The brutal mathematics of modern attrition warfare have exposed a precarious gap in American readiness. For decades, the United States military has relied on “exquisite” munitions—highly sophisticated, precision-guided weapons that offer unmatched lethality but require an equally exquisite amount of time to manufacture. When the Russo-Ukrainian War ignited in 2022, the Pentagon discovered that these weapons cannot be summoned by simply flipping a switch or signing a check.
The challenge is not merely a lack of funding. Since the invasion, the Department of Defense has unleashed emergency authorities and supplemental funding to ramp up production. Yet, the results have been wildly inconsistent. While some weapon systems saw meaningful increases in delivery rates, others remained stubbornly stagnant, revealing a hard truth: surge capacity is not something that can be improvised during a crisis. It must be built, maintained, and rehearsed during peacetime.
For a Pentagon increasingly focused on a potential high-end conflict in the Pacific, the lessons from Ukraine serve as a warning. If the U.S. Enters a confrontation with China relying on the same “boom-and-bust” procurement cycles that hampered the response in Europe, the industrial shortcomings could become a strategic liability. The military does not just need more missiles; it needs a comprehensive playbook for industrial mobilization.
The Illusion of the Emergency Surge
In the early stages of the conflict in Ukraine, the Pentagon touted production increases in 155mm projectiles, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS), and Air Intercept Missile-9X. On paper, these successes suggested that the Defense Production Act and flexible acquisition authorities were working. However, a closer look reveals that these gains were not the result of post-2022 improvisation, but rather the dividends of decisions made years earlier.
The 40 percent increase in GMLRS production between 2022 and 2024, for instance, was rooted in pre-crisis purchases and proactive “lifetime buys” of critical circuit chips. Similarly, the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) interceptors benefited from a new production facility that broke ground in 2019 and serendipitously opened just as Ukraine’s need for air defense peaked. These were not “surges” in the traditional sense; they were the result of sustained demand signals and capital investment.
Conversely, weapons that had been neglected during peacetime proved nearly impossible to accelerate. The Stinger missile, a cornerstone of Ukrainian defense, had not been purchased by the U.S. Army in 18 years. Despite the urgent need, ramping up production hit immediate bottlenecks due to a depleted skilled workforce and obsolete parts. The Javelin program faced similar struggles, having been kept on “life support” by a trickle of foreign procurement before the crisis.
| Munition System | Surge Outcome | Primary Driver of Result |
|---|---|---|
| GMLRS | Successful Increase | Pre-crisis chip buys & sustained procurement |
| PAC-3 | Successful Increase | New facility commissioned in 2019 |
| Stinger | Stagnated/Slow | 18-year procurement gap; workforce loss |
| Javelin | Stalled/Slow | Minimal pre-crisis production volume |
Keeping the Production Lines ‘Warm’
To avoid the “Hail Mary” approach to munitions, defense analysts argue the Pentagon must move away from treating production as a discretionary line item. When munitions are used as “bill payers” to fund other priorities, production lines go cold. Once a factory closes or a specialized workforce retires, the cost and time required to restart those processes are astronomical.
One proposed solution is to treat the maintenance of production lines as a core readiness requirement, similar to how the military maintains aircraft or ships. This would involve continuous funding for selected critical munitions to ensure that sub-tier suppliers and skilled laborers remain active. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) could play a pivotal role here, using allied demand to smooth out volatile procurement cycles and lower unit costs through economies of scale.
the Pentagon is exploring the Civil Reserve Manufacturing Network, a consortium of commercial manufacturers that can be pivoted to defense production during a crisis. While maintaining such a network may seem wasteful during peacetime, it functions as an insurance policy against the total collapse of a specific supply chain.
Building a Playbook for the Pacific
The Department of Defense is currently refining its 2026 Acquisition Transformation Strategy, which places surge capacity at the forefront. However, a formal “playbook” is still missing. This playbook would require a standardized definition of “surge”—defined as a time-bound increase in production without requiring the full-scale mobilization of the entire civilian economy.
A strategic pivot would involve identifying a narrowed list of “critical munitions,” particularly those essential for a China-related contingency. For these systems, the Pentagon should require prime contractors to provide detailed data not just on their own capacity, but on the capacity of their sub-tier suppliers. Many bottlenecks occur not at the final assembly plant, but at the level of the small business providing a unique valve or a specific chemical propellant.
To ensure these plans actually work, the military must move beyond tabletop exercises and into “industrial wargaming.” This would mirror the 1978 Nifty Nugget exercise, which tested the U.S. Government’s ability to mobilize against a Warsaw Pact attack and revealed systemic failures across the board. Modern exercises should involve actually producing components at an accelerated pace to uncover hidden bottlenecks in real-time.
Key Pillars of a Munitions Surge Strategy:
- Surge Clauses: Standardizing contracts to include explicit options for accelerating delivery rates.
- Long-Lead Stockpiling: Obtaining authorization to stockpile raw materials and components before a final weapon contract is even signed.
- Workforce Pipelines: Expanding K-12 and vocational initiatives, such as the Manufacturing and Engineering Education Reimagined for All program, to replenish the skilled labor pool.
- Tripwire Integration: Coordinating with the intelligence community to identify adversary behaviors that would trigger the activation of surge plans.
the ability to win a protracted conflict depends as much on the factory floor as it does on the battlefield. The experience in Ukraine has proven that the industrial outcomes of a future war are decided years before the first shot is fired. For the United States, the window to build a resilient, responsive industrial base is closing.
The next critical checkpoint for these initiatives will be the implementation of the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which is expected to mandate a comprehensive joint mobilization and sustainment readiness study to stress-test the current industrial base.
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