A senior rail industry figure has warned that proposals to alter the size of HS2 trains to maximize capacity could lead to higher costs, fewer passenger seats, and slower journey times for those traveling north of Birmingham. The warning comes as the government and HS2 Ltd navigate the fallout of previous project scaling, specifically the 2023 decision to cancel the northern leg of the high-speed network.
At the center of the dispute is a £2 billion order for 54 high-speed trains, to be manufactured in Derby and Newton Aycliffe by a joint venture between Alstom and Hitachi. While the order was finalized in 2021, the shift in the project’s scope has left officials questioning whether the original specifications still meet the needs of a truncated network.
The core of the issue is a mismatch between the trains’ potential length and the physical constraints of existing UK rail infrastructure. While the recent high-speed line between London and Birmingham can accommodate massive 400-meter trains—formed by doubling 200-meter eight-carriage units—most existing stations in the North, including Manchester Piccadilly, cannot. This limitation threatens to create a bottleneck where the “high-speed” experience ends abruptly at Birmingham.
The Capacity Gap in the North
Chris Gibb, a non-executive director of the state-owned rail operating company DfT Operator (DFTO), has broken ranks to caution against varying the current train order. Speaking in a personal capacity to the all-party parliamentary rail group in Westminster, Gibb argued that replacing the current fleet of 11-coach Pendolinos with shorter eight-coach HS2 trains would result in immediate overcrowding.
Gibb stated there could be “no doubt that if HS2 opened by replacing 11-coach Pendolinos with eight-coach trains these would be full and leave people behind on day one.” This capacity drop would be compounded by a technical limitation: unlike the Avanti West Coast Pendolinos, the Hitachi-Alstom trains do not feature “tilting” technology. This means they must slow down significantly on the curved sections of conventional tracks, potentially making the journey north of Birmingham slower than the services they were intended to improve.
To mitigate this, HS2 officials are reportedly considering an alternative: ordering approximately 43 longer trains, each 250 meters in length, which could fit into most existing stations. However, Gibb warns that such contract variations would not only be expensive but could waste significant work already completed on stations and depots designed for the original specifications.
Comparing the Rolling Stock Options
| Train Type | Length/Capacity | Capability | Infrastructure Constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| Original HS2 Order | 200m (8-coach) / 400m (16-coach) | High-speed rail | 400m only fits London-Birmingham line |
| Proposed Variation | 250m | High-speed rail | Fits most existing northern stations |
| Current Pendolinos | 11-coach | Tilting (Faster on curves) | Compatible with West Coast Main Line |
A Strategy for Long-Term Recovery
Rather than altering the existing contract with Alstom and Hitachi—which Gibb suggests would invite contractual penalties and delays—the industry expert proposes a two-pronged approach. He argues the government should stick to the original order to avoid immediate financial waste but simultaneously plan a full replacement of the aging Pendolino fleet.
By investing in longer, faster, and modern versions of the tilting fleet, the government could theoretically increase capacity and reduce journey times across all routes without requiring new railway construction in the immediate future. Gibb anticipates this would eventually result in a cost saving, as the overall number of trains required to move the same volume of passengers would decrease.
This perspective has found support among some of the project’s most prominent critics. Lord Berkeley, a long-term skeptic of HS2, backed the idea of maintaining a consistent type of rolling stock, noting that since full services to the north might not materialize until 2040 or 2050, consistency is key to operational flexibility.
The Financial and Political Stakes
The current debate occurs against a backdrop of intense fiscal scrutiny. Lord McLoughlin, the former transport secretary who saw the project through its initial legislative stages, described the current state of affairs as a “tragedy.” The tension lies between the desire to cut costs in the short term and the risk of delivering a service that is functionally inferior to the one it replaces.
There is widespread speculation that any decision on train size will be announced during the upcoming “reset” of HS2’s schedule and budget. This reset, led by chief executive Mark Wild and currently under discussion with government ministers, is expected to redefine the project’s financial trajectory following the scaling back of Phase Two.
Despite these warnings, HS2 Ltd maintains that the current plan remains unchanged. A spokesperson for the organization stated: “The Hitachi-Alstom joint venture is contracted to deliver a fleet of 54 new trains for HS2. No changes have been made to the original order.” The company added that they continue to work with the Department for Transport (DfT) and manufacturers to finalize designs before production begins in Derby and Newton Aycliffe.
The outcome of these deliberations will determine whether the North receives a genuine upgrade in connectivity or a compromised service that fails to match the capacity of the legacy West Coast Main Line. The next critical checkpoint will be the official publication of the revised budget and schedule “reset” by HS2 Ltd, which will clarify if the rolling stock contracts have been amended.
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