The Russian troop build-up and far-reaching demands from Moscow have not yet persuaded Western governments to think outside the box of stereotypical reactions. That Vladimir Putin is demanding security guarantees is nothing new. Nor does he see NATO’s eastward expansion as the main threat. Apparently he’s finally had enough of a policy that cares little about Russian security interests.
In his speech to the German Bundestag on September 25, 2001, Putin also swore to the establishment of a common European house. As a guest at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, he warned against including Georgia and Ukraine in the alliance, after which the decision was made in principle, although not yet implemented. The short Russian-Georgian summer war followed. Western Ukraine policy and the flight of the pro-Russian Kiev leader Viktor Yanukovych as a result of the Maidan riots led to the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and military support for separatists in eastern Ukraine.
Seven years later, a final warning may be reaching the West. Despite all the speculation about Putin’s motives, it is at least clear what he does not want: the open or gradual integration of Ukraine into NATO. He is obviously prepared to defend this red line with “military-technical means”. At the same time, he combines such a goal with an attempt to redesign the European security structure. The time for this seems propitious. With Joe Biden, a US President is in power who probably only has one term and wants to achieve something in those four years. Domestically, he wants to reform the United States, and in terms of foreign policy he wants to focus on the conflict with the new world power, China. That’s why Biden needs to shed ballast. With the withdrawal from Afghanistan, he already has one less expensive engagement.
Russia is the other burden, especially if it ramps up security costs in Europe, perhaps even geographically close to the US, as the Russian side has suggested. But Russia could also be part of a solution, depending on how the US positions itself with regard to Ukraine and a European security architecture. For Washington, Russia is primarily of security policy importance for two reasons. It is an equivalent global nuclear power, with significant cyber and space capabilities and long-range, highly accurate weapons – a potential direct threat to the US, which Biden wants to reintegrate into a strategic framework. The second reason has to do with China, clearly the bigger problem for the US. A clash with either challenger jeopardizes Joe Biden’s domestic political agenda and poses the potentially nightmarish possibility of finally driving Russia into the arms of China. As a result, Biden needs a strategic deal with Moscow, which is only conceivable if he accommodates Putin with a European security architecture.
Post-Soviet neutrality
Since the Russian President does not seem to be bluffing, it is high time that Germany and its partners help to de-escalate the situation with attractive proposals. Putin’s behavior is open to criticism, but in view of the danger of war, it is important not to continue the spiral of confrontation. To do this, NATO’s direct negotiations with Russia would have to be consolidated and a conference process would have to begin that would deal with the possibilities for a new European peace order. A distinction should be made between short-, medium- and long-term goals. In the short term, a moratorium on NATO expansion, confidence-building measures, military disengagement, arms control talks and the implementation of the Minsk II treaty would be desirable. In the medium term, with the exception of the Baltic states, neutrality for the post-Soviet republics and the status of Crimea could be negotiated with the option of a second referendum.
In the long term, however, this would also mean that eventually both NATO and its Eastern counterpart, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), could become obsolete, replaced by a system of collective security. From today’s perspective, that sounds illusory – but what is the alternative if you rule out the possibility of a “system winner”?
It would be attractive for Russia if the West offered such a goal, even if it is still a long way off. It wouldn’t take much other than the acknowledgment that everything is impermanent, including military alliances.