When Göring tried to prevent the outbreak of World War II

2024-08-24 10:00:02

Time.news – Two events on August 25, 1939 prevented the German army from launching the Fall Weiss (White Case) as planned, the plan to attack Poland the next day at 4.30am, triggering the Second World War: Aid to the Polish-British Mutual Pact and the defection of Italy. On that frenetic day, Adolf Hitler summoned Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, at the top of the Oberkopmmando der Wehmacht, to the Reich Chancellery three times to halt, restart and halt military preparations at the last minute. Although the Führer had assured his leaders on 22 August, in a private meeting at the Berghof in which they were all in civilian clothes, that Great Britain and France would not start a European war, he was silent that day the second Ribbentrop would sign with Molotov a non-aggression pact with the USSR, Hermann Göring knew that London would have agreed to the pact. This was reported to him by his friend Birger Dahlerus, a Swedish industrialist who was tasked with conducting a diplomacy similar to that of rival Joachim Ribbentrop’s official staff.

Military Communications Assistance Pact and Italian secession

On August 24, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain called the Council of Ministers who announced that the government would ask for energy plans (the two chambers would approve the Emergency Energy Act in the evening with 447 votes in favor and only 4 against) and contracts. as soon as possible the military forces organized in April with Poland would have been defined by an agreement, announced on the 25th, assuring that accommodation with the English was still possible, then entrusted Dahlerus with the task of mediation Meanwhile, Hitler had invited the British ambassador Nevile Henderson to propose an agreement between Germany and England in exchange for help in recapturing Danzig and the Corridor: the Reich promised not only to guarantee the Polish border, but also to protect the British Empire in every part of world, providing that Berlin’s right to reclaim the colonies is recognized. But when the Self-Help Treaty was announced to him at 3 o’clock in the evening, he revived his war rage: he called Keitel back and ordered him to continue. The watershed came at 6pm when Mussolini announced that Italy would not go to war with Germany.

Attack orders and counter-orders for the morning of August 26th

It was at that point that Hitler canceled Fall Weiss for 26 August, when some units had already crossed the border. Meanwhile Dahlerus had returned from London with a letter from Foreign Minister Halifax to Göring on “the desire of His Majesty’s government to reach a peaceful settlement”. Ribbentrop, who discovered the matter and was impressed, said in front of the Führer that the Swede was a British agent. The Gestapo took Dahlerus from the hotel and took him to Hitler, who overheard him and told him to leave London immediately to send him to negotiate. And it makes you memorize six points that are the same as those presented in Henderson this morning. On the morning of the 27th Dahlerus was in London where he reported everything to Chamberlain, Halifax and Secretary of State Cadogan. He also left at 7pm to report the answer to the six points and to see Goering at 11pm, at his home: London shared the desire for a general agreement, but on Danzig and the Corridor he hoped for the international guarantee of Germany, Italy, France. , Great Britain and the USSR; he rejected the idea of ​​returning the former colonies to Germany and rejected all offers to guarantee the government with arms because it “does not reconcile with the honor and interests of the British Empire”. Hitler appeared to agree. Another attempt to prevent the outbreak of war was made by Italian ambassador Raffaele Guariglia and French foreign minister Georges Bonnet. Guariglia suggests that Bonnet welcomed Mussolini’s last-minute intervention in the role of mediator.

The Trap of “Six Points” and “Magnanimous Giving”

On Monday 28 August, Halifax tried to convince Poland to sit down at the negotiating table as soon as possible, and in fact Warsaw gave his permission to direct negotiations with Berlin. Dahlerus had been informed, by the British embassy in Berlin, that the attack on Poland was scheduled for the morning of September 1st. But in the evening Henderson was received by Hitler who told him that he could be satisfied with “the return of Danzig, the entire Corridor and the restoration of the borders of upper Silesia”. It is a restart with new requirements. Warsaw, meanwhile, issued a general mobilization order for 31 August. In a very heated conversation between Hitler and Henderson, the Führer also requested that the Polish government send a representative to Berlin by Wednesday 30 August. Goering sent Dahlerus back to London, where he arrived on the morning of the 30th, waiting for Charles F. Spencer, to deliver the so-called “big offer” of the Führer in 16 points, which he learned by one. At 10.30 Dahlerus talked about it with Chamberlain, Halifax, Horace Wilson and Cadogan, who rejected Hitler’s proposal to hold negotiations in Berlin. Shortly after midnight the Swede was at Göring’s headquarters, unaware that Henderson had received new instructions from London in which he had said that the British government could not advise the Polish government to “adhere to this policy which is completely irregular” ( or sent a plenipotentiary to Berlin) and therefore the ambassador called on the German government to activate the normal diplomatic channels. To the point of the British note, listed by Henderson to Ribbentrop, the Nazi foreign minister who received him after midnight responded by reading listlessly and quickly, in German, the “magnanimous offer”, but refusing – against all the law of diplomacy – to send a message. And he emphasized that the deadline has passed without the arrival of the government in Berlin. Polish ambassador Józef Lipski, when Henderson urged him to go to Ribbentrop, said he would be equivalent to giving the order. Paris is also putting pressure on him.

A last ditch effort to save the peace

At 10am on August 31, Dahlerus was at the British Embassy with a written copy of the “16 points”: Göring accepted this responsibility, against Hitler’s prohibition. Lipski received word of the “great sacrifice” around noon, in the presence of Ogilvie-Forbes, from Dahlerus, who had seen it for the first time. Then he told Foreign Minister Józef Beck in Warsaw: it was the last communication from Berlin. When Lipski, according to accepted principles, asked for an audience with Ribbentrop, he was asked if he had full power to negotiate, and when he refused, he was fired: it was the last German-Polish contact. At 5pm there was an unnecessary meeting by Göring at his home in Berlin with Henderson and Dahlerus, with Hitler’s approval, to separate Great Britain from Poland. We have already decided. At 12.40 Hitler signed “Instruction No. 1 for the conduct of war”, with the attack on Poland at 4.45 am on 1 September.