The title of the book, a wonderful title, is borrowed from the biography of the physicist Richard Feynman. That is: Feynman’s biographer wrote an introduction to Feynman, then Tim Palmer came along and took the introduction as a title. “Supremacy of doubt”. Feynman believed in the supremacy of doubt. Palmer wrote a book about the supremacy of doubt – from quantum physics to global warming. How uncertainty can help us understand our chaotic world. A suitable book to read this week, in front of the scenes of horror from Turkey and Syria. A suitable book to read for those who ponder the question – which we will stop pondering next week, because there will be other news – is Israel ready for a similar earthquake.
The leaders of the protest against the reform in a scathing letter against the commissioner; the police: “wrong publication”
Ben Gvir summoned the district commander for an investigation; The commissioner attacked: “Pity for the manner”
Palmer deals with the description of non-linear systems and the surprises inherent in them. He himself spent much of his career in the weather. Among other things, he tried to understand how it is possible that sometimes the forecaster says there will be light rain, and in the end there is a storm. Promise “Barbara” and get Barbara. Much of what he describes is also relevant to earthquakes. When exactly will they come, what will be their predicted strength and how much destruction will they cause. As you could recall this week, the answer is that we don’t know.
As you can get an impression from Palmer’s book, the answer is that we probably won’t know either. Not the certain kind of knowledge. Not news of the “now it’s one o’clock, in an hour it will be two o’clock” kind of news. In the best case, if the tools improve a lot, it will be possible to say things along the lines of: with a 70% probability there will be a magnitude 6 earthquake – either it will, or it won’t. Either it will be 6, or it will be 4 – or God forbid 8. In non-linear systems, extreme events must be taken into account.
example? Palmer deals with the extreme possibility that one day, without us preparing for it in advance, the earth will leave its orbit around the sun and sail to infinity. The probability is low, but not zero. A bigger fear: an asteroid will be separated from its orbit in the asteroid belt and fly towards Earth. Luis Alvarez, winner of the Nobel Prize in Physics, calculated the size of the meteor that hit the Earth and resulted in the destruction of the dinosaurs – 10 km.
“Compared to the diameter of the Earth (13 thousand km), an object of this size may not seem very large. After all, the difference between them is equal to the difference in size between an air rifle bullet and a two-story building,” writes Sean B. Carroll in his book “A Series of Successful Coincidences.”
But size doesn’t always matter. “The important thing here is that asteroids are much faster than rifle bullets (about 80,000 km per hour), and when an asteroid of this size enters the atmosphere, the force of the fireball’s impact on the face of the earth is enough to drill a crater 190 km wide and 40 km deep . Such an impact is expected to raise into the atmosphere, and even beyond it, huge amounts of rock fragments, dirt and dust that will hide the sunlight, envelop the earth in coldness and cold, and inhibit the production of food by the plants.”
Is humanity ready for such damage? It is less prepared than the State of Israel is prepared for a major earthquake. It is even less prepared than Turkey is for a major earthquake. But she is preparing. Or trying to prepare. It’s a race between NASA’s ability to develop a rocket that can destroy an approaching asteroid in flight, and the time it will take for the rare event to happen.
If the asteroid comes before the missile, it could be the end of humanity. If the missile gets ahead of the asteroid, we might be saved. or not. Because it is possible to overtake the asteroid, but to become extinct even earlier for a different reason. A sufficiently lethal and sufficiently contagious virus is an option. Dramatic global warming with devastating results is an option.
The working tools of the regime systems in the face of such developments are limited. This week they will rush to remind the relevant ministerial committee to convene to discuss the earthquake. But preparing for an earthquake is a complicated matter, devouring budgets. The captain has to decide: how much to invest in a fast train to Eilat, how much to invest in strengthening house foundations in Beit Shean. Then he has to decide how quickly to strengthen the foundations of the houses (he and not her, because as we will see, the current government has no interest in appointing female captains, only male captains).
NASA is preparing for the arrival of the asteroid on the assumption that humanity still has many years until it arrives. If it turns out that the asteroid is already on its way, we probably won’t be enough. Israel is preparing for the arrival of the earthquake on the assumption that it will come sometime, in some area, with some intensity. These are predictions that are based on estimates and Probabilities, not about certainties. There are no certainties and there cannot be. Which also means that there is no perfect preparation for extreme events and there cannot be.
Three things distinguish between countries that deal well with earthquakes and those that do not: the first – the quality of construction. A prosperous country, which renews the buildings and adapts them to modern standards, will be more durable. Israel is a prosperous country in some places, and much less prosperous in other places. When the disaster comes – and we hope it doesn’t come – the vulnerable are those who are always vulnerable. Those who drink more sugary drinks than others, because their politicians insist on doing so. Those who do not study core subjects and do not progress to high-income subjects. Arabs, ultra-Orthodox, the periphery – they will be hurt more.
The second thing that strengthens countries in the face of major disasters is the ability to react – the speed of preparation of the police, fire brigade, medical rescue services, hospitals. Israel has a great advantage over most other countries – it is used to man-made disasters, and is therefore more prepared for a certain type of natural disaster. Our daily disaster may be our salvation when an unusual event occurs.
Benjamin Netanyahu (Photo: Yonatan Zindel Flash 90)
And there is the third thing, elusive and difficult to examine: social cohesion, mutual guarantee. Israelis used to think of themselves as outstanding in this field. Israelis used to think they had some hidden quality of “unity” that was revealed in difficult moments. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expresses this sentiment from time to time. A few years ago, at the commemoration of the victims of the Altalana ship – the most painful example, apart from the murder of Yitzhak Rabin, of the danger inherent in factionalism – Netanyahu said that “disagreements are an integral part of democracy.
We must always remember one simple truth: we are brothers, we are one people. There is no other.” Except that with Netanyahu (and it should be clear: not only with Netanyahu) there is sometimes a gap between what the speaker says and what the decision-maker does.
Do the Israelis still have this quality that can be trusted? Maybe there is, and maybe it cracked in a homemade earthquake. An earthquake of the least lethal type. The damage of our earthquake is not immediately visible, but it permeates and has a long-term effect. See the graph and the sentiment that emerges from it regarding what has been happening in Israel since election day. There will be those who will point to the coalition’s rapacity as evidence that the cohesion is cracking. Others will point to the race of some prominent opposition supporters to withdraw money from Israel, as evidence that cohesion is cracking.
The question, as troubling as it may sound, is the following question: will you rush to take risks to rescue your neighbor from the ruins, even if you are enthusiastic supporters of legal reform and the neighbor is the legal advisor to the government? Would you offer a roof to your neighbor even if you believe that the legal reform will lead to a dictatorship, and the neighbor is Levin’s rival?
in view of the risk of loss
There is of course no room for comparison: Benjamin Netanyahu is not Vladimir Putin. Israel is not Russia, and it is hoped that it will not be either. The purpose of this text is not to imply that someone in Israel is doing something similar in severity to what Russia is doing. Its purpose is to examine the dynamics of decision-making, against an available example. that’s it. We are talking about a sharp debate, not a war. This is about changing the law, not about the entry of tanks.
Still, it’s interesting to compare what happened to Putin when he decided to go to war against Ukraine, and what happens to Netanyahu (and maybe it’s not him, but his colleagues who drag him along) when he tries to go to war against the legal system used in Israel. Why interesting? Because there are things in which the similarity is evident: underestimation of the expected resistance. Underestimation of the opponent, of his determination, of his willingness to insist. And as a result: an underestimation of the risk concerning the price that will be charged to everyone, attackers and attacked, because of the move.
Every governmental decision should bring benefit, and every governmental decision may have a price. Without currently going into the question of whether the legal reform is necessary or not, and in what format it is necessary or not, when a decision was made to promote it, it was based on at least the following three assumptions: 1. There is a need for it (this is the assumption of the entrepreneurs). 2. The government has enough power to implement it (coalition majority). 3. The damage caused to the country will be lower than the benefit of the reform (because it is clear that there is no point in a move that brings little benefit and causes a lot of damage).
These are three assumptions that can also be attributed to the President of Russia when he went to war in Ukraine. He thought the war was necessary, even if most of the world disagreed with its conclusion. He thought he had the power to win. He thought that the benefit he would get from war would exceed the cost involved in it – and Putin knew that war would have some kind of cost. Hence the similarity: Putin was wrong in at least two of his assumptions.
The Netanyahu government also seems, at least now, to have made a mistake. As mentioned – we will ignore the first assumption. We will ignore the question of whether the war in Ukraine was really necessary for Russia, and we will ignore the question of whether the legal reform is really necessary for Israel, because it is clear that these are assumptions without which no one would have initiated these moves. We will focus on the following two assumptions: 1. We can 2. The benefit is greater than the harm.
Vladimir Putin (Photo: Reuters)
Of course, it is not yet possible to make a definitive judgment. Can Russia conquer Ukraine? time will tell. The war is not over yet. But it seems that one thing can already be said: she cannot do it with the same efficiency and speed as those who expected her to do it. It is hard to assume that Putin chose to go to war knowing that his forces would get stuck in the mud, fail in their missions, advance and then retreat, encountering a stubborn and brave enemy. It is hard to assume that Putin chose to go to war knowing that he would be dragged into its second year when he is isolated, bruised, and seemingly helpless.
A year ago, before the war, Russia looked much scarier than it does today. And the result: countries like Germany, Canada and the USA feel safe enough to send tanks to Ukraine. They are not afraid that the tanks will fall into the hands of the Russians. They are not afraid that the tanks will only irritate the Russians and make them move up a gear. They have recognized that the Russians have no higher gear – unless they resort to measures Really devastating.
They recognized that the Russian army is much less scary than it seemed to be just a year ago. Which of course also undermines Putin’s second working assumption: the benefit is greater than the harm. At least at the moment, there is no benefit at all, and the damage is heavy. Economic isolation, international hostility, abandonment of citizens, erosion of deterrence.
Russia a year into the war is a wounded Russia, ruffled feathers. Putin is a feather plucked leader. The world is openly talking about the end of his era, and even if the talk is cheap and the reality is that Putin still rules Russia, the talk also has meaning, the image also has meaning. Is it already clear that the harm is greater than the benefit? Since the war is not yet over, it is difficult to say such a thing with complete confidence.
We need to see how it will end, whether there will be arrangements, what Russia will get in exchange for getting off the tree, how much stronger Ukraine will be after its heroic show. But the possibility is definitely there. The possibility that this war will cause Russia more harm than it will benefit it certainly exists. That is – even from the point of view of Putin, who believes that there is a reason for war, at least two out of three assumptions may turn out to be wrong.
Now we will compare to Israel, after mentioning, just to be sure, that there is no similarity. Here no one shoots, no one invades, no one acts with lethal cruelty. Here it is a debate about legislation, and one should hope that it will remain no more than a debate about legislation. Still, it is impossible not to notice what is similar: a new government thought there was a good reason to make a dramatic move.
A new government thought it had the power to do it. A new government thought that his benefit would outweigh his harm. Was she wrong? too early to say. But it seems we can already say that she may have been wrong. It is possible that she embarked on this move under the assumption that she could – but in fact she could not. Apparently, she has the necessary votes in the Knesset, but she was not prepared for the strength of the opposition to her move.
She did not imagine how determined and strong the opposition to the move would be. Therefore, she also did not make a correct calculation of benefit and harm. Such a calculation, when re-done, may lead some of the ministers and members of the Knesset to the conclusion that even if the move is necessary, it is not worthwhile, because its harm outweighs its benefit.
But it is not certain that a correct calculation will lead them to this. And even if it is, not sure immediately. Psychological characteristics create a paradox that Prof. Gadi Hyman describes beautifully in his book “Fear, Regret and Wishful Thinking”. This is the tendency of leaders to gamble so as not to lose. That is, when they encounter a difficulty they did not expect, and which may lead them to a loss, they take a step that goes against logic. Instead of coming down from the tree, they climb a higher branch.
Raise the bet amount. Hyman cites as an example the decision of Germany to launch a submarine attack in the First World War. “An unlimited submarine attack, for all its dangers, was the only alternative that gave Germany any chance of victory,” he writes. The naysayers were convinced that the bet was worthwhile. They were convinced that it was worth taking a risk to avoid a loss. In retrospect, it was obviously not worth it, but in real time they played with relaxing scenarios. Among other things, they assumed that despite the fear, America would not intervene in the war.
Of course, this is not always what happens, the tendency to take risks does not always win over common sense. But that is often what happens. And in practical Israeli translation: sometimes leaders decide to carry out a plan, to insist on it with all their might, even when there are clear signs of the possibility that the damage will be greater than the benefit. If this happens to the Netanyahu government as well, the warnings of economic harm, the fear of pulling the strings with the opponents to the point of violence, the possibility of forceful countermeasures that will harm Israeli society as a whole – all these will not divert the government from its path.
It is true, they say about Netanyahu, and his record also proves, that we are not a risk taker, that he is usually sound and cautious. Which brings me back to Hyman’s book. There were also some such German generals in the First World War, but, as Hyman writes, “the high probability of suffering a loss turned the Germans from risk-averse to risk-loving.” If this happened to Netanyahu as well, the battle for reform will rise to a much higher temperature before it is decided.
This week we used information and data from the index website as well as the surveys “Maariv”, “Globes”, News 13 and News 12. Full disclosure: the books “Fear, Regret and Wishful Thinking” by Gadi Hayman and “A Series of Successful Coincidences” by Shawn B. Carroll were published in the series The books “The Hedgehog and the Fox” edited by me.