An article published in the USA by Vyto Babrauskas, whose services were hired to help understand what happened and why in the disaster that occurred in the dry fertilizer storage structure of Adair Grain Co., on the evening of April 17, 2013 in the town of West in the state of Texas in the USA, reveals several omissions.
In the explosion, 15 people were killed, more than 200 were injured, 2 schools were destroyed, one nursing home and many other buildings. Most of the dead were volunteer firefighters or came to help. It was one of the most tragic incidents in the US, where many firefighters lost their lives.
The author writes that since almost a decade after the explosion no substantial changes were enacted to protect the public and the firefighters from a similar disaster, the whole message is as the title of the article says – protecting the lives of firefighters is not necessary.
1,300 facilities across the US
According to a federal government study, there are more than 1,300 facilities across the US that store significant amounts of ammonium nitrate, most of which are old and built of wood like the incident in question.
The claim is that nothing substantial has been done in the past decade to reduce the probability that such a disaster will repeat itself. The actions of the firefighters in the West disaster were in accordance with the recommendations of The Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG) but despite this they were killed. Any reasonable person will come to the obvious conclusion that this document is tragically flawed and needs to be changed, but such a change was not made.
Ammonium nitrate is non-flammable, cannot ignite and cannot burn. But it can explode, when a large and uncontrolled fire takes place near it. The lessons learned are that an ammonium nitrate storage facility will not explode in the following cases: if an uncontrolled fire does not occur near it and if other explosives are not stored in the same place.
The second lesson is very simple to implement through regulatory regulations (which was not done in the Beirut port explosion disaster nor in the Tianjin port explosion disaster). Therefore, the focus should be on preventing an uncontrolled fire, and for this only two conditions are required – that the structure be made of non-combustible materials and that no flammable goods be introduced into the facility.
The building in West was built in the late 1960s almost entirely of wood, except for parts covered in steel. This is usually the cheapest form of construction, if there are no building laws or other requirements, and there are none. Almost all of the 1,300 facilities that store significant amounts of ammonium nitrate across the US are also built of wood, and almost all of them are old. Therefore, they must be replaced with safe structures (with concrete domes, for example).
Selling without a safety check
Chemical manufacturers often practice a responsible-care policy: if a buyer wishes to purchase a dangerous chemical, the company will not sell it to him without first performing an inspection at the facility and determining that the buyer can safely handle the product.
If such an inspection had been conducted for the West facility, the disaster would not have occurred, as the manufacturers would not have supplied products to the facility. In this respect the facility at West was not unusual: ammonium nitrate was sold daily to buyers whose facilities had not been inspected and had not been determined to provide adequate fire safety.
The only positive response to the West disaster was from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), which continued to amend the relevant NFPA 400 code. However, in the writer’s opinion, this was a cosmetic fix rather than a substantial safety improvement for 2 main reasons. The NFPA 400 code only applies when both a building code and an authority having jurisdiction exist and the updated provisions do not yet prohibit wood construction and storage in an existing wood structure.
If the wooden structure at West were standing today, even the updated NFPA 400 would not require replacing it with a non-combustible structure.
Despite the disaster, the instructions were not amended
At the federal level, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is the primary agency that regulates workplace safety. The regulations regarding ammonium nitrate are very old, out of date and not amended following the West disaster. The author writes that the agency published a message containing false information on the subject.
There is no telling when or where in the US the next major ammonium nitrate explosion disaster will occur. 10 years after the disaster at West, the fire services are in exactly the same situation. A similar event will likely result in a similar outcome. So, if the current situation continues, the message that will be sent is: Protecting the lives of firefighters is not necessary.
Avraham (Avi) Ilon, M.Occ.H, safety supervisor, explosion supervisor, former professional coordinator of trainings for safety supervisors, explosion supervisors and D-Nor fireworks operators | Member of the Explosives Safety Branch of the Israeli Association for Safety Engineering at the Engineers Bureau Member of the Bureau of Safety Inspectors in Israel Manager of professional groups on explosives and pyrotechnics