A growing debate is unfolding in Australia over how antisemitism is defined and addressed, sparked by a modern report that directly challenges the findings of a government-backed study. The controversy centers on whether criticism of Israel should be considered a form of antisemitism, and what impact this definition has on free speech and the lived experiences of Jewish Australians. The core of the dispute lies in differing methodologies and conclusions regarding the prevalence and nature of antisemitism within the country, raising questions about the $159.5 million in security funding and policy changes enacted in response to the initial government report.
In November 2025, research commissioned by Australia’s Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism (ASECA) formed the basis for a sweeping government response, including an Antisemitism Education Taskforce, university ‘report cards,’ and even powers to cancel visas. This week, a counter-narrative emerged with the publication of Not in Our Name: Jewish Australians Speak Out, a study by Dr. Leia Greenslade and Professor Linda Briskman. The new report, based on a survey of 384 Jewish Australians and in-depth interviews with 30 who oppose Israeli policy, presents a markedly different picture of antisemitism in Australia.
Contradictions Within the Government Report
The central contention revolves around the methodology employed by the ASECA report. Researchers Greenslade and Briskman argue that the report’s ‘Generalised Antisemitism Scale’ conflates prejudice against Jewish people with political opposition to the state of Israel, utilizing the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism. This approach, they contend, inherently assumes anti-Zionist views are antisemitic, leading to a circular and potentially misleading conclusion. As the Not in Our Name report highlights, the ASECA report appears to “discover” widespread antisemitism by pre-supposing that anti-Zionism *is* antisemitism.
Perhaps most strikingly, the ASECA report’s own qualitative data contradicts its quantitative findings. According to the report, focus group participants “did not perceive Jewish individuals as collectively responsible for the actions of the Israeli government” (page 7). Further, the report acknowledges that “many participants expressed support for Jewish communities while as well criticising the actions of the Israeli state” (page 8), and explicitly states that “Australians consistently draw a distinction between the Australian Jewish community and the actions of the Israeli government” (page 10). Yet, the report then proceeds to classify the ability to differentiate between a people and a state as a “knowledge gap,” effectively equating disagreement with Israeli policy to antisemitism.
This methodological flaw is further underscored by a data table within the ASECA report itself. The gap between its two subscales – measuring prejudice versus political opposition – was found to be largest among students (0.50) and young adults (0.49), and smallest among older cohorts. This suggests, according to the Not in Our Name researchers, that education correlates with increased political opposition to Israel, but does not necessarily indicate a rise in prejudice against Jewish people. Despite this finding, the ASECA report concludes that universities are breeding grounds for antisemitism, a justification used to support recommendations to defund non-compliant universities.
Voices of Dissent: Jewish Australians Speak Out
The Not in Our Name report gives voice to Jewish Australians who actively challenge the conflation of anti-Zionism with antisemitism. The report’s respondents – 85 percent of whom are university-educated – demonstrate that critical engagement with Israeli policy does not equate to animosity towards Jewish people. Participants describe journeys of evolving perspectives, often rooted in personal experiences and a commitment to social justice.
One participant, identified as Dale, recounted growing up as a “Zionist” but having his views “unravel” after serving in the Israeli army at age 19. Another, Esther, described a process of learning about “structural oppression and colonialism” that shifted her understanding. Lori, a participant in her fifties, spoke of finding a deeper connection to her Jewish identity through involvement in anti-Zionist Jewish groups. As one participant, Leanne, succinctly place it: “I’ve never felt so connected to Jewish people in my life.”
The Not in Our Name respondents also offer a contextual understanding of rising antisemitism, linking it to specific events and actions by the Israeli government, rather than treating it as an isolated phenomenon. Lesley, a participant, observed that “every time Israel goes to war there’s an increase in antisemitism…and this war has been so extreme that there’s a more extreme reaction.” Several respondents identified a cycle where the conflation of Judaism with the Israeli state actually *generates* the backlash it purports to measure.
Differing Experiences and Recommendations
Data from the Not in Our Name report reveals a nuanced picture of lived experiences. 48 percent of respondents reported no increase in personal encounters with antisemitism since October 7, and only 14 percent identified their educational institution as a source of antisemitism. Notably, some reported experiencing more abuse from within the Jewish community than from outside it. One participant, Noah, stated: “I’ve seen way more anti-Semitic slurs coming from Zionist Jews than I’ve seen from even the neo-Nazis.”
The differing perspectives are reflected in the recommendations offered by each report. The ASECA framework prioritizes surveillance and punishment, advocating for funding cuts, media monitoring, an expanded Education Taskforce, and a hate crimes database based on the IHRA definition. In contrast, the Not in Our Name report calls for fostering pluralism within Jewish institutions, diversifying curricula to include Palestinian perspectives, and grounding ethical inquiry in Jewish values – principles like Tikkun Olam (Repair the world), Chesed (Loving kindness), and Tzedek (Justice). One approach views dissent as a threat, while the other sees it as a core tenet of Jewish tradition.
It’s worth noting the disparity in resources allocated to each effort. The ASECA apparatus operates with millions in public funding, while the Not in Our Name report was produced by two academics with minimal financial support. Yet, the latter demonstrates stronger adherence to basic social science standards, including transparent methodology, internal consistency, and conclusions directly supported by the data. The ASECA report, the researchers argue, contradicts its own findings and still advocates for enforcement.
The Australian government adopted all 13 recommendations from the ASECA report without significant scrutiny, framing them as a response to the Bondi Beach massacre. Though, the recommendations were published five months prior to the attack, and none addressed the intelligence failures that allowed it to occur.
The debate underscores a fundamental question: can a distinction be drawn between criticism of Israeli policy and antisemitism? Both the ASECA report’s own respondents and the participants in the Not in Our Name study appear to agree that such a distinction is not only possible, but essential. As one participant in the latter report poignantly stated: “Being Jewish is in the heart. It’s not in the land.” The question now is whether Australian policymakers will heed that message.
The government has not yet indicated any plans to revisit its adoption of the ASECA recommendations. The next scheduled update on the implementation of the “Eliminating Antisemitism” strategy is expected in early 2026. This ongoing conversation highlights the importance of continued dialogue and critical examination of policies aimed at combating antisemitism, ensuring they are both effective and respectful of fundamental freedoms. Share your thoughts on this important issue in the comments below.
