An academic study indicates that the launch sites of Russian and Chinese strategic missiles could be destroyed by a NATO attack with conventional weapons. “The imbalance threatens stability and increases the risk of irreparable errors,” one of the authors of the document explains to Fanpage.it. “The international community underestimates the situation. Arms control initiatives are needed.”
The United States and NATO have the ability to destroy a large part of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and China using only conventional weapons. For which the technological and numerical superiority of the West is unquestionable. Paradoxically, the deterrent effect of this predominance is far from guaranteed. It is a situation that accelerates the arms race, some experts note. And it makes miscalculations or accidents so serious as to unleash total nuclear war more likely. The relaunch of multilateral initiatives for disarmament is becoming increasingly urgent.
“A silent revolution that has been underway for 30 years has greatly increased America’s conventional counterforce capacity,” he tells Fanpage.it Manuel Galileomilitary analyst and researcher at Soas University of London. “The supremacy has become overwhelming. It is impossible to make a precise calculation, I do not know if it would be 70, 90 percent or something else, but most of the launch sites of Russian and Chinese intercontinental missiles could be annihilated with a non-nuclear attack”.
Together with Soas professor Dan Plesch, Galileo has just published a study that quantifies and analyzes a potentially destabilizing disequilibrium. And very risky. In the event of a severe crisis, it cannot be ruled out that Moscow or Beijing will launch their atomic bombs preemptively to recover the strategic disadvantage that penalizes them. And we are not talking about “simple” tactical atomic bombs. We are talking about Armageddon.
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Manuel Galileo, Soas University of London
Manuel, but shouldn’t America’s conventional supremacy reassure us? If NATO doesn’t even need to resort to strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles to nullify the threat of enemy missiles, deterrence is assured. Or not?
In fact, the imbalance on the conventional weapons front greatly increases the chances of a large-scale nuclear conflict. Because Russia and China know what the numbers are but do not perceive this situation as bringing stability. This is what political scientists call “cognitive dissonance.”
A bit like the fox with the grapes: he can’t reach the bunches and decides they are unripe…
The fact is that the perception in Moscow and Beijing is only that of a substantial imbalance. The cognitive dissonance is evident. And it acts as a trap that drags you to the bottom in a gradual repetitive cycle, apparently under control.
In short, is the situation risky because the Chinese and Russians see things their own way or because the US has too many conventional weapons? Whose fault is it?
Of no one and of all. Of course, the seriousness of the picture is underestimated. And this threatens both the realities and the perceptions of strategic stability. In our study we do not point to any culprits. We have only lined up and analyzed facts. Found in Chinese, Russian and Western documentation and publications.
Facts such as the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe (announced on the sidelines of the NATO summit on July 10: from 2026, the SM-6, the Tomahawk and hypersonic missiles still under development will be deployed in Germany, ed.) cause concern. They explain why Moscow and Beijing are anxious and why Russia, after the end of the INF treaty that had effectively abolished them, has resumed production of that type of weapons (the INF treaty, signed by Gorbachev and Reagan in December 1987 was abandoned in 2019 by the US, which accuses Moscow of having violated it several times, ed.).
In fact, Russia and China are so afraid of the US conventional counterforce that they have put their intercontinental ballistic missiles on standby. They are already ready to launch. A dangerous mode: one mistake and the unthinkable happens.
What is the basis of the conventional military superiority of the Americans and their allies?
On what in our firm we call “the three Ds”: Detection, Defeating, Defending.
That is: detection, elimination and defense. Can you give us some examples?
By “surveying” we mean the work that strategic drones can do, like the Global Hawk (Northrop Grumman RQ-4: in a day it can cover 100 thousand square kilometers, ed.). It has great autonomy, it flies everywhere. And it can find camouflaged mobile launch systems in Siberia and in the regions of Russia near Central Asia. And then, of course, there are satellites.
This is for the “detection”. And the protagonists of the “elimination”, who are they?
The most advanced missiles. Like the JASSMs (joint air-to-surface standoff missiles, NATO has about 3,500, the authors of the study estimate, ed.), launched from fighter-bombers or even from transport aircraft such as the C-130, with the Rapid Dragon system (a pellet module that can accommodate cruise missiles or other material intended for launch, ed.).
There are more and more of these missiles, and with ever greater ranges. The most remote strategic nuclear platforms can now be reached with ease. Even if they are located, as in China, 2,500 kilometers from the nearest border.
But some launch bases, especially in China, are underground, protected by meters of concrete. Do you really think that a Jassm or Tomahawk missile will be enough to take them out?
The bases that are part of the so-called “Great Underground Wall” in China are indeed the most difficult to destroy. But total destruction is not necessary. And the US has conventional weapons perfectly capable of generating an “earthquake effect”. Depots, exit routes and silos would still be damaged. In all likelihood, to the point of rendering the launch structure unusable.
There is a “D” missing, Manuel. How does the “defense” factor work in NATO’s conventional supremacy?
It works, for example, with the Aegis system. It has been developed over the last 15 years and can be used by the navy. In the case of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads by Russia or China, American ships off Murmansk, or in the South and East China Sea, equipped with the Aegis system, can intercept enemy carriers in their boost phase. That is, in the first five or five minutes after launch. When they are most vulnerable.
And the “three Ds” would have done their job…
Exactly. Detection, defeating, defense: the “Three Ds” ensure the possibility of a preventive conventional attack. By detecting all targets, wherever they are. By eliminating them. And finally, by defending themselves in case the surviving enemy launch bases respond with their intercontinental missiles.
But Russia and China have highly sophisticated missile defense systems. Is it that easy to overcome them?
The war in Ukraine has shown that even systems that were thought to be highly effective, such as the S-400, can be eliminated by simple tactical drones. But ever better radars and early warning systems are being developed. In Kaliningrad, the exclave between Poland, Lithuania and the Baltic Sea, Russia has the Container system in operation, equipped with new-generation radars that can monitor airspace at long ranges and detect ballistic missiles.
In general, what strategies do China and Russia have to counter what we have said so far?
In short, the Chinese are digging ever deeper silos and tunnels for their strategic nuclear weapons. And the Russians are dispersing their mobile launch platforms across their vast country. And it’s not just a matter of moving a truck. For each launcher, there are many support vehicles and a sophisticated logistics apparatus. More generally, what is happening is that the number of weapons is increasing. The response of China and Russia to the ever-increasing US conventional force is obvious: build more weapons, and more advanced ones. It’s a race that doesn’t stop.
What is the ultimate goal of your study?
That of opening our eyes to a global strategic issue that is rarely discussed. The discussion today is confined to the regional level. On the conflict in Ukraine, on the one in the Middle East, on the crisis between Beijing and Taiwan. However, the global vision is lost. We are running towards an ever greater militarization of the world.
As lovers of peace, we have produced a pragmatic, realistic document. Without taking sides. We believe that rebuilding a diplomacy of disarmament and multilateral action to strengthen trust are necessary. We must return to negotiating arms control. As the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres indicated last July, when he expressed himself in favor of convening an extraordinary assembly of the United Nations to discuss disarmament and global security.
The task is difficult. Not impossible. But to resume talking about arms control, we need to know the current situation and address it pragmatically. Our study aims to be a contribution in this direction.