Everything that you wanted to know, but were afraid to ask about the possibility of a new round of conflict between Russia and Ukraine, was told by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. It published draft treaties with the United States and NATO, designed to “guarantee the security of Russia.”
Putin’s ultimatum
The very fact of publishing one’s own draft treaty before the start of consultations with partners is, to put it mildly, unusual for modern diplomatic practice. But it is very typical for the period 1938-1941. In essence, this is an ultimatum.
The Kremlin is demanding that the West abandon the 2008 NATO Bucharest Declaration, which promised membership in the alliance to Ukraine and Georgia, actually end military-technical cooperation with Kiev, and abandon the deployment of certain types of weapons on the territory of NATO countries proper. Plus, we know from the statements of Russian officials: Moscow wants Washington to force Kiev to unilaterally fulfill part of the Minsk agreements on granting a special status to the regions of Eastern Ukraine that are virtually completely controlled by the Kremlin. The “security guarantees” that Putin and Lavrov are repeating must be formalized, moreover “within a specific period of time and on the basis of the principle of equal and indivisible security.” That is, the Russian leadership demands for itself the right to veto NATO decisions, and even in the near future. It turns out that it does not intend to conduct long-term negotiations on various aspects of security, as was the case during the Cold War.
Constantine Eggert
Moscow has not spoken such a language with the West almost since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Even in 1983, when it seemed that the deployment of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe and a series of regional crises nearly brought the planet to the brink of a third world war, the rhetoric was more restrained. Whatever one may say, but the slogan “The USSR is the bulwark of the world!” then hung on every second wall. Imagine the banner “The Russian Federation is the stronghold of the world!” on Tverskaya. Happened? So it’s hard for me.
If the conditions contained in the projects published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are met, the North Atlantic Alliance as an independent organization will cease to exist, and Ukraine will lose its sovereignty. Therefore, the answer to the Kremlin’s ultimatum is predetermined – a refusal. It turns out that the Russian leadership is deliberately leading matters to conflict. What for?
Russian citizens trust the Kremlin
I will assume that all of Putin’s public speeches should be taken literally. He really believes that Ukrainians and Russians are one people, and that Russia has the right to its sphere of influence in Eurasia, and that new members are being dragged into NATO by force, and in “color technologies”, and that Europeans dream of freeing themselves from American dictatorship.
The latest poll by the Levada Center showed that 50 percent of respondents consider NATO and the West in general to be the culprit of the current tension. Another 16 percent goes to Ukraine. Even if we make allowances for the traditional insincerity of the answers of some of the respondents, it still turns out that two-thirds of the population unconditionally believe in state propaganda and, in fact, are ready to accept the idea of war.
The argument “The regime does not need” load 200 “should not be completely rejected, of course. It is clear that the resumption of full-scale hostilities will lead to serious losses among the Russian military. The Ukrainian army is not what it was in 2014-2015. But with such a uniform public opinion clearly cannot expect mass protest demonstrations “for peace” on the streets of Russian cities. That is, everything depends on what Supreme Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin decides. And what exactly he decides depends on a host of unknown factors, including quality and interpretation. various information coming to him through open and closed channels.
Putin is actually president for life. He will very soon officially receive full political control over the regions of Russia. The law on public power, adopted in the second reading, will give it the appropriate powers by the end of the year. The last inhabitant of the Kremlin to wield such power was Stalin. This power cannot be peaceful by definition. It is impossible without external design “relying on status” – obedient satellites, pocket separatists on call, special groups to “eliminate” unwanted people, rudeness elevated to the rank of a state exam for loyalty. This is not only about Ukraine, but about a new edition of Russia, to which, in theory, history textbooks will forever be labeled “Putin’s”.
It is theoretically possible to withdraw troops from the Ukrainian borders just like that, according to the results of the video summit with Biden, for the sake of some meetings of some “working groups”, but practically not. It would be nice, of course, to achieve the fulfillment of all requirements without a war. But if it doesn’t work out, why not resort to force? All the more so if, as it seems, there are only helpless Roosevelts and not a single Churchill around. In addition, the current Russian government has, in addition to tanks, Gazprom (which Stalin did not have).
The logic of Putin’s ultimatum assumes that at least part of the requirements must be met. Otherwise, the Russian authorities will look powerless and frivolous. And this is absolutely impossible to allow. And the inhabitants of Russia, according to sociologists, got used to the idea of war in advance. This fact, quite possibly, will become decisive when the time comes for the Kremlin to decide.
Author: Konstantin Eggert is a Russian journalist, author of the weekly column on DW and the interview-project DW “vTRENDde”. Konstantin Eggert on Facebook: Konstantin Eggert, on Telegram: Oberleutnant_Eggert
The commentary expresses the personal opinion of the author. It may not coincide with the opinion of the Russian editorial staff and Deutsche Welle in general.
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