It was supposed to happen today, even a week or two ago. According to the original plan of what is commonly defined as the “protest forces”, the streets of the country from Kaplan in Tel Aviv to the last alley in the periphery were supposed to be flooded with protesters. A huge and violent protest wave demanding the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu The one and only requirement: “Go and immediately”.
During the last few weeks, as part of the preparation of the ground for the implementation stages, the plan was published and detailed in the media so many times, that today it seems that not only political commentators, but also an average 5-year-old child knows how to recite it about its stages and timetables. Phase I: The fighting in Gaza is reduced and conducted at a low intensity; Phase B: The reservists return home en masse; Step 3: Benny Gantz realizes what he promised in advance when establishing the emergency government, namely to dismantle the package and leave Netanyahu without a public safety net and with his original coalition.
Phase D, which is the continuation of Phase C: the withdrawal of the state camp constitutes an opening shot for a mass protest. The “hell in the streets” that the protest leaders promised Netanyahu is happening in reality. The pressure to bring forward the elections is taking its toll, the Likud members who have been labeled as “swingers” and “disgruntled” are treated with personal care, such that the megaphones at 6 in the morning near Idit Silman’s house about a year and a half ago will be seen as a pampering camp. The result: the advance of the elections on the assumption that Netanyahu is no longer coming back from them.
Benjamin Netanyahu (Photo: Tomer Appelbaum)
In the height of irony, just at this point, when the protest plan had penetrated well into the public consciousness, it went wrong and became entangled. The train that was supposed to race towards the destination, which is, as mentioned, the overthrow of the government and the expulsion of Netanyahu from political life, got stuck at the first stop and even today has not yet set off.
Why did the plan go awry even though the IDF did its part, i.e. moved to Phase III of the Iron Sword War, first in the north of the Gaza Strip and then also in the central camps? Why – while the reservists are returning en masse, and the protest leaders are already in preparation – is Gantz in no hurry to carry out the Part of it?
The answer is complex, as usual. There are several reasons for the chairman of the state camp’s hesitation, and each of them is certainly convincing. First of all, public opinion. The polls that have been published in the media for several weeks consistently show that the vast majority of the public in Israel opposes the departure of the state camp, which would mark the end of the emergency government. In my opinion The average citizen who is not a protester, a politician or a learned commentator from the studio, including the citizen who defines himself as a supporter of Gantz and his party – the state of emergency in the country has not ended, the war continues, the kidnapped and their captors are still in Gaza, and Gantz has no reason to claim that the need for an emergency government has become redundant. Gantz and his advisers saw this further Before the publication of the polls commissioned by the media systems, this is exactly the dynamic they see in the internal polls, which are much more detailed.
Gideon Sa’ar, Benny Gantz (Photo: Yonatan Zindel, Flash 90)
But it’s not just public opinion that’s keeping Gantz in the government with Netanyahu. Lately, Gantz and his people have received identical messages from two very significant directions. The Americans and IDF officials expressed to the chairman of the state camp a firm opinion in favor of his remaining in the emergency government. After all, if Gantz retires, then who will remain in the cockpit? Who will hold the steering wheel without getting in the way? Who will manage the continuation of the war, the contacts for the deal, the contacts for the day after? It is true, Netanyahu and his partners, that the mere mention of their names causes the top US government officials (and to some extent also the top military ranks in Israel) to get dizzy and have a shock attack.
Gantz received the requests, sat down for discussions with his people and came to the conclusion that the original retirement plan needed an inevitable update. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, the factors that are not among Netanyahu’s supporters have become the main holders of his government. Thanks to the American government and the senior members of the security establishment, the emergency government did not fall – neither in mid-January nor in early February. It seems that Netanyahu’s temporary partner had to reset the suitcase that he had packed and almost locked.
The day after the deal
Another element, heavy and heavy with consequences, which certainly plays a significant role in any political process and is able to influence the future of the government as much if not more than the conduct of the state camp, is the negotiations for the abductee deal. The real picture, but certainly allows one to get a general impression of the power relations and the possible scenarios in the event of progress in the negotiations.
After the end of the Paris summit – even before the head of the Mossad, the head of the Shin Bet, and Major General Nitzan Alon gathered in Kirya together with the members of the War Cabinet and shared with them the details of the proposed outline – the “horror outline” was leaked to News 12. The leak presented to the public a horror scenario in which, as part of The deal requires Israel to empty the prisons of terrorists, including the most serious murderers, including the perpetrators of the October 7 massacre, to agree to a day of truce for each abductee. And this is just the beginning.
There are two explanations for the horror leak that Netanyahu’s office was quick to deny: to horrify the public as much as possible so that any deal that comes later will be perceived as an achievement and not a terrible defeat. Or horrifyingly in order to create in advance a public wave against any possible deal, with the understanding that even if Hamas backs down from the blanket demand for the end of the war and the withdrawal of the IDF, thus opening an opening for the continuation of the negotiations, almost any deal brought before the Israeli government is capable of leading to a political crisis.
Today, according to the estimates of most of the parties in the political system, the chances of success of a deal, almost any deal, are quite low. This is due to the understanding that there is almost no point where the flexibility of Hamas is able to meet the flexibility of ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gabir. This is even if we assume that Netanyahu himself, despite his sharp and militant statements, is willing to be very flexible. According to Hamas’ parameters, there is no outline for a deal that would be perceived as reasonable and not promiscuous in the eyes of Ben Gabir and Smotrich.
Benjamin Netanyahu and Bezalel Smotrich (Photo: Yonatan Zindel, Flash 90)
It is likely that Netanyahu will definitely know how to rally the majority of Likud ministers in favor of the deal, if an outline is found that will advance to the final stages of discussion and voting in the government. In other words, any deal that Netanyahu and Deri bring to the government will receive the required majority. The issue is not the majority in favor of the transaction, but the continuation that will follow this majority. Theoretically, the level of resistance to a kidnapping deal that Ben Gvir and Smotrich can demonstrate, can be different, depending on the severity of the outline. In their view, both or one of the two can vote against the deal (just like Ben Gvir did in voting on the kidnapping deal in November), but remain in the government. The higher degree of opposition is withdrawal from the government, but without bringing the elections. A kind of promise to be a safety net for the government from the outside. Theoretically this is definitely a possible option. In practice, the chance that Netanyahu will go for it tends to zero.
Netanyahu is, as we know, a graduate of the Wai agreements. He doesn’t need Wikipedia to remember the political consequences of his signing the agreements – which led to the overthrow of his first government, despite the promise he received about that security network from the outside, which in practice was torn up and disappeared the next day. The event is deeply etched in his mind. The Netanyahu of 2024, unlike the Netanyahu of 1998, knows an iron rule: when your partners leave the government, no safety net works. That’s why he just won’t let it happen. He will not risk the government in a deal that will be defined by the partners as “promiscuous” and push them out.
It is not impossible that the deal issue – if and when it progresses to the decision stages on the Israeli side – will eventually do the job for the forces that are impatiently waiting for the delayed dissolution of the emergency government. What has not happened so far from the multitude of reasons described above, may happen if the gap between the red lines of Netanyahu and his partners and the red lines of Gantz and his friends turns out to be too great. In the meantime, this is a completely theoretical assessment, and it will remain so as long as the mediators have not received a clear answer from Hamas regarding the proposal formulated in Paris at the beginning of the week. From there all the storylines are expected to progress accordingly. where? We will know soon.