For decades, the Lebanese state has existed in a precarious duality, sharing power and territory with a paramilitary force that often wields more influence than the national army. As the country navigates the aftermath of recent hostilities, a fragile hope has emerged that Lebanon seeks peace through a restored sense of national sovereignty, yet the path to a stable future remains blocked by a fundamental disagreement over who holds the right to bear arms.
The central tension lies in the gap between the official aspirations of the Lebanese government and the strategic imperatives of Hezbollah. While the state formally advocates for a centralized authority, Hezbollah views its arsenal not as a challenge to the state, but as a necessary deterrent against external threats. This ideological divide has turned the quest for peace into a complex negotiation where the Lebanese government must convince one of its most powerful actors that disarmament is a viable security strategy.
The current volatility is underscored by the terms of the ceasefire reached in late 2024. Under the agreement, Hezbollah committed to removing its fighters and weapons from southern Lebanon, a region that has effectively functioned as a Hezbollah stronghold for years. This move is intended to allow the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to deploy and establish a security buffer, theoretically returning the south to state control.
The Litani Divide and the 2024 Ceasefire
The 2024 ceasefire deal represents one of the most significant attempts to enforce the spirit of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which called for the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River to be free of any armed personnel other than the LAF and UNIFIL peacekeepers. For the Lebanese government, the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from the south is a critical first step toward ending the cycle of conflict with Israel.
However, the transition is fraught with logistical and political hurdles. The removal of weapons from the south does not necessarily imply a surrender of those weapons; rather, it is a spatial relocation. The challenge for the state is ensuring that the LAF has the resources and political backing to maintain this vacuum, preventing a return to the status quo where paramilitary groups operate with impunity in border villages.
The stakes are particularly high for the residents of southern Lebanon, who have faced repeated displacements. For these communities, peace is not merely a diplomatic term but a requirement for the reconstruction of homes and the return of agriculture to a region that has been a battleground for generations.
The Struggle for a State Monopoly on Arms
The concept of a “state monopoly on arms”—the principle that only the national government should possess the legal authority to maintain a military—has been a recurring theme in Lebanese political discourse. Former President Michel Aoun previously defended this policy, arguing that for Lebanon to function as a sovereign state, it cannot have a “state within a state.”
Despite this official stance, the reality on the ground has remained stubbornly resistant to change. The Lebanese state has historically struggled to impose this monopoly because Hezbollah is deeply integrated into the country’s political fabric, holding seats in parliament and influence within the cabinet. This entanglement means that any push for total disarmament is often viewed not as a legal requirement, but as a political attack on a specific sectarian and political bloc.
The struggle for sovereignty is further complicated by Lebanon’s internal political vacuum. The country has struggled to maintain a consistent presidential leadership, which has weakened the executive branch’s ability to enforce national security policies or negotiate a comprehensive disarmament framework with the confidence of the international community.
Beyond the South: The Strongholds of Dahieh and the Bekaa
While the 2024 ceasefire focuses on the south, the question of disarmament extends far beyond the Litani River. Hezbollah’s influence is deeply entrenched in other strategic hubs, most notably the southern suburbs of Beirut, known as Dahieh, and the eastern Bekaa Valley. These areas serve as more than just residential hubs; they are centers of administrative control and locations for significant portions of the group’s arsenal.
In Dahieh, the group provides a wide array of social services, from healthcare to education, creating a social contract with the population that often supersedes the state’s presence. In the Bekaa Valley, the group’s presence is tied to both strategic depth and regional logistics. For the Lebanese state to truly achieve a monopoly on arms, it would need to project authority into these heartlands—a move that would likely be met with significant internal resistance.
The geographical distribution of Hezbollah’s power creates a fragmented security map. While the south may see an increase in LAF presence, the continued existence of “security zones” in Beirut and the Bekaa ensures that the state’s sovereignty remains conditional.
The Deadlock of Disarmament
The possibility of a nationwide disarmament remains remote, primarily due to the stance of Hezbollah’s leadership. Secretary-General Naim Qassem has explicitly rejected discussions regarding a full, nationwide disarmament, maintaining that the group’s weapons are essential for the defense of Lebanon.
This creates a diplomatic deadlock. The international community and various Lebanese political factions argue that peace is impossible as long as a non-state actor possesses the power to initiate conflict. Conversely, Hezbollah argues that the Lebanese Army is not yet sufficiently equipped to handle a full-scale invasion or insurgency without the group’s support.
| Region | Ceasefire Status | Primary Security Actor | State Authority Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| Southern Lebanon | Withdrawal Process | LAF / UNIFIL | Increasing |
| Dahieh (Beirut) | N/A | Hezbollah | Limited |
| Bekaa Valley | N/A | Hezbollah / LAF | Mixed |
The resolution of this conflict depends on whether Hezbollah can be convinced that the Lebanese state can provide a security guarantee that equals or exceeds the protection offered by its own missiles. Until then, the “state monopoly on arms” remains an aspiration rather than a reality.
The next critical checkpoint for this fragile peace will be the conclusion of the 60-day transition period associated with the 2024 ceasefire, during which the international community will monitor the actual withdrawal of fighters from the south and the effectiveness of the LAF’s deployment. This window will determine if the current agreement is a genuine step toward sovereignty or a temporary pause in a long-term struggle.
We invite readers to share their perspectives on Lebanon’s path to stability in the comments below.
