The internal struggle for the soul of Iran’s foreign policy has reached a breaking point as the administration of President Masoud Pezeshkian attempts to navigate a path toward regional de-escalation. In a move that underscores the deepening rift between the executive branch and the security apparatus, Iran’s president says Guards commanders are wrecking ceasefire chances, signaling a public admission of the limited control the presidency holds over the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
This friction is not merely diplomatic; it is institutional. While the presidency seeks to lower the temperature with Western powers and regional rivals to salvage a crumbling economy, the IRGC remains committed to a doctrine of “active deterrence” and internal purging. This ideological clash is played out against a backdrop of severe security failures, most notably the assassination of Majid Khademi, the man entrusted with protecting the regime from the incredibly penetrations that eventually claimed his life.
Khademi was not a typical frontline general. He was a custodian of the Islamic Republic’s most guarded secrets, serving at the intersection of two of the state’s most sensitive functions: shielding the IRGC from foreign infiltration and directing the intelligence arm tasked with crushing domestic dissent. His death in the heart of Tehran serves as a stark reminder that the security apparatus, while obstructive to the president’s diplomatic goals, is itself profoundly vulnerable.
The Rise of a Shadow Spymaster
For years, Majid Khademi remained one of the most opaque figures in Iran’s power structure. Unlike the public-facing commanders who lead regional proxies, Khademi built his career in the quiet, secretive world of vetting, internal discipline, and protection. Reports indicate he hailed from the Fasa area in Fars province, though his identity was often obscured in official records, appearing under variations such as Majid Hosseini.
His ascent was a calculated response to the regime’s fear of internal collapse. After a series of high-profile security breaches and reported Israeli penetrations in 2022, the IRGC underwent a massive shake-up. Khademi, who had led the Defense Ministry’s intelligence protection organization since 2018, was tapped to head the Guards’ Intelligence Protection Organization. In June 2025, following the killing of his predecessor Mohammad Kazemi, he was promoted to lead the IRGC Intelligence Organization.
This promotion placed him at the helm of a body that the U.S. Department of the Treasury has described as instrumental in the violent suppression of protests, utilizing arbitrary detentions and mass intimidation to maintain order.
A Doctrine of Existential Threat
The tension between the presidency and the Guards is rooted in how they perceive the current moment. In a rare interview in February, Khademi provided a window into the IRGC’s mindset. He did not view domestic unrest as a reaction to economic hardship or political repression, but rather as a foreign-backed plot. To Khademi, the answer to dissent was not dialogue, but a wider surveillance dragnet.
During that interview, he claimed the Guard had summoned 2,735 people linked to anti-security networks, “counseled” 13,000 others, and identified 46 individuals allegedly tied to foreign intelligence services. These figures reflect a state of mind where the regime views ordinary social currents as security problems.
Khademi revealed that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had urged him to pay close attention to intelligence work because the current period was “like the year 60″—a reference to the early 1980s, one of the most repressive and bloody phases of the Islamic Republic. This comparison suggests that the IRGC is operating under a mandate of existential survival, making the president’s efforts to secure a ceasefire appear, to the Guards, as a dangerous concession.
The Internal Security Architecture
To understand why Khademi’s role was so sensitive, one must distinguish between the two primary intelligence arms of the IRGC:
- Intelligence Protection Organization: Focuses inward on loyalty, secrecy, and preventing infiltration within the Guard’s own ranks.
- Intelligence Organization: Focuses on domestic repression and political-security cases.
Because Khademi had led both, he was more than a general; he was the custodian of the regime’s inner vulnerabilities. His loss is an institutional blow, exposing the fact that the very man tasked with stopping the penetration of the state was himself reached in the middle of Tehran.
The Cost of Infiltration
The vulnerability of the IRGC has not gone unnoticed by Washington. In March, the Rewards for Justice program offered up to $10 million for information on Khademi and other senior IRGC figures. This designation marked him as a high-value target, signaling that foreign intelligence services had successfully mapped the regime’s hidden architecture.
Khademi was also a primary driver of the “national information network,” a state-backed effort to isolate Iran’s internet and tighten digital control. This push for censorship was intended to prevent the “two types of infiltration” Khamenei feared: the deliberate agents of foreign powers and the broader current of citizens who might advance an enemy’s aims without knowing it.
| Year | Role | Primary Focus |
|---|---|---|
| 2018 | Head of Defense Ministry Intelligence Protection | Military secrets and vetting |
| 2022 | Head of IRGC Intelligence Protection Organization | Internal IRGC discipline and counter-espionage |
| 2025 | Head of IRGC Intelligence Organization | Domestic repression and political security |
What This Means for the Ceasefire
The death of a spymaster while the president warns that Guards commanders are sabotaging peace efforts creates a volatile paradox. On one hand, the IRGC’s perceived omnipotence is shattered by the assassination of its top intelligence chief. On the other, such failures often drive hardliners to double down on repression and aggression to project strength.
For President Pezeshkian, the struggle is now a race against time. If the IRGC continues to view every diplomatic overture as a form of “infiltration,” the chances of a sustainable ceasefire remain slim. The security apparatus is not just wrecking the chances of peace; it is operating on a different map of reality than the civilian government.
The next critical checkpoint will be the upcoming quarterly security review in Tehran, where the presidency is expected to push for a more unified command structure to prevent independent IRGC actions from triggering a wider regional conflict.
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