Electronic warfare, another crucial front of Russia’s offensive in Ukraine

by time news

On the battlefields of Ukraine, the simple act of turning on a cell phone can trigger a storm of projectiles. Artillery radars and remote controllers for drones can also draw enemy fire.

is the electronic warfare, a key but invisible aspect of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Military commanders mostly avoid discussing it, fearing they will jeopardize operations if they reveal secrets.

Electronic warfare technology attacks communications, navigation and guidance systems in order to locate, blind and deceive the enemy, and deliver lethal blows.

It is used against artillery, fighter jets, cruise missiles, drones, and more. The armed forces also use it to protect their troops.

It is an area in which Russia was thought to have a clear advantage heading into the war, but, for reasons not entirely clear, its vaunted electronic warfare capability only appeared in the early stages of the war in the chaotic failure of its offensive. to capture kyiv, the capital.

It has become a much more important factor in the current fierce battle for eastern Ukraine where shorter, more easily defended supply lines move electronic warfare equipment closer to battlefields.

Communication systems of Russia, in the Voronezh region. Photo: AP

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communications attack

A Ukrainian intelligence official said the Russian threat is “very serious” in terms of hampering reconnaissance efforts and commanders’ communications with their troops. The Russian interference with the GPS receivers in the drones that Ukraine uses to locate the enemy and directing their artillery attacks is especially intense “at the line of contact,” he said.

Ukraine has had some success in countering Moscow’s electronic offensive. He has captured important equipment, in a significant blow to Russian intelligence.

And destroyed at least two mobile multi-vehicle electronic warfare units.

Ukraine’s ability in electronic warfare is difficult to assess. Analysts say it has improved considerably since Russia captured Crimea and instigated a separatist revolt in the country’s east in 2014.

A Russian attack on a building in Mariupol, Ukraine, in a file image.  Photo: AP

A Russian attack on a building in Mariupol, Ukraine, in a file image. Photo: AP

Ukraine has also effectively used US technology and intelligence and other NATO members, which helped him, for example, to sink the warship Moskva.

Allied satellites and reconnaissance aircraft are assisting from neighboring skies, as is Elon Musk’s network of Starlink communications satellites.

how is the offense

Electronic warfare has three basic elements: tracking, attack, and protection. First, intelligence is collected by locating enemy electronic signals. On attack, “white noise” interference disables and degrades enemy systems, including radio and cellular communications, air defense, and artillery radars. In addition there is the spoofing, or identity theft, which confuses and deceives. When it works, the munitions miss their targets.

“Operating in a modern battlefield without data is really hard,” said retired Col. Laurie Buckhout, a former chief of electronic warfare for the US military. The interference “can blind and deafen aircraft very quickly and dangerously, especially if you lose GPS and radar and fly a fighter at 600 miles per hour (965 kilometers per hour).”

Russian military vehicles on the outskirts of Mariupol, after the capture of that key city.  Photo: EFE

Russian military vehicles on the outskirts of Mariupol, after the capture of that key city. Photo: EFE

all of which explains the secret surrounding electronic warfare.

“It’s an extremely secret field because it relies heavily on evolving, cutting-edge technology where profits can be copied and erased very quickly,” said James Stidham, a communications security expert who has worked as a consultant to the State and Homeland Security departments. United States National.

Ukraine learned hard lessons about electronic warfare in 2014 and 2015, when Russia used it to overwhelm its forces. Russians shot down drones and disabled warheads, penetrated cellular networks for psychological operations and concentrated on the Ukrainian defenses.

A Ukrainian official told Christian Brose, an aide to the late Sen. John McCain, how Russian data warriors tricked a commander into answering a cell phone call from his mother. when he did, they geolocated him and killed him with precision rocketsBrose wrote in the book “The Kill Chain.”

In the current conflict, electronic warfare has become a raging theater of contention.

Russia has jammed GPS in areas from Finland to the Black Sea. A Finnish regional airline had to cancel flights on one route for a week as a result.

Russian interference has also affected television broadcasts in Ukraine, said Frank Backes, an executive with the California-based Kratos Defense group, which has satellite ground stations in the region.

Difficulties

But in the initial days of the invasion, Russia’s use of electronic warfare was less effective and extensive than expected. That might have contributed to his inability to destroy enough radar and anti-aircraft units to gain superiority in the air. Some analysts think Russian commanders refrained from advancing electronic warfare units out of fear they would be captured. At least two were.

In addition, Russian commanders may have initially limited the use of electronic warfare in the conflict due to fears that untrained and unmotivated technicians could malfunction the systems.

“What we know now is that the Russians eventually shut down the systems because they were interfering too much with their own communications,” said retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former US Army Europe commander.

The problems were obvious. many Russian soldiers spoke on unprotected radio channels, easily monitored by outside elements.

The Russian Defense Ministry did not respond to questions for this article.

The magnitude of the advantage that its electronic systems now offer is not clear. The Ukrainian forces are now more concentrated, which could make them easier to attack.

Much depends on whether Russia’s tactical battalions “are actually configured as they are in theory,” said James Rands of Jane’s military intelligence think tank. Each group must have an electronic warfare unit. The Pentagon says that 110 groups are in Ukraine.

The Kremlin claims to have more than 1,000 small unmanned vehicles Orlan-10 which he uses for reconnaissance, attack targeting, cell jamming and interception.

The United States and Britain are providing Ukraine with jamming equipment, although it is not clear how much they help. Neither country gave details.

Musk’s Starlink network is a proven value. Its more than 2,200 satellites in low orbit provide broadband internet to more than 150,000 ground stations in Ukraine.

Cutting those connections is difficult for Russia. It is much more difficult to interfere with low orbit satellites than with geostationary satellites.

Source: AP

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