Any road that passes through the territory of Armenia must be controlled by Armenia. Toivo Klaar

by times news cr

According to Toivo Klaar, the EU’s special representative for the crisis in the South Caucasus and Georgia, it is quite logical that in the context of unblocking communications in the South Caucasus, any road, any railway that will pass through the territory of Armenia should be controlled by Armenia.

In an exclusive interview with “Armenpress” reporter in Brussels, Klaar referred to the “Crossroads of Peace” project proposed by the Armenian authorities, the possible peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the guaranteed safe return of Nagorno Karabakh Armenians to their homes.

-Unlike Azerbaijan, which regularly talks about the so-called Zangezur Corridor in the context of unblocking regional communications, obviously implying the idea of ​​having an extra-territorial corridor through the sovereign territory of Armenia, the Armenian government proposes the “Crossroads of Peace” project, which implies unblocking regional communications under the jurisdiction and sovereignty of countries on the basis of which, as a result of its implementation, the region can become an important international logistic and commercial intersection. it can also be a kind of guarantee of peace. How would you interpret this initiative of the Armenian government and what opportunities do you see here? Do you consider the implementation of this project possible, taking into account the destructive position of Azerbaijan in the matter of unblocking communications?

– First, I think that a few months ago (ed. May 2023), President Aliyev announced on television in Moscow that during his meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan in the presence of President Putin, he very clearly said that calling it a “corridor” does not imply extraterritoriality. President Aliyev has said in other cases, in narrower environments, that this does not imply extraterritoriality. Yes, by calling it a corridor, as you know, we say transport corridors, referring to the various corridors that we have in Europe, which never imply extraterritoriality. So, obviously, from our point of view, it is quite logical that any road, any railway that passes through the territory of Armenia is controlled by Armenia. Or any road or railway that passes through the territory of Azerbaijan or passes, I don’t know, through the territory of Germany, is controlled by the given country. Therefore, it is absolutely the only logical arrangement. For example, in this case, Azerbaijan wants to have a guarantee that the citizens of Azerbaijan and cargo passing through the territory of Armenia will be safe. It is completely logical and normal. But how it will be done is the responsibility of the Armenian authorities.

I think that Prime Minister Pashinyan’s vision of road and railway connections uniting the countries is something that we completely share. We absolutely share the vision of an open South Caucasus, where rail and road connections are open and countries are reunified as they were at the end of the Soviet Union era and even more. Road and rail connections to Turkey and, of course, Iran, which is already the case, should also be open. This is how we see the future, absolutely, our vision of a peaceful South Caucasus is that these transportation links are open again, and there is trade, there are people traveling across borders.

– Since you mentioned the demand of the President of Azerbaijan that the passage of citizens of Azerbaijan through this corridor should be very safe, here I want to ask a question that concerns Armenians forcibly displaced from Nagorno Karabakh. What is your approach to the right of these people to return to their homes? But let me draw attention to one point. The corridor of Lachin was closed and the Armenians did not have a chance to cross safely, many of them are arrested on false charges. Azerbaijani forces could not guarantee the safety of those Armenians. Thus, Azerbaijan is demanding things that it has not done.

– I think you bring up many different issues, but I would focus on the possibility of the return of the residents of Nagorno Karabakh. We definitely believe that this is a very important thing, that first of all their right to return is guaranteed. And secondly, that conditions are created that provide a sufficient sense of safety and security for them to want to return. We have made it very clear from an EU perspective that all displaced persons must be able to return safely and securely to their former places of residence if they wish to do so. And in that sense, this is an issue that we have raised on various platforms. We think this is a very important issue that needs to be resolved. But, of course, nobody can be forced to return if people don’t want to. But if there are those who want to return, then maximum efforts should be made to provide them with conditions that will allow most of these people to make a decision to return.

– Since you talked about peace in the region… Azerbaijan continues its expansionist rhetoric and wants to reach a peace agreement only on its own terms. How do you imagine the peace agreement? What points should be included in it so that it is fair, balanced and ensures stability?

– I think it is important that on the one hand you have a contract, you have a text that can be very comprehensive or not. Everything depends on how Armenia and Azerbaijan will ultimately decide and formulate the text of the agreement. Equally important is the implementation of the final peace agreement, the fulfillment of the conditions that come after it. And here, of course, we should talk about the opening of communications, talk about demarcation of the border. For me, it is also very important to ensure the distance between the forces along the border, the real sense of security that will be given to the residents along the border, but also on a wider scale. And then, of course, you have all those issues like, you know, opening embassies, making sure direct air links are open, people being able to travel back and forth. Rhetoric, of course, will also be important for all interested parties. After more than 30 years of conflict, it is not only about the rhetoric of Azerbaijan, but also of Armenia. There were statements by different actors and in different contexts. The whole context must be changed in terms of providing a real feeling for the population of Armenia and Azerbaijan that, indeed, we are now in a different world, in a situation where the South Caucasus can really fulfill its role as a crossroads, a crossroads of peace, north-south and east- in the west directions. For me, this is at least as important as the signing of the text of the peace treaty, which, as I say, is important, but what follows it is at least as important, so that there is this real feeling of change in circumstances.

– The EU wants to be the mediator of that peace agreement. However, at the last moment, the Azerbaijani side refused first the meeting in Granada, then the meeting scheduled for the end of October in Brussels. How do you interpret this dodge of Aliyev? To what extent does the EU consider these steps of Azerbaijan constructive?

– First, in this context, the EU does not have to be on any side. We, and particularly President Michel, offered his friendly services. The primary interest for us is to have an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And where it is signed in the end is much less important for us than the fact that there is a real settlement of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is a point. And as for President Aliyev’s decision not to come to Granada, we were disappointed, we thought it was an important opportunity and quite an important forum to send strong messages. President Michel is still ready and wants to organize a meeting of leaders in Brussels as soon as possible. Dates are, of course, important. But the most important thing is actually moving forward, and that’s what we’re focused on, trying to encourage progress toward a real settlement of relations.

-Many political scientists tend to think that Azerbaijan is not really interested in the European platform and the 3+3 format is more beneficial for Aliyev. What is your assessment of this approach?

– I have no particular opinion, from our point of view, we consider both the last and the previous meetings in the 3+3 format as a format where the countries of the region, which certainly have problems, can discuss them as neighbors. At the same time, I also understand that, at least from the beginning, there was an understanding that especially the conflict, the peace agreement, the settlement, really should not be the subject of discussion in that format. So, again, progress is the most important thing for us, and on which platform is much less important. But we believe that in fact, in our opinion, there is no real reason why we cannot make serious progress in the settlement process, because the issues on the table for us are very few, and we believe that they have been discussed many times. Therefore, we really see no reason why we cannot move forward, and why Azerbaijan and Armenia cannot move very quickly in the direction of normalizing relations.

-Azerbaijan criticizes the arming of Armenia, while it has a military budget three times larger, and airplanes with ammunition do not stop landing at the Baku airport. How do you interpret this rhetoric of Azerbaijan?

– I think that every country has the right to defend itself and buy the weapon it considers necessary for the defense of its territory. That is my simple answer. Most of the countries of the world buy weapons from abroad in order to defend their territory. So, in that sense, there is nothing spectacular or wrong about this.

– The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan criticized the statements made by Josep Borel during the press conference held after the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the EU. Azerbaijan announced that “by supplying weapons, the EU contributes to the policy of militarization of Armenia, which undermines peace and stability in the region.” Azerbaijan has also announced that the EU will receive an adequate response, effectively threatening not only Armenia, but also the European Union. What is your attitude to this?

– We very much welcome the interest of the Armenian government to expand its relations with the European Union. What about supporting Armenia within the framework of the European Peace Fund, from our point of view it refers to potential support in some areas where Armenia considers itself vulnerable, for example cyber security has been mentioned as one of them. And again, if this goes forward, because it’s still in the planning stages, we don’t see it as a move against anybody. Rather, it is done for the purpose of strengthening Armenia’s sovereignty, which, I think, is beneficial to everyone, not only Armenia, but also Armenia’s neighbors and the wider international community. We want to have a strong, self-confident Armenia, which is a good partner for the European Union and an equally good partner for its neighbors, including Azerbaijan.

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The initiative you referenced from the Armenian government ⁣to unblock ⁤regional communications under the jurisdiction and sovereignty of⁤ the respective countries demonstrates a proactive approach toward ⁣enhancing regional connectivity ​and integrating​ Armenia into international logistics and commerce. This perspective highlights Armenia’s aspiration for a peaceful, open ⁤South Caucasus and offers numerous opportunities, including economic development, increased trade, and enhanced diplomatic ⁤relations ‌with neighboring countries.

Interpretation of the Initiative

  1. Regional Integration: The Armenian ‍government’s initiative ‍emphasizes the importance of regional connections that can enhance trade and foster cooperation among South Caucasian countries. This can be ‍viewed as a ⁣potential pathway to normalization ⁢of ‌relations, promoting mutual benefits through⁢ connectivity.
  1. Peace through Connectivity:⁣ By presenting the initiative as a pathway ⁢to peace, the Armenian government is advocating for a shared understanding that infrastructure projects can create interdependence⁣ and reduce hostilities. The idea is‌ that infrastructure can ⁣be a stabilizing ⁢factor in a historically contentious region.
  1. Responses to Azerbaijan’s Position: The⁣ initial proposition for a transport⁤ corridor, especially⁢ as discussed by President Aliyev, reflects a delicate negotiation dynamic concerning sovereignty and territorial integrity. Armenia’s emphasis on the jurisdiction‍ over these⁣ transport links can be ⁤viewed as ⁤a commitment to state sovereignty while still aligning on mutual interests.

Opportunities

  1. Trade Growth: Unblocking and‌ establishing communication lines can lead to increased trade not only between‌ Armenia and Azerbaijan ‍but‌ also ⁤with Turkey and Iran. This could diversify⁣ Armenia’s economy‍ and reduce its economic reliance on any single partner.
  1. Security Guarantees: By ensuring safe passage for citizens and‌ goods, this initiative could lay the groundwork for ⁤more‍ extensive security arrangements, which could ⁢alleviate fears of conflict and promote a sense of ‌safety among populations.
  1. International⁣ Support: The involvement of the EU and the prospect of international mediation and support can‍ add legitimacy to ⁣this initiative and help facilitate the implementation process, ⁢as long as⁣ both​ parties are willing to engage constructively.

Challenges ​to Implementation

  1. Azerbaijan’s ‌Position: The destructive stance of Azerbaijan—evident from⁢ its demands⁤ and reluctance to engage in negotiations—presents a significant hurdle. The perception that Azerbaijan wants to dictate terms can stall progress.
  1. Human Rights Concerns: There are legitimate anxieties surrounding the ⁢safety of displaced Armenians wishing to‍ return to⁤ Nagorno-Karabakh, along with broader⁣ human rights ‌considerations. The recent history brings skepticism about Azerbaijan’s guarantees for safety, ⁣as ​evidenced by the tragedies ‍that have befallen Armenian civilians.
  1. Political Will: The success​ of this project hinges ‌on​ the political will of both governments⁣ to commit to peace‍ and cooperation.⁣ This requires shifting ​rhetoric‌ and public perceptions, which can be a lengthy process given entrenched​ narratives on both sides.

Conclusion

while the ‌Armenian government’s initiative ⁤to ⁣unblock regional communications holds the potential for significant economic ⁣and political benefits, the fulfillment of such ⁢a vision will require​ navigating⁤ complex⁣ geopolitical dynamics, particularly considering ‌Azerbaijan’s current positioning. Continuous dialogue, assurance of rights, and ‌concrete steps toward demilitarization and traffic safety will be crucial⁢ to ⁤moving forward. International actors, particularly those within the EU, can play a vital role in ⁢fostering ‌dialogue and establishing frameworks for ‍cooperation, but the ultimate success ⁤relies heavily on the willingness and commitment of both‍ Armenia and Azerbaijan to seek⁢ a peaceful resolution.

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