According to portal sources, among other things, the chair of the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, has started to shake, and the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation, Alexander Bortnikov, is said to be leaving his post this year.
Defense of the Kursk region
Kremlin master Vladimir Putin put his former bodyguard Alexei Dyumin in charge of the Kursk direction; he also holds the civilian position of Secretary of the State Council, an advisory body whose functions are unclear.
Despite the fact that A.Diumin previously worked at the Ministry of Defense, such an appointment is incomprehensible from the point of view of the personnel, the portal writes. This means that V. Putin does not trust the General Staff, and in a crisis situation he relies only on a person who is personally loyal to him, a source close to the Ministry of Defense of “Important Stories” explained to “Važni Istori”.
But it’s not just in the military: Putin’s former adviser Dmitry Mironov is now in charge of all major personnel appointments in Russia. Due to the strengthening of the positions of V. Putin’s “bodyguard”, there have been conflicts in the government system for a long time: for example, between A. Dyumin and the first deputy head of the presidential administration, Sergey Kiriyenko.
Formally, the activities of the State Council were to be supervised by one of the departments of the president’s administration, headed by S. Kiriyenko’s ally. However, as a source familiar with the details of this conflict told “Važnije Istorii”, in one of the meetings of the State Council, A. Dyumin simply expelled S. Kirijenko’s person, saying that he had no place there.
Clan power structure
Conflicts in Russia’s power vertical are mainly due to its clan structure. The vulnerability of such a structure became particularly evident this year, when former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, with whom Putin recently went for a walk in the taiga and went fishing, fell into disgrace.
After S. Shoigu’s departure, the Ministry of Defense began a large-scale purge of people who were once considered close to the minister. Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov remained in his post, but after the failure of the Russian army in the Kursk region, his fate also became doubtful.
As Bloomberg reported, V. Gerasimov ignored intelligence reports about the concentration of Ukrainian armed forces near the Russian border and decided not to inform V. Putin about it.
If this is true, it is not surprising that Putin lost confidence in the general staff and sent a former bodyguard to repel the Ukrainian attack.
Changes in the FSB
The FSB, the Russian regime’s main criminal agency, has also seen a “fierce” power struggle this year, according to one current and two former officers. The main reason for these conflicts is the weakening of several powerful clan leaders, including high-ranking generals.
First, according to the sources interviewed by Važni Istorii, this year the long-time and elderly director of the FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, will leave his post. Among his potential successors are his first deputy, Sergei Koroliov, and the head of the counterintelligence service, Vladislav Menshchikov.
“S. Koroliov’s promotion was likely, among other things, out of inertia, as the heads of the FSB used to come from the economic bloc. But now the priorities have changed: the importance of oligarch control has passed. Now the most important thing is the control of the army and the military-industrial complex, saboteurs and terrorists, which is V. Menshchikov’s topic. Therefore, he has a chance. However, since decisions on such appointments are made by one head (V. Putin), trying to predict them is a thankless task,” said Andrej Soldatov, editor-in-chief of “agentura.ru”.
Second, this year former Secretary of the Security Council Nikolay Patrushev lost his position at the FSB. Despite the fact that N. Patrushevas in 2008 left the directorship, he retained enormous influence in the agency, and many of his people continued to work there. However, after their patron was transferred to the humiliating position of adviser to the president on shipbuilding issues, they will probably lose their influence, Važnije Istorii writes.
One of the main generals of N. Patrushev’s team and the FSB as a whole, the head of the constitutional order protection service, Aleksei Sedov, who will turn 70 this year, is likely to leave his post. Due to the vacancy of the head of this service, which is responsible for persecuting the opposition and killing V. Putin’s political opponents, a hardware battle has already begun.
One of the candidates to replace A. Sedov is Ivan Tkačiov, the odious head of FSB “K” department. Despite the fact that I. Tkachiov has patrons in the Kremlin – the internal political bloc of the presidential administration has repeatedly used the services of the department he leads to deal with unwanted persons – “Važni Istorii” sources believe that he is unlikely to take A. Sedov’s place. I. Tkachiov has always been considered a man of another once all-powerful but gradually losing influence clan leader – Rosneft head Igor Sechin.
The Russian government system is structured in such a way that the weakening of the ruler usually turns into problems for his vassals.
Changes in state enterprises
For many years, while Putin ruled Russia, the heads of state-owned companies were considered among the most powerful people in the country. They were entrusted with vital responsibilities: transferring billions of dollars into Putin’s accounts (registered in the names of his close associates), building him palaces, supporting his mistresses, and sometimes ordering countries he didn’t like to turn off the tap.
Therefore, these most important positions are traditionally occupied by V. Putin’s old friends from the KGB and St. Petersburg City Hall: former colleagues Sergey Chemezov and Nikolai Tokarev head Rostec and Transneft, respectively; “Rosneft” and “Gazprom” are still managed by the former colleagues of the city mayor’s office, I. Sechin and Alexey Miller.
But their time is also running out.
Among the mentioned people, S. Chemezov undoubtedly retained his influence: “Rostec”, which he heads, is the main producer of weapons for the army. However, “the political significance of figures like I. Sechin and S. Miller is diminishing,” said one person on the Russian Forbes list who worked for Gazprom. – It’s one thing when you control 30 percent. European markets, and everything else when you have almost nothing.”
In addition, according to the source of Važnije Istorii, both S. Miller and I. Sečinas have long asked to retire for health reasons. Their departure will inevitably lead to competition for expensive state-owned enterprise assets and contracts. How this fight will end can be easily guessed from the example of the criminal cases of the people of the former head of the Russian Railways, Vladimir Yakunin.
What’s next?
During 25 years of unlimited power, V. Putin destroyed all the institutions that ensure the stability of the state system in developed countries: fair elections, independent courts, free media. The real power in Russia belongs to several clans of V. Putin’s friends and colleagues, who for many years played the role of supreme leader, resolving conflicts between clan leaders.
“Where the state institutions are weak, the mafia appears, and everything is decided by the don”, ironized a source who has worked with V. Putin’s friends for many years.
This kind of state system works well in the medium term because it allows the leader to rule without restrictions and the clans to plunder with impunity. However, in the long run or during a crisis, the vulnerability of such a structure becomes apparent: clan leaders age and weaken, leading to increased competition and conflict.
In the past, they would have been solved by the Supreme Don, but the Don himself is old, doesn’t trust anyone and is hurt by one war, which has been going on for a long time not according to his script, the portal concludes.
2024-08-21 21:56:26