There is still the possibility of a diplomatic solution that will allow an end to this terrible war and the withdrawal of the Russian military while protecting Ukraine’s vital interests. If the Russians are ever to withdraw, a diplomatic agreement on the terms of such withdrawal is required.
After the first round of Ukrainian-Russian talks in Belarus, a member of the Ukrainian delegation stated that “the parties have identified a number of priority issues for which specific solutions have been outlined.”
The West should support a peace deal and Russia’s withdrawal by offering Russia the lifting of all new sanctions imposed on the country. The offer to Ukraine was supposed to be a massive reconstruction package that would also help Ukraine draw closer to the West economically and politically—rather than militarily—like Finland and Austria did during the Cold War, despite their neutral status.
“Demilitarization” and “Denazification”
The Russian side is demanding that Ukraine sign a neutrality treaty, “demilitarization” and “denazification” and recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea, which was recaptured from Russia after the Ukrainian revolution. These demands are a mixture of the acceptable, the unacceptable, and the vague.
The neutrality option for Ukraine has often been referred to as “Finlandization,” and perhaps last week’s determined and unified Ukrainian response to Russian aggression has given that term new meaning in the case of Ukraine. For, like the Finns in the “Winter War” of 1939-1940, the Ukrainians have been militarily abandoned by the West, which has publicly and repeatedly stated that it has no intention of fighting in their defense.
On the other hand, the extraordinary courage and determination with which the Finns fought seems to have convinced Stalin that dominating Finland would pose too great a challenge. Finland was the only part of the former Russian Empire not to be incorporated into the USSR and, despite its contractual neutrality, was able to develop into a successful democratic, social market economy during the Cold War. Similarly, we must hope that the courage and determination of Ukrainians have convinced Vladimir Putin that running Ukraine as a Russian client state is impossible and that neutrality is the best deal he can get.
What Volodymyr Zelenskyy hints at
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has publicly indicated that a neutrality treaty could be offered; and he’s right about that. Because two things have become absolutely clear from this war: that Russia will fight to prevent Ukraine from becoming a military ally of the West, and that the West will not fight to defend Ukraine. In view of this, it is beyond hypocritical to keep open the possibility of a NATO membership bid that NATO intends never to fulfill and to ask Ukrainians to die for this fiction.
As for “demilitarization” and “denazification,” the meaning and terms of which must be negotiated. Of course, demilitarization is unacceptable if it means that Ukraine must unilaterally disband its armed forces; however, a recent statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has indicated that Russia would accept a ban on missiles stationed in Ukraine. This could be modeled on a similar guarantee given to the US that ended the Cuban Missile Crisis.
As for “denazification,” it presumably means that Ukraine should, at the behest of Russia, ban far-right parties and militias. This is completely unacceptable interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs; but perhaps Ukraine could make a counter-offer that addresses Moscow’s concerns about the rights and future of Ukraine’s Russian minority by guaranteeing them under Ukraine’s constitution – which, by the way, is something the West does according to its own principles anyway should support.
And the annexation of Crimea?
The demand for recognition of the Russian annexation of Crimea remains. Here, respect for international law and the background that Crimea, which was only transferred from Russia to Ukraine by Soviet decree in 1954, must be weighed against reality, the prevention of future conflicts and the interests of the people of the region – what essentially what we asked of Russia in the case of Kosovo.
Ukraine has already lost Crimea and cannot win it back, just as Serbia cannot win back Kosovo without a bloody and never-ending war, in which case Ukraine would almost certainly lose. Our principle in all such disputes must be that the fate of the affected areas must be decided by local democratic referendums under international supervision. This should also apply to the separatist Donbas republics.
These proposals are likely to be denounced as “a reward for Russian aggression”; but if Putin’s original goal was to subjugate all of Ukraine, then such a deal would fall far short of Moscow’s maximum goals. Moreover, such an agreement would not bring Russia anything that it had not practically achieved before the invasion.
The West is morally right in opposing Russia’s outrageous and illegal war and in responding by imposing extraordinarily severe sanctions on Russia. But he would be morally wrong to oppose a reasonable deal that would end the invasion and spare the Ukrainian people terrible suffering. America’s own recent record provides no basis for such rigid adherence.