Article by Theodoros Tsakiris in “K”: The energy implications of a generalized Shiite-Israeli war

by time news

Iran‘s second direct ballistic attack on Israel on October 1 was the Iranian regime’s predictable response after nearly two weeks of escalating attacks against Hezbollah that have partially weakened the Shiite group’s impressive missile, ballistic and guided artillery capabilities, estimated to number in the hundreds of thousands. projectiles launched.

Although there has been some internal backlash in Tehran arguing against a retaliatory strike, views mainly expressed according to the New York Times by the country’s newly elected president Massoud Pezeskian, the hard-line wing of Iran’s political establishment under Ali Khamenei felt that avoiding a response it would trigger additional Israeli attacks against both Iran and Hezbollah. That assessment would quickly prove to be wrong, as Israel continued its offensive against Shiite Lebanon undeterred and prepared to retaliate with ferocity against the Iranian onslaught.

The important thing, however, is that Iran has had and will have no choice but to attack Israel if it attempts to destroy Hezbollah. Tehran’s two-plus weeks of inaction since Israel began its campaign against Hezbollah, seizing thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies, has caused a psychological rift between Tehran and the organization that is largely the Islamic Guard’s “hometown”. of the Revolution (IRGC).

The organization that grew during the 32-year leadership of Sheikh Nasrallah is the most valuable “jewel” in the “crown” of the Shiite axis of resistance that began in 1982 in Lebanon and expanded to Iraq, Yemen and Syria after the American involvement in Iraq in 2003 -2011 and the expansion of the Arab uprisings in 2011.

This means that even if Israel does not retaliate strongly against Iran for the October 1st attack – which is highly unlikely – Iran will strike again against Israel if it pushes Hezbollah to the brink of collapse.

Israel also knows that its goal is not simply to create security conditions on its northern border in order for its approximately 60,000 internally displaced citizens to return to their homes. The intensity and systematicity of the multiple strikes against Hezbollah and the small-scale ground invasion of South Lebanon, the fourth since 1978, suggest much broader goals.

Objectives such as structurally weakening Hezbollah to the point where it would be vulnerable to attacks by its internal enemies and enabling the Lebanese army to take control of the border with Israel, along the line of confrontation up to the Litani River. This ground campaign will be much more difficult and bloodier than the Gaza operation, while an eventual Israeli decision to establish, as it did between 1985-2000, a security/occupation zone 5-15 km deep inside Lebanese territory, will revive Hezbollah.

The oil price spike nearly a month before the US election will hurt Kamala Harris and the Democrats.

Israel also believes that the culmination of the US pre-election confrontation, which remains highly ambiguous, has given it complete freedom of movement to do more or less as it pleases, having ensured US participation in fending off Iranian (counter)attacks. This is indeed true, but even with American assistance several dozen of the 180 ballistic missiles that Iran launched on October 1 penetrated its multi-layered air defenses. What is not the case is that Israel has similar freedom of movement to launch a massive air campaign against Iran that would include the country’s nuclear and energy infrastructure.

President Biden, with whatever political power he has left, publicly warned Israel not to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. It is an “easy” warning, since without active American involvement a unilateral Israeli attack would not achieve much, since the Israeli air force does not have the very heavy armor-piercing missiles that can destroy underground and scattered Iranian military infrastructure.

Similar messages of restraint are being given privately by the Americans to prevent a massive attack on Iranian oil facilities, which many Israeli military and politicians, such as General Amirdor and former Prime Minister Bennett, publicly support.

If Israel ignores these warnings and attacks Iranian oil infrastructure, such as crude processing plants, port facilities and Iranian refineries, in addition to pushing oil prices well above $100 a barrel, it will damage politically Kamala Harris and the Democrats ahead of the November 5 election. This is something that in the final analysis may be consistent with Mr. Netanyahu’s personal political interest.

Also, if Israel massively hits Iranian oil infrastructure it will “free” Iran to attack oil targets of US allies in the region, primarily Jordan, initially through cyber-attacks and if further escalated through similar large-scale attacks (or of greater) severity with those launched against Saudi Arabia in September 2019. In this scenario – depending on the degree of escalation – oil prices will completely escape, while the possibility of a partial closure of the Straits of Hormuz cannot be ruled out either, if the Iranians (counter)attack American troops in the Gulf region holding them jointly responsible for the Israeli strikes.

Ultimately if the upcoming Israeli counterattack against Iran is to be symmetrical it should focus on purely military targets and not seek to destroy the country’s oil infrastructure. Even if Israel does not strike Iran’s oil system, it can target non-oil energy infrastructure, such as major natural gas production facilities and especially Iran’s power plants and domestic electricity and gas networks. If the blow is purely military and avoids further bilateral escalation, then Iran may take responsibility for accepting what Nasrallah has refused to do, a unilateral truce that will stop Israel’s northern front and abandon the Palestinians. This might pull the region one step before the cliff…

*Dr. Theodoros Tsakiris is a professor of Geopolitics and Energy Policy at the University of Nicosia.

2024-10-06 09:37:01

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