Indonesia tested its decades-old nonaligned foreign policy on August 12 when an Indonesian Navy frigate briefly joined a passing exercise with China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy off Taiwan’s east coast.
The Passing Exercise and the Homeward Voyage
The military engagement centered on the Indonesian Navy frigate KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai-332 and the PLAN guided-missile frigate Honghe. The vessels conducted joint navigation, communications procedures, and underway replenishment exercises in mid-August in the Pacific Ocean and Philippine Sea off Taiwan’s eastern coast, outside the disputed waters of the South China Sea.
According to the Indonesian Navy’s official explanation, the maneuvers were carried out as a standard international protocol during the warship’s homeward voyage. Head of the Indonesian Navy Information Service First Admiral Tunggul stated that the vessel was returning to Indonesia after completing joint exercises with the Russian Navy in Vladivostok.
“Passing exercises are common goodwill engagements conducted by navies worldwide as a manifestation of naval camaraderie and maritime diplomacy inherent in warship operations.”
First Admiral Tunggul, Head of the Indonesian Navy Information Service
The exercise was also confirmed by China’s Ministry of National Defense. However, the timing placed the routine maritime diplomacy directly into a high-stakes geopolitical flashpoint, as the maneuvers coincided with Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military drill.
Taipei’s Condemnation and Jakarta’s Defense
The encounter immediately triggered diplomatic ripples in Taiwan. Following Beijing’s announcement of the drill on August 11, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council condemned the move as a “provocation” and requested further details from the Indonesian government via its Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
An Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson acknowledged that the location made it particularly sensitive,
but maintained that the warship’s presence was simply part of its transit route back to Indonesia.
The Indonesian Navy reinforced this stance, stating officially that its activities with the Chinese Navy were not warfighting activities in nature
and not intended as combat training.
Regional analysts interviewed by international media offered differing views on the weight of the drill. Ying-Yu Lin, an associate professor at Taiwan’s Tamkang University Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, noted that the exercise had limited tactical value. It wasn’t as practical as a joint maritime drill, but China wanted to claim its capability in the waters,
he observed.
At the same time, Ratih Kabinawa, a visiting research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, argued that Jakarta should have anticipated Taipei’s sharp reaction. Like it or not, Indonesia is now dragged into this kind of geopolitical gambit,
Kabinawa said, adding that passing exercises represent some of the lowest-level naval activities utilized by China to justify its intimidation of Taiwan. Indonesia must also exercise caution in this regard,
she cautioned.
Balancing Superpower Pressures Under a Nonaligned Doctrine
The episode underscores the delicate balancing act defining Indonesia’s free and active
foreign policy doctrine, which has guided the nation for over half a century. As the world’s largest island nation, Indonesia seeks to avoid formal alignment with either Beijing or Washington, even as both capitals vie for influence in its Asia-Pacific strategy.
The competing diplomatic currents were highlighted on the very same day as the passing exercise, when Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto met with U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby in Jakarta. While Prabowo also visits Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, Jakarta has simultaneously accommodated U.S. requests for blanket overflights, granting American military aircraft access to Indonesian airspace.
Chong Ja Ian, an associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore, noted that Indonesia’s neutral posture remains subject to intense external pressure. The principle of free and active foreign policy wouldn’t change much, but we’ll wait and see how Jakarta operates it,
he said. Observers point out that the current administration faces a lack of clear guidelines for interpreting this doctrine amid rising cross-strait tensions. Yet analysts emphasize that any direct military involvement in a Taiwan Strait conflict remains highly unlikely, given that approximately 350,000 Indonesian citizens reside in Taiwan. So I don’t think Indonesia would get involved in being a combatant, but rather involved in trying to evacuate their citizens,
Kabinawa noted. That would risk the political and economic stability of the country itself.
