The atmosphere inside the Mining Commission of the Chamber of Deputies was less a formal hearing and more a political standoff. For Máximo Pacheco, the president of Codelco, what was intended to be a summary of a four-year tenure became a lesson in parliamentary friction. In a narrow 6-5 vote, deputies blocked Pacheco from delivering his prepared farewell speech, opting instead to move directly to a grueling interrogation.
The tension underscores the precarious position of the state-owned copper giant, which serves as the financial bedrock of the Chilean economy. While Pacheco sought to use his final appearance to frame a narrative of stabilization and recovery, the legislature remained focused on the immediate: project delays, a widening productivity gap compared to private mining firms, and a tragic safety record that continues to haunt the company’s operations.
The clash reached a tipping point when deputies, led by commission president Cristián Tapia (Independent PPD), pressed Pacheco on labor conflicts and safety protocols following a fatal accident on July 31. Pacheco’s response was a sharp reminder of the boundaries of power. While acknowledging the “genuine interest” of the lawmakers, he warned that direct legislative intervention in labor negotiations is constitutionally forbidden—a breach that, he noted, could technically constitute grounds for removal from office.
The Huérfanos 1270 Saga: More Than a Remodel
Although the deputies silenced his speech, the document itself reveals a president desperate to settle a long-standing grievance: the rehabilitation of Codelco’s corporate headquarters at Huérfanos 1270 in downtown Santiago. The project has become a symbol of inefficiency for critics, spanning five years of delays and ballooning costs.
In the speech he was not permitted to read, Pacheco announced that workers began returning to the headquarters on April 27, exactly five years and one week after the board first decided to remodel the site in April 2021. He defended the timeline by clarifying that the original decision was made under his predecessor, Juan Benavides, and was initially conceived as a partial remodel tailored for a pandemic-era shift toward telework.
However, the project spiraled. Pacheco detailed a series of systemic failures, including “grave breaches” by the contractor that led to the termination of the original contract in July 2022. He argued that the company faced a binary choice: abandon a dangerous, half-finished skeletal building in the heart of the capital or commit to a total rehabilitation. The latter was chosen, a move approved by the board, Cochilco, and the Ministry of Social Development.
According to Pacheco, the intervention was not a luxury but a legal and safety imperative. Court rulings and technical reports had identified severe risks, including the potential for facade elements to detach and fall into the street, making the “price increase” a secondary concern to public safety.
Correcting the ‘Oversized’ Projections
Beyond the bricks and mortar of the corporate office, Pacheco used his written remarks to address the more critical issue of copper production. For years, Codelco has struggled with declining ore grades and the immense technical challenge of moving operations deeper underground.
Pacheco admitted that the company’s previous production projections were “oversized.” Since 2022, the administration has worked to recalibrate these goals, aiming to return to a production level of 1.7 million tons by the end of the decade—a figure that mirrors the company’s output in 2017. This admission of past over-optimism is a strategic pivot, intended to replace unrealistic targets with “objective signals of stabilization.”
To support this claim, Pacheco pointed to a projected Ebitda (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) of $6.67 billion for 2025. In simpler terms, he argued that Codelco is on track to generate approximately $18 million in daily cash utility, challenging the narrative that the company is “financially inviable” or in a state of terminal decay.
The Structural Race: 2022 vs. 2025
The core of Codelco’s survival depends on “structural projects”—massive engineering feats designed to extend the life of mines like Chuquicamata and El Teniente. Pacheco’s unread speech provided a granular look at the progress of these works, contrasting the state of the projects when he took over versus their projected status by December 2025.
| Project | Status (2022) | Projected Status (Dec 2025) |
|---|---|---|
| Chuquicamata Subterránea (Continuity L1 Ph1) | 17.4% | 90% |
| Rajo Inca | 23.1% | 94% |
| El Teniente Diamante | 15.6% | 51% |
| El Teniente Andes Norte | — | 80% |
| El Teniente Andesita | — | 80% |
Despite these numbers, the human cost remains the most contentious point. The speech acknowledged a seismic event in 2025 that resulted in the deaths of six workers at El Teniente. While the project percentages show technical progress, the recurring safety failures continue to fuel the deputies’ skepticism regarding Codelco’s operational management.
For Pacheco, the data suggests a company that has stopped the bleeding and is beginning to heal. For the Mining Commission, the data is secondary to the accountability for delays and the loss of life. This fundamental disconnect is why a simple farewell speech was deemed an unacceptable use of the commission’s time.
The company now awaits the finalization of its 2025 budgetary execution, which Pacheco claims is nearing 100%. The next critical checkpoint will be the official quarterly production report, which will reveal whether the “stabilization” mentioned in his silenced speech is translating into actual copper in the ground.
Do you believe the state should have more direct oversight of labor safety in companies like Codelco, or should the constitutional boundaries mentioned by Pacheco be strictly maintained? Share your thoughts in the comments.
