The political landscape of Hungary has undergone a seismic shift following the legislative elections, where Peter Magyar and his Tisza party secured a commanding victory. By capturing 138 of the 199 seats in Parliament, Magyar has obtained the elusive two-thirds majority required to fundamentally rewrite the nation’s legal and institutional framework. This mandate provides him with the theoretical power to dismantle the systemic architecture built by Viktor Orban over the last sixteen years.
For the 45-year-old incoming Prime Minister, the victory is not merely a change of administration but a mandate for a “complete regime change.” Magyar has pledged to restore the rule of law and end the era of the “state-party” model, where the boundaries between the ruling Fidesz party and the state apparatus became virtually indistinguishable. Central to his immediate agenda is the introduction of term limits, proposing a maximum of two mandates for any Prime Minister, effectively capping the tenure at eight years.
Though, the depth of the “Orban system” suggests that winning the election was only the first step. The challenge now shifts from political competition to an immense administrative and legal undertaking. The goal of démanteler le système Orban en Hongrie—dismantling the Orban system in Hungary—requires more than a parliamentary majority; it requires the removal of deeply embedded “veto players” and the reversal of hundreds of decrees designed to consolidate power.
The Architecture of an ‘State-Party’
Since 2010, the Fidesz party has constructed a sophisticated web of control that extends far beyond the Prime Minister’s office. This system relies on a combination of constitutional amendments, “cardinal laws,” and the strategic use of emergency decrees—particularly during the pandemic—to bypass traditional legislative scrutiny. The result is an institutional edifice that political scientists describe as an “integrated system” of control.
The media landscape serves as the most visible example of this consolidation. Over the last decade, the vast majority of public broadcasting and a significant portion of private media were brought under the direct or indirect influence of the government. During the campaign, these outlets were used to paint Peter Magyar as a puppet of foreign interests in Brussels or Kyiv. In a decisive first move, Magyar has already announced the suspension of state media broadcasts to make way for a new media law and a revamped regulatory authority.
Beyond the media, the system is anchored by a network of oligarchs—businessmen close to the previous administration who built economic empires through preferential access to public contracts. These economic ties create a layer of resistance, as these actors have already signaled their intent to maintain their positions regardless of the political shift. This clientelism extends to the local level, where “local barons” and Fidesz-aligned mayors have long controlled municipal resources.
| Sector | Orban-era Mechanism | Magyar’s Proposed Remedy |
|---|---|---|
| Executive Power | Unlimited PM terms | Two-term limit (8 years total) |
| Media | State-controlled propaganda | New media law & independent regulator |
| Judiciary | Long-term political appointments | Removal of “veto players” & judicial reform |
| Economy | Clientelist public procurement | Anti-corruption task force & EU oversight |
The ‘Veto Players’ and Institutional Friction
Despite the two-thirds majority, the transition is unlikely to be seamless. Valentin Behr, a researcher at the CNRS, notes that theoretical power does not always translate into mechanical efficiency. The new Parliament is largely composed of political novices, and there is a risk that the majority could fracture over the specific details of the “de-Orbanization” process.
More critical are the individuals occupying long-term institutional posts. The Hungarian system is currently guarded by “veto players”—officials appointed under Viktor Orban with exceptionally long mandates. For example, the Prosecutor General was appointed for a nine-year term, and the President of the Supreme Court holds an eleven-year term. These figures possess the legal authority to obstruct or delay the new government’s reforms.
Magyar has taken a confrontational approach to these holdovers. On the evening of the election, he issued a blunt ultimatum to those who might hinder his progress: “Leave, do not wait for us to chase you out.” His primary target is President Tamas Sulyok, a close associate of Orban. Whereas Magyar has repeatedly called for resignations, these appeals have so far remained unanswered, highlighting the gap between political will and institutional reality.
The Economic Imperative and the EU Factor
Time is a critical constraint for the new administration. The most pressing urgency is economic, as Hungary struggles with high inflation and a frozen treasury. More than 30 billion euros in EU funds remain suspended due to concerns over the rule of law and democratic backsliding under the previous regime.
Unlocking these funds is Magyar’s “absolute priority.” However, the European Commission is wary of repeating the “Polish precedent.” In 2024, the EU released billions to Donald Tusk’s government following initial promises of reform, yet Tusk has since struggled to fully dismantle the legacy of the PiS party. Brussels is demanding concrete evidence of progress in several key areas:
- The restoration of judicial independence.
- Tangible measures to combat corruption in public procurement.
- The protection of press freedom and LGBT+ rights.
- Cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the International Criminal Court.
To satisfy these requirements, Magyar has announced the creation of a dedicated structure to investigate abuses of power and corruption from the previous administration. This legal offensive is intended to serve as both a moral cleansing and a practical signal to the European Commission that the “regime change” is genuine.
While Viktor Orban has conceded defeat, he has not announced his retirement from politics, suggesting he intends to remain a voice in the national debate. The transition of power has occurred, but the systemic dismantling of the state-party model is a colossal task that will likely span the entirety of the next four years.
The next critical checkpoint will be the convening of the new assembly in early May, where the first legal challenges to the existing institutional appointments are expected to be tabled. We will continue to track the legislative steps taken to unlock the EU funds and the subsequent resignations of key judicial figures.
We invite readers to share their perspectives on the transition in Hungary and the challenges of restoring the rule of law in the comments below.
