Donald Trump has long claimed that the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was a flawed agreement, one that left the door open for Iran to eventually acquire a nuclear weapon. During his first term, he withdrew the United States from the pact, opting instead for a policy of “maximum pressure.” Now, as he contemplates a potential return to the White House, the former president has signaled a desire to strike a new, “far better” deal with Tehran.
However, the technical landscape of Iran’s nuclear program has shifted fundamentally since 2015. While a new agreement might appear politically viable on the surface—focusing on uranium stockpiles and enrichment moratoriums—experts warn that these measures are no longer sufficient. The challenge is no longer just about how much uranium Iran possesses, but how quickly they can produce more of it and how effectively they can turn that material into a warhead.
The central problem is that Iran has not merely maintained its program; it has evolved. In the years following the U.S. Withdrawal from the JCPOA, Tehran accelerated its research into centrifuge technology and installation speeds. This evolution has created a “sprint” capability that makes the constraints of the original 2015 deal obsolete.
The ‘Sprinting’ Problem: Why Old Constraints Fail
In 2015, the JCPOA focused heavily on capping the number and types of centrifuges Iran could operate. The goal was to ensure a “breakout time”—the time needed to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one bomb—of at least one year. This window was intended to give the international community time to detect a violation and respond diplomatically or militarily.
By 2024, that window has shrunk. Iran has developed advanced centrifuges that are significantly more efficient than the early models used in 2015. More critically, Tehran has improved its “installation speed,” the rate at which it can set up “cascades”—networks of interconnected centrifuges that accelerate the enrichment process.
This technological leap means that even if a new deal were to impose a total moratorium on enrichment and the surrender of all highly enriched uranium, Iran’s inherent knowledge cannot be “bombed away.” If Tehran decided to break a future agreement, it could potentially rebuild its infrastructure and produce weapon-grade material in a fraction of the time it would have taken a decade ago. Some estimates suggest that with current technology, the timeline to produce one weapon’s worth of material could be reduced to as little as six months, even starting from a position of severe constraint.
The Blind Spot: Gaps in International Oversight
A deal is only as strong as its verification. Under the JCPOA, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had unprecedented access to Iranian sites. This included the implementation of the Additional Protocol, a legal tool that allows inspectors to investigate undeclared sites to ensure no covert nuclear activity is occurring.
That oversight has largely collapsed. Following the 2020 assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh and subsequent tensions, Iran halted much of its cooperation with the IAEA. This created a critical “knowledge gap.” Since 2021, Iran has produced tens of thousands of centrifuges; while many are at known sites like Natanz and Fordow, there is no way to verify if hundreds of others have been diverted to clandestine facilities.
For any new deal to be effective, it would need to address these gaps through several rigorous requirements:
- Full Reimplementation of the Additional Protocol: Allowing the IAEA to unmask secret facilities.
- Comprehensive Centrifuge Accounting: A complete audit of every centrifuge manufactured since 2021 to ensure none are hidden.
- Verification of Non-Nuclear Research: Access to military and research sites that could be used for weaponization.
Beyond Enrichment: The Weaponization Hurdle
There is a vital distinction in nuclear proliferation between enrichment (making the fuel) and weaponization (building the bomb). The 2015 deal focused almost entirely on the former, as restricting industrial enrichment facilities is easier than monitoring the smaller, more discreet activities involved in warhead design, such as computer modeling and explosives testing.
For years, U.S. Intelligence assessments suggested that Iran was not actively pursuing the weaponization phase. However, that confidence has eroded. In recent annual reports, intelligence agencies have become more cautious, reflecting a growing concern that Tehran may be moving closer to the final stages of bomb assembly.
A “better deal” in the eyes of the Trump administration might focus on “nuclear dust”—the removal of uranium enriched to 60%. While this removes the immediate threat, it does not address the capability to design a warhead. Without new, intrusive authorities to monitor weaponization, a deal may simply push Iran’s most dangerous activities further underground.
| Feature | JCPOA (2015) | Required “Better Deal” (2025+) |
|---|---|---|
| Breakout Time | Approx. 1 Year | Significantly Shorter (due to tech) |
| Centrifuge Tech | Capped types/numbers | Full accounting of advanced models |
| IAEA Access | High (Additional Protocol) | Must be restored + expanded |
| Focus | Enrichment & Stockpiles | Enrichment + Weaponization |
Necessary but Insufficient
Even a technically perfect nuclear deal cannot solve the broader geopolitical friction between Washington and Tehran. The nuclear program is often the focal point of diplomacy, but it is not the only threat. Iran’s ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and its sophisticated ballistic missile program remain immediate risks to U.S. Interests in the Middle East.
Focusing solely on the nuclear issue risks ignoring the “protean” nature of the threat. A nuclear-armed Iran would make existing regional tensions immeasurably more dangerous, but a nuclear deal alone will not stop Tehran’s regional ambitions or its missile development. Diplomacy must therefore be part of a wider strategy that addresses both the atomic threat and the conventional military capabilities of the regime.
The next critical checkpoint for these tensions will be the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors meetings, where the agency is expected to report on Iran’s compliance and the status of outstanding investigations into undeclared nuclear sites.
Do you think a new nuclear deal is possible, or is military deterrence the only remaining option? Share your thoughts in the comments below.
