Leaders from 11 Southeast Asian nations departed Cebu, Philippines, last week after a biannual leadership summit that failed to produce a single binding agreement on the region’s most pressing threats. Despite meeting under the shadow of a severe economic downturn and a volatile energy market, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) returned home with a collection of aspirational statements and the creation of several new working groups, but no concrete policy shifts.
The ASEAN leadership summit outcomes highlight a growing divide within the bloc, as member states struggled to coordinate a response to the energy crisis triggered by the ongoing war in Iran. The conflict has severely constricted liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies from the Gulf, sending prices surging and pushing several Southeast Asian economies toward recession. While the summit was intended to chart a regional path toward energy security, the 11 members could not agree on a unified strategy to stabilize costs or secure alternative supplies.
Beyond energy, the summit saw a total stalemate on other critical fronts. Members failed to establish a code of conduct to resolve long-standing territorial disputes in the South China Sea, tabled a proposed climate funding plan, and deferred the creation of an AI governance framework to a subordinate working group. The lack of progress suggests a multilateral body that is increasingly unable to function as a strategic actor during genuine emergencies.
The Energy Crisis and the LNG Dependency
For much of the region, the current energy crisis is not merely a financial burden but a systemic threat to governance. Southeast Asia is among the most dependent regions globally on LNG imports from the Gulf. While wealthy members like Singapore and the oil-producing state of Brunei remain relatively insulated, the majority of ASEAN members—ranging from middle-income to poor—are in dire straits.
Unlike Japan or South Korea, which possess the capital to navigate the volatile spot market for LNG, poorer ASEAN nations are seeing businesses collapse and government functions falter as fuel runs dry. To mitigate the shock, some governments have attempted to provide fuel subsidies or release limited national reserves, but these measures are unsustainable for nations already facing economic contraction.
During the Cebu summit, several emergency proposals were floated to break the deadlock, including the creation of a regional strategic petroleum reserve similar to the one maintained by the United States. Other suggestions included an agreement to end competition on the spot market and a fast-track plan to increase renewable energy imports. However, none of these initiatives gained the necessary consensus. Instead, the bloc opted to send envoys to the Gulf to negotiate individual LNG contracts and established a task force to study renewable energy—steps that critics argue are insufficient for the immediate crisis.
Proposed vs. Actual Energy Outcomes
| Proposed Strategy | Summit Outcome | Immediate Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Regional Strategic Petroleum Reserve | Rejected/No Agreement | Continued reliance on volatile spot markets |
| End to Spot Market Competition | Rejected/No Agreement | Member states continue to outbid one another |
| Renewable Energy Import Boost | Referred to Task Force | No immediate shift in energy mix |
| Coordinated Gulf LNG Strategy | Individual Envoy Missions | Fragmented national negotiations |
A Systemic Paralysis: The Consensus Trap
The failure in Cebu is a symptom of a deeper structural flaw: the “ASEAN Way.” Established in 1967, the organization operates on a strict consensus-based model, meaning all 11 members must agree before any collective action is taken. This effectively grants every member state a veto, allowing a single dissenting voice to paralyze the entire organization.
Joshua Kurlantzick, a senior fellow for Southeast Asia and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, notes that the organization has become “congenitally incapable of responding to genuine emergencies.” He argues that while ASEAN was more effective when it was a smaller group led by a dominant power like Indonesia, the current expansion to 11 members—including several authoritarian states—has made interests too divergent for meaningful coordination.
This paralysis is most evident in the bloc’s inability to address internal security crises, such as the 2021 military coup in Myanmar. Despite years of diplomatic effort, ASEAN has remained largely ineffective in restoring democratic governance in Myanmar, reflecting a broader democratic regression across the region over the last two decades.
The Shadow of the ‘Proxy Veto’
Adding to the internal friction is the increasing influence of China. Although not a member of ASEAN, Beijing has cultivated deep ties with member states such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. Kurlantzick suggests that these nations now function as de facto client states, providing China with what is essentially a “proxy veto” over any ASEAN initiative that might conflict with Beijing’s interests.
The most glaring example of this dynamic is the failure to establish a code of conduct in the South China Sea. While nations like the Philippines and Vietnam have pushed for tougher measures to protect their territorial integrity, these efforts are consistently blocked by members like Cambodia, who align with China’s position. This dynamic transforms the summit from a decision-making body into a “talk shop,” where the primary value lies in bilateral side-meetings with regional powers rather than collective action.
Despite these failures, ASEAN continues to find success in economic integration. The bloc has historically been effective at facilitating trade deals and fostering regional commerce, though this success is increasingly overshadowed by the region’s inability to handle strategic or security crises.
The next critical checkpoint for the region will be the upcoming follow-up meetings of the newly formed renewable energy task force, though there is little indication that these discussions will result in the binding commitments required to alleviate the current energy shortage.
We invite readers to share their perspectives on ASEAN’s role in regional security in the comments below.
