2023-11-13 10:17:12
The Bundeswehr was aware of the fundamental importance of efficient drone and air defense long before the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. However, the brutal practice of modern warfare may have reinforced this perception: In the Middle East, a non-state terrorist group managed to use converted commercial drones to damage watch and radio towers on the Israeli border – the beginning of the barbaric attack on Israeli territory with more than 1,200 deaths.
Massive rocket attacks from Gaza and Lebanon overwhelmed even one of the world’s best air defense systems. In Ukraine, unmanned aerial vehicles are the weapon of choice for both warring parties – they are indispensable not only for reconnaissance for Kiev and Moscow, but also as an offensive weapon.
As winter approaches, Russia is expected to once again use cold and energy shortages as a weapon against the Ukrainian civilian population with targeted missile and drone attacks. Against this background, America is even working on new air defense systems that combine Soviet and Western technology.
Outdated, bulky and not enough
Nevertheless, Germany is a long way from having air defense like that of Israel and now also Ukraine. Now Germany is not at war itself. And we can hope that it stays that way. Nevertheless, it is downright negligent that politicians have neglected this point for so long. As with so many structural weaknesses, this is due to a lack of will to deal with the supposedly no longer existing threat situation after the end of the Cold War and to radical austerity measures. While in 1990 the anti-aircraft missile units comprised more than 10,000 posts, today they only consist of around 2,600 soldiers.
When it comes to ground-based air defense, the Bundeswehr is not completely blank, especially since it is carried out in conjunction with NATO: In the short and close range, Germany has the light air defense system with the Ocelot weapon carrier to protect the troops’ mobile operations from helicopters or unmanned aerial vehicles. In addition, the MANTIS system is intended to defend military and civilian facilities against rockets as well as artillery and mortar shells. Iris-T systems, which are already doing excellent work in Ukraine, will soon be deployed on German soil. At longer ranges, American Patriots fight aircraft, ballistic missiles or cruise missiles in an emergency. The Navy also has three air defense frigates.
But: Ocelot is outdated, the MANTIS system is bulky, and Germany has too few of the Patriots, as well as the other systems. There is a big hole, especially in the lowest range. The German Gepard anti-aircraft gun tanks, which Kiev uses efficiently against drones, have been out of service with the Bundeswehr since 2010. According to an analysis by the Science and Politics Foundation, Germany’s capabilities are just sufficient to protect an area the size of the Berlin urban area.
Protection can only be achieved across countries
In addition to the weakness at close range, the Bundeswehr has so far had a glaring capability gap in the so-called top interception layer. Berlin wants to close this with the acquisition of Arrow 3 from Israel. The system can combat missiles at an altitude of up to 100 kilometers – it is aimed primarily at possible attacks from Russia and is also intended to protect European neighbors.
The EU is poorly positioned to combat missiles with a high ballistic curve. The successful use of Arrow 3 was recently observed in defending against rockets fired by the Yemeni Houthi rebels against Israel. One of a total of three systems should be ready for use within around two years. Then the rest by 2030.
There is a long way to go until then. Germany would be the first country outside of Israel to use Arrow 3. It is unclear how the system will be integrated into the structure of the Bundeswehr. And how it will be integrated into the NATO defense umbrella or the common European air defense that Berlin is striving for. It is clear that comprehensive protection can only be achieved across countries.
Konrad Schuller Published/Updated: Recommendations: 120 Gregor Grosse, Strickscheid Published/Updated: Recommendations: 10 Gregor Grosse Published/Updated: Recommendations: 34
But networking different systems is an extremely complex matter; the political level is not yet taken into account. France, for example, is opposed to a common protective shield. This does not bode well for the defense of the German and European skies. And this despite the fact that all actors should be aware right now of how vulnerable a country is without adequate air defense.
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