The United States and Saudi Arabia signed a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement and a bilateral safeguards agreement on Wednesday. The 30-year deal, announced by the Energy Department, opens the door for American companies to develop Saudi nuclear infrastructure and potentially build a domestic uranium enrichment facility.
The 123 Agreement and U.S. Industry Access
On Wednesday, the Energy Department announced that Wright and Abdulaziz signed a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, commonly known as a 123 agreement, along with a bilateral safeguards agreement. According to the department, the pact provides extensive access for American companies participating in the Saudi nuclear energy program, which aims to benefit American industry, workers, and supply chains while addressing Saudi energy needs.
Congress is expected to review the finer details soon, but several core provisions have already emerged. The 30-year arrangement places American companies at the center of developing Saudi Arabia’s nuclear infrastructure. This roadmap could include the construction of a domestic uranium enrichment facility, provided a two-year joint United States-Saudi study determines that enrichment within the kingdom is both warranted and commercially viable. US President Donald Trump has approved the nuclear cooperation agreement lasting up to 30 years, expected to open the door for American companies to take part in developing Saudi Arabia’s nuclear industry.
If the United States ultimately rejects moving forward with indigenous enrichment following that study, Saudi Arabia would face strict limitations. According to the Wall Street Journal, the kingdom would not be allowed to enrich uranium independently or partner with another foreign nation for a period of 10 years.
Threshold Capabilities and Regional Proliferation Concerns
Formally, this was a programme for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In practice, however, the agreement brings Saudi Arabia noticeably closer to acquiring what is known as threshold nuclear capability
: the ability to convert a civilian nuclear infrastructure into a military programme in a relatively short time, should such a political decision be taken. The contentious point is not the construction of nuclear power plants, as dozens of countries use nuclear energy without possessing nuclear weapons. The difference lies in the nuclear fuel cycle. Uranium enrichment is necessary to produce fuel for certain types of reactors, but the same technology, if used to a much higher degree, can produce fissile material suitable for nuclear weapons. Reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, from which plutonium can be extracted, poses similar risks.
For this reason, Washington spent years pressing its Middle Eastern partners to give up the right to enrich and reprocess uranium domestically. The clearest example is the agreement with the United Arab Emirates, which came into force in 2009. Abu Dhabi accepted what became known as the “gold standard”: it committed not to enrich uranium and not to reprocess nuclear waste. It also signed the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), allowing for broader and more intrusive inspections. In contrast, according to what has become known so far, the agreement with Saudi Arabia includes neither a renunciation of enrichment and reprocessing nor the Additional Protocol. This means international inspectors may not have the same capacity for snap inspections of undeclared facilities that they would under a stricter regime.
The Trump administration maintains that bilateral security and verification mechanisms will apply, and that the agreement meets the legal US requirements on nuclear non-proliferation. However, these mechanisms have not been fully disclosed and can hardly be equivalent to the unrestricted access granted to the IAEA. The timing makes the agreement even more politically explosive. The United States has built its pressure on Iran around the argument that domestic uranium enrichment can serve as a pathway to building a nuclear weapon. Washington now appears ready to allow Saudi Arabia to retain exactly this capability, albeit under different terms and American oversight. The image of an America seeking to deny Tehran enrichment technology while leaving open the possibility that Riyadh could acquire it will become a key argument for Iran’s claim of a double standard.
Geopolitical Fallout Across the Middle East
The problem is significant and not merely theoretical. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has publicly stated that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia will seek to do the same as soon as possible.
Uranium enrichment does not automatically lead to a nuclear bomb; further technical knowledge, weapon design and the development of a suitable delivery and detonation system are also required. It does, however, create the most significant industrial and technological foundation for a future military programme.
The agreement is causing understandable concern in Israel too. Although the Israeli government views Saudi Arabia as a potential strategic partner against Iran, it can hardly view the acquisition of enrichment technology by any Arab country without reservations. Israel’s security strategy has for decades rested on maintaining overwhelming qualitative military superiority and, although never officially confirmed, on its nuclear exclusivity in the Middle East. A Saudi enrichment infrastructure could trigger a chain reaction. Turkey, Egypt and other regional powers would gain an additional argument to claim similar capabilities. The nuclear balance would then be defined not simply by whether Iran possesses a weapon, but by how many countries would be able to build one relatively quickly. For Donald Trump, the agreement also carries a clear economic dimension, as the construction of reactors, fuel facilities and supporting infrastructure could bring tens of billions of dollars to the American nuclear industry.
Sources: en.protothema.gr.
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