Venezuela on a Knife’s Edge: Power Struggle and the Threat of Renewed Conflict
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Venezuela finds itself in a precarious state following the removal of Nicolás Maduro, with the nation’s future hinging on a fragile alliance between civilian and military leaders and the potential for escalating conflict. Delcy Rodríguez was sworn in as interim president on January 5, 2026, but her leadership represents just one faction within the complex power dynamics of the country’s ruling elite, officially committed to the ideology of Chavismo.
The situation is far from stable. Rodríguez and her brother, Jorge Rodríguez, a longtime advisor to Maduro, lead the civilian wing, while Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello and Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López represent the interests of the armed forces. This division, however, only scratches the surface of Venezuela’s power structure, which also includes a multitude of armed groups with their own distinct agendas.
Scholars with decades of experience researching these groups warn that Chavista leadership now faces a critical choice: yield to U.S. pressure regarding economic and policy decisions, or resist. Both paths carry a significant risk of armed conflict, with potentially devastating consequences for the country’s stability.
A Precarious Balance of Power
Currently, if the existing elite cohesion holds and Chavista leadership acquiesces to demands from the U.S., the likelihood of large-scale armed conflict remains relatively low. Over the years, the government has strategically cultivated loyalty by placing trusted officers in key positions and granting access to lucrative resources, including oil, gold mining, and the drug trade. Maintaining this cohesion, however, depends on the military’s continued control of these institutions and the associated legal and illicit markets that benefit senior officers.
However, instability also threatens from outside this elite circle, particularly from the armed “colectivos.” These diverse groups, ranging from staunch government supporters to more critical factions, are numerous, well-coordinated, often heavily armed, and control significant territory, including areas within the capital city. While many are primarily motivated by economic interests, a subset remains committed to insurgent, anti-imperialist ideologies. Should Chavista leaders be perceived as capitulating to U.S. pressure, these groups could view it as a betrayal and resort to guerrilla violence.
As one founder of a prominent colectivo stated in a 2021 interview, “As long as imperialism exists, armed struggle will always be present because imperialism seeks to destroy the people.” While colectivo activity was subdued immediately following Maduro’s removal, reports and social media videos have surfaced showing members harassing reporters and civilians.
Potential for a Fractured Front
The durability of the current Chavista front remains uncertain. The Rodríguez siblings and the Cabello-Padrino López military apparatus likely have differing tolerances for U.S. proposals. The Rodríguez siblings have generally adopted a more pragmatic approach, with Delcy demonstrating a willingness to move away from state-led socialism toward market-oriented policies to stabilize the Venezuelan economy. This shift could attract support from business elites and broader segments of the population.
Military factions, however, have steadily increased their political influence since the death of Hugo Chávez. These forces prioritize economic controls that allow them to benefit from crony capitalism and maintain their interests in strategic sectors like oil, gold, food distribution, and the drug trade. Furthermore, Chavismo’s anti-imperialist nationalist ideology resonates strongly within the armed forces.
Statements from the U.S. suggesting a de facto ruling role were likely perceived as blatant imperialism and a public humiliation within Chavista circles. While the Rodríguez siblings may be willing to accept this to preserve stability, hard-line military figures may be less inclined to compromise. The civilian leadership remains officially committed to Maduro, but the U.S.’s assertive actions raise the political cost for the military to align with a civilian leadership perceived as yielding to Washington’s demands. Whether this translates into defection will depend on how any realignment impacts the military’s economic interests.
The Contours of Conflict
An open rupture over the role of the U.S. in Venezuela would likely result in an asymmetrical conflict between the U.S. and Venezuelan armed forces. The National Bolivarian Armed Forces of Venezuela comprises approximately 123,000 active personnel, supported by 8,000 reservists. The Bolivarian Militia, integrating civilian volunteers, adds an estimated 200,000–300,000 members. Despite being weakened by years of economic crisis, Venezuela’s armed forces remain a formidable force.
This conflict would likely involve the colectivos, who have collaborated with the armed forces as part of the Unión Cívico Militar, as established by Maduro. This would result in both formal armed conflict and guerrilla warfare. The relationship between the government and police forces has historically been fraught with mistrust, but officials recognize their institutions’ survival is tied to Chavismo’s fate.
Venezuela’s more than 140 police forces, including the Policía Nacional Bolivariana (PNB), the CICPC (investigative police), and the SEBIN (political intelligence police), are the most powerful. The PNB and CICPC have benefited from widespread corruption, with officers involved in extortion and kidnapping, and both have played a role in state violence. The CICPC, however, is often seen as lacking strong ideological loyalty to the government. Police forces are more closely aligned with the military than the Rodríguez siblings’ civilian faction, and this alignment would likely hold in the event of a rupture.
The Role of Criminal and Guerrilla Groups
Numerous gangs and criminal organizations operate throughout Venezuela, ranging in size from a dozen members to “mega-gangs” exceeding 100. While the Trump administration has often mischaracterized these groups, it is true that relationships with the Maduro government allowed some to become more organized and capable. Others were weakened or dismantled. These groups prioritize control over illicit markets – drugs, kidnapping, extortion, and food distribution – and are unlikely to exhibit ideological loyalty. In a civil-military split, they may remain neutral, focusing on protecting their criminal enterprises and potentially exploiting the instability to expand them.
Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez could attempt to revive a familiar strategy: negotiating informal agreements with gangs in exchange for calm and tacit support. In the past, Chavista governments have avoided entering gang-controlled areas and tolerated their dominance over illicit markets, a tactic that can provide short-term stability but also exacerbate tensions with the police.
Finally, guerrilla groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN) and FARC dissident groups operate along the Venezuela-Colombia border. Well-armed and involved in illegal mining, extortion, and smuggling, they have benefited from Chavismo’s rule, shifting their focus from national political power to controlling local infrastructure and illicit markets. These groups maintain political agendas, even if focused on Colombia, and would likely seek to preserve and expand their control over illicit economies. Their alignment would depend on both ideological commitments and a strategic assessment of whether civilian factions aligned with Washington pose a greater threat to their interests.
Addressing this complex network of armed groups through state-building and multilateral cooperation could provide Venezuelans with stability in the post-Maduro era. However, this outcome is far from guaranteed, particularly if the U.S. continues its policy of direct coercion.
