It is the moment that Iran can seize to gain advantages. They would hardly be conceivable without the Ukraine conflict. First, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian turns up at the Munich Security Conference and is viewed with less skepticism than under normal circumstances. Its presence indicates that the West is not just talking to itself. Soon after, the gas and oil exporter Iran hinted that it would be able to step in on the world market should Russia drop out or be boycotted because of the Ukraine war.
This is only possible because, after months of negotiations in Vienna, a return to the 2015 nuclear agreement and a waiver of applicable sanctions is almost sealed. The status quo that existed until Donald Trump unilaterally terminated the contract in May 2018 will not be reactivated. Iran wants to know that it will not be the target of punitive action again if the US leaves the country again. What is needed are guarantees that US governments – no matter who provides them – cannot shake. One of the maxims that would then apply would be that agreements reached between Iranian and foreign companies on investments, the exchange of goods or other projects must not be made more difficult or prevented. The USA would therefore have to give up the practice of prosecuting third parties if they have and hold contracts with Iranian partners.
That would have to be anchored, not promised – and would be at the expense of US negotiator Rob Malley. In an unofficial negotiation document, he takes the view that it should be enough that President Biden assured the G7 summit in Cornwall in June 2021 that his government would respect the agreement. Iran rightly considers such a commitment to be too non-binding. The wall of hostile distrust between the two states remains high. Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian therefore proposes that the parliaments of the signatory states of the nuclear treaty (the five UN veto powers and Germany) confirm what has now been negotiated. A procedure that brings into play a sovereign who all too often leads a shadowy existence in international agreements. If the legislature vouches for an agreement, executive arbitrariness is difficult to achieve. Even if Amir-Abdollahian is likely to fail with his idea, it is an indication of how self-confident Tehran is acting.
In this way, the temptation was resisted to enter directly into bilateral consultations with the USA, which should include a prisoner exchange, instead of with all signatory states of 2015. The Iranian request that there should be “a clear gesture of goodwill” in advance of such talks was formulated in the certainty that the Americans would not bring themselves to do so. They should have ensured that Iranian assets frozen at foreign banks – a good ten billion dollars – were released.
So far, the US has been just as reluctant to concede, as Russia has been, to confirm that its rights in matters relating to nuclear agreements will not be affected by the current avalanche of sanctions from the West. A next – still – non-contractual anti-sanctions clause? At present, it may be more unacceptable to Western negotiators, the US, UK, France and Germany, than the guarantees claimed by Iran.