ASEAN Prefers China Over US as Trump’s Policies Spark Geopolitical Concerns

by ethan.brook News Editor

The geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia is undergoing a fundamental shift, as fears over the volatility of U.S. Foreign policy now outweigh long-standing anxieties regarding territorial aggression in the South China Sea. According to the latest ISEAS survey, the leadership of U.S. President Donald Trump has emerged as the primary source of concern for the region’s strategic thinkers.

The “State of Southeast Asia 2026” report, released on April 7, reveals a region increasingly uneasy with the unpredictability of its traditional security partner. For the first time, the U.S. President’s leadership was cited as the top geopolitical fear by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute respondents, with 51.9 per cent naming it as their chief concern. This figure surpasses the 48.2 per cent who identified aggressive behavior in the South China Sea as the region’s most pressing threat.

This shift in sentiment coincides with a reversal in superpower preference. A slim majority of the 2,008 opinion-makers and thought leaders surveyed—comprising academics, government officials, and business leaders—now prefer China over the United States. Specifically, 52 per cent of respondents would opt to align with Beijing, compared to 48 per cent who chose Washington.

The result marks a volatile swing in regional alignment. In 2025, the U.S. Had briefly reclaimed its position as the preferred superpower as concerns over Chinese influence peaked. However, that trend has since inverted, reflecting a growing disillusionment with American stability.

The ‘Trump Factor’ and Economic Friction

The erosion of trust in U.S. Leadership is not merely diplomatic but deeply economic. The report highlights a sharp increase in pessimism regarding bilateral relations; 29.5 per cent of respondents now expect their country’s relationship with the U.S. To deteriorate under the current administration, a significant jump from the 14.2 per cent who felt this way in 2025.

The 'Trump Factor' and Economic Friction

Much of this friction stems from the implementation of global reciprocal tariffs. While trade tensions were previously viewed as a binary conflict between Washington and Beijing—leaving Southeast Asian nations as “periphery casualties”—the current administration’s tariffs have directly impacted regional powerhouses, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.

This economic pressure has forced a strategic pivot. Roughly 20.7 per cent of those surveyed now believe that building alternative supply chains is the only viable solution to enhance regional resilience. 38.5 per cent of respondents indicated that the U.S. Should prioritize the respect of international law over unilateral actions that threaten the global system.

The nature of the distrust has also evolved. In 2025, the primary fear was that the U.S. Would be too distracted by internal domestic turmoil to lead globally. In 2026, that concern has been replaced by a more acute fear: 35 per cent of distrustful respondents now worry that American economic and military power could be used to directly threaten their specific national interests and sovereignty.

China’s Dominance and the Rise of Domestic Friction

As the U.S. Position wavers, China has cemented its status as the region’s dominant force. The ISEAS survey finds that Beijing remains the most influential economic power for ASEAN, cited by 55.9 per cent of respondents, and the leading political-strategic power at 40 per cent.

However, China’s ascent is not without its own set of complications. The report identifies a critical shift in how ASEAN views Beijing’s influence. While geographical disputes were previously the main point of contention, the primary concern has shifted toward internal interference. For the first time, China’s interference in the domestic affairs of ASEAN member states was named the region’s top concern regarding Beijing, cited by 30.3 per cent of respondents.

This now outweighs the 28 per cent who are concerned with “strong-arm tactics” in the South China Sea and the Mekong River. To improve ties, 35.1 per cent of respondents emphasized that Beijing must resolve maritime and territorial disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law.

Preferred Superpower Alignment Trends (2024–2026)
Survey Year Preferred Superpower Percentage (Lead)
2024 China 50.5% (vs 49.5% US)
2025 United States Lead Reclaimed
2026 China 52% (vs 48% US)

A Backdrop of Global Volatility

The survey results were captured during a period of intense global instability, which likely colored the respondents’ outlook. The poll was conducted between January 5 and February 20, 2026—a window that saw the U.S. Attack Venezuela and depose its president, followed by military strikes on Iran.

The subsequent conflict in the Middle East, which included the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28, has had tangible ripples across Southeast Asia. The near-closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical conduit for roughly 20 per cent of the world’s oil and gas, has triggered energy shortages and price hikes in countries like Thailand and Malaysia.

These external shocks have reinforced the region’s desire for “strategic autonomy.” An overwhelming majority of respondents rejected the idea that ASEAN neutrality is no longer viable. Instead, 55.2 per cent favor stronger internal unity to resist pressure from major powers, while 24.1 per cent continue to back a strictly non-aligned stance.

“What stands out in this year’s survey is that South-east Asia is uneasy about both major powers, albeit in different ways,” said Joanne Lin, a senior fellow and coordinator at the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS. “The broader message is that South-east Asia still wants balance, not alignment – but preserving that balance is becoming more difficult.”

The Search for a Trusted Third Partner

Amidst the friction between Washington and Beijing, Japan remains the region’s most trusted ally. Despite a slight dip from 66.8 per cent in 2025, Japan holds a trust rating of 65.6 per cent, followed by the European Union at 55.9 per cent.

This reliance on “middle powers” underscores a broader strategy of diversification. By strengthening ties with Tokyo and Brussels, ASEAN nations hope to avoid being forced into a binary choice between two superpowers that both inspire significant apprehension.

Professor Herman Kraft of the University of the Philippines noted that internal cohesion is the region’s best defense. He suggested that by focusing on unity, ASEAN is better positioned to engage both the U.S. And China without being forced to strategically seize sides in their competition.

The regional community now looks toward the upcoming ASEAN summits to spot if this desire for unity can be translated into a cohesive diplomatic framework. Official updates on the bloc’s strategic posture are expected following the next round of ministerial meetings scheduled for later this year.

Do you believe ASEAN can maintain its neutrality in an increasingly polarized world? Share your thoughts in the comments below.

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