As a result, the regime’s responses have become more extreme, with almost no indication of willingness to surrender or compromise with US demands. That is the bad news. The good news is that the joint US-Israeli military campaign is proceeding according to plan, and at times even ahead of schedule.
The war aims of Israel and the United States are broadly aligned. Both seek to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, ideally permanently, and to deny it the ability to develop and produce ballistic missiles and drones in quantities and sophistication that no defense system could counter. These are the two existential threats the war is meant to eliminate, at least for years, even if the current regime survives.
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Compared with Operation Rising Lion, interception rates have improved. Interception in the north
(Photo: Gil Nechushtan)
However, there are areas where the goals and levels of commitment differ. Israel is working intensively to weaken the regime in order to enable its overthrow by the Iranian people. President Donald Trump does not view regime change as a primary objective. He is willing to settle for replacing the leadership, even if it remains clerical, as he has done in Venezuela. Accordingly, US Central Command is not focusing its military effort on that objective and has left it largely to the CIA.
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The United States has taken responsibility for the Strait of Hormuz. Smoke rises from oil facilities in Tehran after IDF strikes on March 8
(Photo: Majid Saeedi/Getty Images)
The IDF is not attempting to topple the regime directly, as doing so through firepower alone is nearly impossible and Israel has no plan to send troops into Tehran’s streets. Instead, Israel is acting across multiple channels to create conditions in which the Iranian people will want and be able to take control of their fate. This is the war’s “holy grail.”
If the regime falls, Iran’s network of proxies, led by Hezbollah, would also be neutralized. Credit must be given to Iran. It has learned lessons from previous confrontations and prepared well for the current war. Anticipating decapitation of its leadership and damage to command structures, it dispersed its military assets geographically and granted local commanders authority to act based on pre-set directives.
Its second major effort was to move critical assets underground. This includes nuclear laboratories, ballistic missiles and launchers, drones, and even fast attack boats, all buried tens of meters beneath rock. Iran also divided the country into 31 ballistic missile commands, each with independent launch authority. It had also planned in advance to close the Strait of Hormuz in the event of a US attack.
In the nuclear domain, the joint US-Israeli strategy aims to target all components of Iran’s weapons program, from enriched uranium to key knowledge centers, including scientists and engineers. There have been significant successes, but further operations are likely required, especially since Iran has also moved much of this infrastructure underground.
The regime still retains access to approximately 408 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%. With relatively few centrifuges, this material could be further enriched to produce eight to ten crude nuclear devices within weeks. This fissile material is stored or buried at three underground sites. As long as Iran can access it, the regime could achieve a form of deterrent immunity similar to North Korea’s. Western officials are debating how to remove or neutralize this material. One option is a ground operation by special forces, which would require more than 1,000 troops, heavy engineering equipment to clear blocked tunnels, several days of work, and sustained protection and logistics. It would be a highly complex and dangerous mission.
Another option is to seal the sites through aerial bombardment, collapsing tunnels in a way that would prevent Iranian access. However, this carries the risk of damaging storage containers and causing radioactive contamination in populated areas. The preferred option is a postwar agreement under which Iran would voluntarily remove the enriched uranium from its territory. In any case, the war cannot end while the regime retains access to highly enriched uranium.
In the missile and drone arena, a systematic effort is underway across several fronts. One is defensive, aimed at reducing launches toward Israel by striking launchers, missiles, and underground storage sites. The air force began targeting tunnel entrances immediately after the opening strike, even before achieving air superiority over Iran, and must continue to monitor and block them.
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US Central Command has not amassed enough forces. Kharg, Iran’s “oil island”
(Photo:Planet Labs PBC/Handout via Reuters)
The “launcher hunt” is conducted mainly by drones operating around the clock. This is why the air force has already lost more than 10 UAVs. Weather plays a significant role. Wintery, stormy conditions make it harder for Israeli aircraft to detect launchers and easier for Iran to launch missiles. As a result, more launches are expected during bad weather, both in Iran and in Lebanon.
A second line of effort targets Iran’s missile, launcher, and drone production infrastructure, a vast and sophisticated industry spread across the country. Strikes against it began this week and will continue. The air force and military intelligence will likely need at least two more weeks to achieve a satisfactory level of damage.
Efforts to weaken the regime are being carried out through intelligence and operational channels, including targeted strikes against security officials and political leaders, and attacks on Basij and Revolutionary Guard facilities across the country. The air force also prioritizes targets with psychological impact, demonstrating the regime’s inability to function. Israeli officials report results, including chaos, confusion within the leadership, and defections, particularly among Basij members. At the same time, efforts are underway to organize opposition groups and encourage public protests. According to informed sources, these efforts are beginning to bear fruit, though it is difficult to predict when a mass uprising might occur, likely not before the end of intense fighting.
If the war were dictated solely by Israel’s timeline, it might conclude within two weeks. However, the challenge of reopening the Strait of Hormuz and countering Iranian attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure has been taken on by the United States and will require at least three more weeks. The reason is straightforward. US Central Command has not yet assembled sufficient Marine forces and naval assets in the region to execute potential operations, including seizing Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil hub, controlling islands in the strait, or escorting tanker convoys. A key limitation is the shortage of ships and helicopters capable of detecting and neutralizing naval mines. European countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, along with Japan, have announced they will join the US effort to reopen the strait.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese front will remain a secondary effort for the IDF, focused on disarming Hezbollah through psychological and economic pressure on the Shiite community, the Lebanese government, and the broader public, rather than large-scale ground maneuver. Ground operations are intended to establish a buffer zone south of the Litani River, similar to the security zone after the First Lebanon War. The Trump administration is not permitting Israel to advance beyond that line, and the IDF prefers to concentrate on Iran, with the understanding that regime change in Tehran would ultimately lead to Hezbollah’s collapse.
In both arenas, Iran and Lebanon, significant achievements have already been made. But for the war’s objectives to be largely fulfilled and for those gains to endure for years, more time is required. In the meantime, Israelis will likely continue running to bomb shelters.
