The Perilous Illusion of Control: Why U.S. Governance in Venezuela Would Repeat Past Failures
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A disturbing image circulated in early January – Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, blindfolded and handcuffed aboard a U.S. naval vessel – underscored a dangerous impulse in American foreign policy: the belief that force can substitute for legitimacy. The hypothetical seizure of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, followed by President Donald Trump’s declaration that the U.S. would “run” Venezuela, isn’t an isolated incident, but a symptom of a broader trend toward “America the Bully,” as one scholar describes it.
Washington’s increasing reliance on coercion – military, economic, and political – aims not just to deter adversaries, but to compel compliance. While this approach may yield short-term results, it’s ultimately counterproductive, hindering the development of lasting power, which hinges on legitimacy and capacity. Applying coercion to governance, experts warn, can solidify resistance, limit diplomatic avenues, and transform domestic political shortcomings into matters of national pride.
There’s no debate that Maduro’s leadership led to Venezuela’s devastating collapse. Under his rule, the nation’s economy imploded, democratic institutions were dismantled, criminal networks infiltrated the state, and millions were forced to flee, many seeking refuge in the United States. However, removing a leader, even a brutal and ineffective one, doesn’t automatically foster a legitimate political order.
The Governance Trap: Force Without Legitimacy
By contemplating direct governance of Venezuela, the United States risks creating a self-defeating “governance trap” – mistaking external force for genuine domestic legitimacy. As a scholar of international security, civil wars, and U.S. foreign policy, and author of “Dying by the Sword,” one expert argues that force can topple rulers, but it cannot generate political authority.
“When violence and what I have described elsewhere as ‘kinetic diplomacy’ become a substitute for full spectrum action – which includes diplomacy, economics and what the late political scientist Joseph Nye called ‘soft power’ – it tends to deepen instability rather than resolve it,” the scholar explains.
From Cold War Interventionism to Modern Imbalance
The Venezuela situation reflects a wider shift in how the U.S. wields its power. Analysis from the Military Intervention Project reveals a sharp increase in U.S. military interventions since the end of the Cold War, coupled with a systematic underinvestment in diplomacy and other tools of statecraft.
Historically, U.S. military intervention was often justified by the perceived existential threat of the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1989. One might expect a decrease in interventions after the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, but that hasn’t materialized. Furthermore, the nature of these interventions has evolved. Missions once focused on short-term stabilization now routinely expand into prolonged governance and security management, mirroring patterns seen in Iraq after 2003 and Afghanistan after 2001.
This trend is exacerbated by an institutional imbalance. By 2026, the U.S. is projected to allocate $28 to the Department of Defense – the “military hammer” – for every $1 invested in the State Department – the diplomatic “scalpel.” This disparity effectively prioritizes force as the default solution. As one official stated on January 4th, regarding Venezuela’s acting leader Delcy Rodríguez, “she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro” if she doesn’t comply.
Echoes of Past Failures: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya
The consequences of this imbalance are readily apparent in recent history.
In Afghanistan, the U.S.-led attempt to build authority through external force proved unsustainable. Despite two decades of reconstruction efforts following the 2001 invasion to oust the Taliban, the foreign-backed state-building project collapsed almost immediately after the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, demonstrating that reconstruction spending cannot compensate for a lack of domestic political legitimacy.
The situation in Iraq following the 2003 invasion offers another cautionary tale. While both the State Department and the Department of Defense proposed plans for a stable, democratic transition, President George W. Bush ultimately favored the Defense Department’s plan, which disregarded crucial cultural, social, and historical factors. This approach assumed that coercion and private contractors would be sufficient for a rapid transition, leading the U.S. to assume responsibility for basic services like electricity, water, and job creation – tasks that inevitably fueled resistance.
Libya presents a different, yet equally troubling, outcome. The 2011 intervention, backed by the U.S. and NATO, removed Muammar Gadhafi but was not followed by a robust governance plan. The result was civil war, fragmentation, and ongoing struggles over sovereignty and economic development.
The common thread across these cases is hubris: the misguided belief that American management, whether limited or oppressive, can replace genuine political legitimacy.
Venezuela’s infrastructure is already in a state of disrepair. If the United States were to assume governance, it would inevitably be blamed for every failure, every blackout, and every food shortage, quickly transforming from liberator to occupier.
The Strategic Costs of Unilateral Action
Taking on governance in Venezuela carries significant strategic costs, even beyond the likelihood of failure. A military attack followed by foreign administration undermines the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention that underpin the international order the U.S. claims to uphold. It also complicates relations with allies, forcing them to reconcile U.S. actions with the rules they are trying to defend elsewhere.
Historically, the U.S. has been strongest when anchoring an open sphere built on collaboration, shared rules, and voluntary alignment. A shift toward a closed, coercive model of power, reliant on force, is prohibitively costly to sustain. These signals are not lost on global players, including Berlin, London, Paris, Taipei, Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing, and Moscow.
When the U.S. attacks a sovereign state and claims the right to administer it, it weakens its ability to challenge arguments that force, rather than legitimacy, determines political authority. Beijing, for example, could point to U.S. behavior to justify a potential takeover of Taiwan, while Moscow could cite similar precedent to justify its actions in Ukraine.
This erosion of credibility doesn’t lead to immediate rupture, but it gradually narrows the space for cooperation and undermines U.S. interests and capabilities. Force may be fast, but legitimacy is the only currency that buys durable peace and stability – enduring U.S. interests. If Washington attempts to govern Venezuela by force, it will likely repeat the failures of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya: power can topple regimes, but it cannot create political authority. Outside rule invites resistance, not stability.
