Even during the election campaign, foreign and security policy appeared to be a wandering phantom that no one wanted to encounter unless they absolutely had to. Will this withdrawal movement become a flight with the next federal government? In the exploratory paper of the SPD, Greens and FDP, the world out there continues to eke out a shadowy existence. “Germany’s responsibility for Europe and the world” is only given in the last of ten points. It would be premature to complain about this ranking as an agenda. However, the prevailing impression is that the potential allies are so moved by their fury of modernization that they overlook how much international relations also need the contemporary.
Since the Afghanistan exit, there should be an awareness that inalienable certainties are now on sale. To single out a few: It is undisputed that the USA will in future limit itself to a transatlantic obligation and set other priorities. To react to this in the Prima-Klima paper only with the sentence about “the strategic sovereignty of Europe” seems negligent. Aren’t we going to have to make arrangements if a Republican president could rule the United States again in four years? Maybe Donald Trump, who gathers simmering anger against the EU. Realistically speaking, the “America First” mantra will henceforth be the benchmark for every US administration. It is therefore well advised to not allow yourself to be led into a collision with China in order to give the American will to confront with European consecration. The madness of a boycott campaign against the Olympic Winter Games in Beijing in 2022 is already rampant. Will a Scholz government consider this with the usual waving or reap clear opposition? One of the survived certainties is also the belief in progressive EU integration that will soon be finalized. The European Council in Ljubljana has just announced that the candidate for accession from the Southeastern European waiting loop will have to circle for a long time. A united Europe cannot afford access as long as exits like the common European rule of law are in prospect.
Too much has wavered for a “progressive coalition” to even give the impression of wanting to continue in foreign policy where Angela Merkel left off. This would be tantamount to an oath of revelation from overly self-centered politicians who praise themselves instead of changing. This becomes clear in an exemplary way in the case of climate protection. What the proposal for coalition talks signals as a new beginning applies largely to national action. It cannot override the fact that you come up against limits as soon as those to Europe are exceeded. Decisions on how to deal with acute resource depletion in the wake of climate erosion are made in the EU as a whole, as in Germany. Provided that all member states can hope for more distributive justice within the confederation of states. Is this to be expected if the designated coalition partners rely on the EU Stability Pact as a quasi-European debt brake? It actually cements the economic performance gap between the EU states, which must have an impact on their contribution to climate protection. It is like the foreseeable waiver of higher taxes for the wealthy in their own country – noble goals have to change conditions, which first lead to these goals having to exist.
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