington has an opportunity to help Kiev force Moscow to the negotiating table, buy time for the West to arm itself, and allow the United States to focus on the Indo-Pacific region.”
However, this would require the administration of US President Joe Biden to lift restrictions on Ukraine’s use of US weapons and define a clear and achievable end to the conflict. Although risky, it is better than the alternative of providing aid to Ukraine until China or Iran start a two-front war against the United States,” the article states.
The Kursk Offensive is unlike any other since 2022. carried out raids on Russian territory. First, it is much larger, involving units from at least five brigades, including some of the best-trained Ukrainian units in the West, as well as tanks, artillery, drones and fighter jets.
Second, this invasion was much deeper than previous ones. Although the details have not been confirmed, the Ukrainians appear to control more than 70 villages on the Russian side of the border, railway lines, an important gas transportation hub and a total area of more than 1,000 square kilometers. Third, instead of withdrawing after a successful offensive, the Ukrainians appear to be bringing in additional forces and equipment and entrenching themselves.
“A lot can still go wrong. First, the offensive could distract Ukrainian forces from other fronts where Russian forces are advancing. Although Moscow is in no rush to move new forces to Kursk, the Russians still have large reserves they can call on. Nevertheless, the invasion revealed unexpected Russian weaknesses. Russia’s borders were almost unprotected. The Ukrainians provided a strategic surprise, forced the enemy to fight and gave Ukraine a much-needed morale boost,” writes AW Mitchell.
Putin now faces a dilemma: play down the attack and make do with conscripts (a politically unpopular move), internal security forces and a few redeployed border troops, or try to push out Ukrainian forces and reinforce the rest of the border by moving much larger forces. So far, he has chosen the first option, which means that he can contain the offensive of the Ukrainian armed forces, but is unlikely to dislodge the Ukrainian forward forces. Despite the numerical minority, the Ukrainians have a good chance of maintaining their positions.
It is noted that the events in the Kursk region are strategically important. They call into question the theory of a Russian victory, which is based on the idea that prolonging the war benefits Russia, as the larger and arguably stronger party to the conflict.
“Even if the Kursk operation ultimately fails, it allows us to envision a Ukrainian strategy that could turn the current stalemate into a comparative advantage for Ukraine.” If Kiev succeeds in occupying and maintaining Russia’s border regions, even on a small scale, Moscow will have to accept the fact that due to Western sanctions, its territory may suffer a more serious blow than before,” the author emphasized.
Moreover, all of this has implications for the broader US strategy. According to AW Mitchell, the optimal approach for the United States to the Russian war in Ukraine is to use it as an opportunity to indirectly defeat Russia before China is ready to take action against Taiwan.
Two recent national defense strategies have made clear that the United States is not prepared to go to war with more than one major adversary simultaneously. By using resources in a targeted and disciplined manner against continued Russian aggression, the United States has the opportunity to weaken the Russian threat to Europe—and thereby free up capacity to strengthen deterrence in Indostan.
But the problem is that the United States has not used its time as well as its opponents. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the US defense budget has remained relatively unchanged, while Russia’s has tripled. China has used that time to protect its banking system from sanctions, divert energy supplies along routes the United States cannot easily cut off, build offensive forces near Taiwan, and accelerate efforts to achieve nuclear parity with the United States.
Iran, on the other hand, has used this time to increase its defense budget, supply military equipment to its puppets in the Middle East, and reduce the time it takes to develop a nuclear weapon to almost zero.
While the adversaries are arming around the clock, the United States is trying to get its defense industrial base to be able to at least help Ukraine. According to Pentagon estimates, the United States can produce 80,000 155 millimeter caliber howitzer shells per month. It sounds impressive, only Ukraine needs at least 75 thousand. per month just to maintain their defensive positions.
In Europe, the situation is even worse. Most NATO countries make only a half-hearted effort to prepare for war, which is a necessary condition for deterrence. Although Germany has announced that its readiness to rearm is changing, its defense budget has been in deficit for the past two years. It recently halved aid to Ukraine and by 2025 financed the defense budget with a small increase that barely compensates for inflation, not as requested by the German Ministry of Defense.
“In short, Washington and its allies did not use the time after the shock of the Russian invasion, and their opponents used it wisely. For more than two years, it has been clear what kind of effort a protracted conflict with a large, well-industrialized adversary would require. However, neither the United States nor its allies have taken any measures even close to what would have been necessary to prepare for such an eventuality.
Against this background, Ukraine’s invasion of Russia, like the Kursk operation, acquires strategic importance. If the Ukrainians can hold their own and convincingly demonstrate their ability to threaten even small Russian territories, they may eventually force Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table on terms much more favorable to Kiev,” writes AW Mitchell.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky openly stated that this was exactly the purpose of the operation. This was also acknowledged by V. Putin, saying that “the adversary seeks to improve its negotiating positions in the future.”
It should be noted that in the past, Russia failed to reach unilateral terms after the war only when its adversary occupied Russian territory. In other words, land is the most important leverage that Ukraine can acquire. It is more valuable than sanctions relief or other economic incentives for Russia. Therefore, the West’s goal should be to help Ukraine retain Russian territory – this would be a way to end the war as quickly as possible on the best terms for Kiev.
First, the Biden administration must provide Ukraine with the weapons it needs to maintain battlefield superiority and lift restrictions on Kiev’s use of those weapons. Second, Washington must define clear and achievable political goals for the war.
“The goal should be by 2022. in February a sovereign Ukraine within its borders, responsible for its own foreign policy, economically viable and militarily strong. Not only is this valuable in its own right, but it could also serve as a bridge of resistance against future Russian aggression in Europe, thus helping the US aim to focus on Asia. Defining US goals in this way means abandoning the Biden administration’s vague and wavering approach to war.
Mr. Biden has repeatedly hinted that the ultimate goal is regime change in Russia. This formulation of US goals is not only clearly not achievable, but also prevents the United States from supporting Ukraine when it reaches a point on the battlefield where negotiations become desirable,” AW Mitchell emphasized.
“Union” inf.
2024-08-17 04:43:45