Ukrainian war editorial | No news until the front moves

2023-05-08 23:34:43

Victory Day will be commemorated this Tuesday in Russia in an environment in which images of military exhibitionism in Moscow’s Red Square and exalted nationalism that seeks connections between the fight against the Nazis and the ukrainian war they will compete to hide others much less successful. As the interception of two drones over the Kremlin and the uncertainties of a stagnant crisis on the battlefield, with the house-to-house fighting in Bakhmut so similar to other dramatic episodes that, like Stalingrad, occupy an important space in Russian memory. Without forgetting disconcerting moments such as the ammunition demands of Wagner’s mercenaries, apparently met, or the harassment by a Russian fighter in the sky of the Black Sea of ​​a Polish Frontex plane and, above all, the wait for the Ukrainian counter-offensive, a kind of D-day that will mark the future development of the war. Whatever it is, its result will mark the exit conditions of any negotiation scenario.

The evolution of the conflict is far from the initial forecasts of Vladimir Putin. Nor the tension between the irascible Yevgeny Prigozhinowner of Wagner, and the Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Shoiguallows us to deduce internal tensions in Putin’s environment, nor does the stagnation of the fronts give rise to going beyond a tendency of war to become chronic conflict. It is obvious that Moscow’s decision to hire soldiers of fortune to unblock the fate of the battle in the face of the limited effectiveness of the reservist mobilizations has had a limited impact and that an organization of mercenaries is unlikely to prevail over the Russian generals. And it is equally obvious that as long as the resources committed to the war do not change, the nature of the battle in eastern Ukraine will hardly change, even if repeated sporadic actions on Russian soil.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive

The future course of the crisis can be decided by the expected Ukrainian counter-offensive, in which the tanks served to Volodimir Zelensky by NATO partners. If from such a counteroffensive a significant setback of the Russian Army is deduced, even greater than that which occurred last fall, it is possible that Putin will consider a negotiated end to the conflict through an interposed power –China, the best located-; If the counter-offensive fails or stalls, the Ukrainian government may be the one that folds to achieve a ceasefire and talks as a lesser evil. In the event that neither of these two options materialize, the prolongation of the ‘sine die’ war does not allow us to predict anything other than greater devastation in Ukraine and a more extreme erosion of the United States’ relationship, on the one hand, with China and Russia. Not to mention a renewed impact of the war on the global economy.

All efforts will be few to achieve the search for the end of the war in the terrain of realism, security in Europe and peaceful coexistence between the superpowers. Because resigning yourself to the outcome of the war through victory in the theater of operations, as so many voices defend on both sides of the divide, will make it impossible for the weapons to fall silent.