The risky raids never achieved much – other than embarrassing Russian leaders. Maybe until now, Forbes writes.
On Tuesday, units of at least two Ukrainian army brigades, which did not include pro-Ukrainian Russian fighters, exploited a gap in defenses around the village of Suzha in the Kursk region, on the Russian side of the border with northern Ukraine.
A day later, hundreds of Ukrainian troops from (at least) the 22nd and 88th Mechanized Brigades, supported by artillery, drones and air defenses, advanced nearly 10 miles into southern Russia, crushed local Russian forces, and captured Suja along with several other villages.
It’s an impressive feat for a military that has been on the defensive all year and has struggled to muster enough forces to withstand persistent but costly Russian offensives across the front line in eastern Ukraine.
The Ukrainian army cannot fully equip the brigades defending the frontline cities in the east, which has dire consequences for Kiev’s efforts to hold on to the last free areas of the Donetsk region. And yet the army could commit two or more brigades to the attack at Suja – and consider the potential gains of this attack worth the potential risks.
“I’m still not sure what the goal is,” writes John Helin, a Ukraine expert at Finnish think tank Black Bird Group. – According to unreliable reports, Ukraine has concentrated elements of two to four brigades in this area. They are very much needed in the east.”
It is possible that the Ukrainian General Staff in Kiev believes that a Ukrainian attack in the north could force the Kremlin to withdraw troops from eastern Ukraine and thus slow Russian progress on this front.
However, this potential diversion involves at least two, and possibly four, Ukrainian brigades. In order for the diversion strategy to work for Kiev, the Kremlin would have to move many regiments from the east – possibly a dozen, according to J. Helin.
If Russia’s northern force group can stop the Ukrainian offensive without “borrowing” regiments from the east, Ukraine’s gambit will fail. Assuming, of course, that targeting Russian forces is the goal.
It is possible that the attack on Ukraine is not a diversion. On the contrary, it may be exactly what it appears to be: a serious effort to occupy and hold Russian territory.
In this case, the ultimate goal may be diplomatic. After occupying even a small part of Russian territory, Ukraine could exchange that territory for Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine during possible future peace negotiations.
On the other hand, Ukrainian planners may not care at all about hypothetical peace talks. They can honestly hope that they will be able to maintain – albeit at great risk – the invasion of Russia.
“As Ukraine tries to seize the initiative in the northeastern border regions, there is an opportunity for further operations,” writes Black Bird Group representative Emil Kastehelmi. “Having caused confusion and forced Russia to react in Kursk, Ukraine may try to attack elsewhere – if there are still free forces left.”
That’s a big “if”. Whatever Ukraine’s strategy in the north, the risks are the same. “Ukrainian commanders have limited forces to reinforce units under pressure or to stop a breakout,” said Rob Lee, an analyst at the Institute for Foreign Policy Research in Philadelphia.
Ukrainian forces are stretched along a 1,100-kilometer front line in Ukraine, and two, three, or four Ukrainian brigades have invaded Russia. Now those frontline forces are even more thinned out. The danger of a further Russian breakthrough is increasing, especially in the east.
Ukrainian commanders are gambling, attacking in the north, hoping not to suffer heavy losses. But attacking in the open almost always costs more than defending from prepared positions.
“Offensive operations … pose the risk of more casualties than defensive ones – at a time when Ukrainian forces are stretched thin,” Lee writes. “Ukraine needs to maintain a favorable ratio in terms of manpower, so taking heavy losses in this operation could make it difficult to carry out.”
The good news for the Ukrainian brigades in Kursk is that, for now, they are maintaining their momentum. They shot down two Russian helicopters, one of them using a kamikaze drone. They killed Russian tanks and captured dozens of Russian soldiers. “The Russians seem to be confused,” notes E. Kastehelmi.
But that could change when the Russians trade space for time and bring in additional forces. Compared to a year ago, Russia “already has more forces [ir] conventional capabilities in the region, better command and control — and have conscript units that can be deployed that are not deployed in Ukraine,” Lee notes.
All outside observers can do now is watch and wait. Perhaps, with a bold and risky attack, the Ukrainians will turn the tide of the war on one front. Or maybe they’re burning the few free soldiers they have for a doomed march across the border.
Time will tell. “Let’s hope that Ukraine has a clear idea about the goals of this operation, and let’s hope that those goals are also achievable both politically and militarily,” writes Mr. Helin. “At the moment, it still seems to me that Ukraine is gambling with pretty bad cards.”
Adapted from Forbes.
2024-08-08 06:13:31