2024-01-19 12:50:15
Russia took the initiative in February 2022 to invade Ukraine. It partially failed, but the war continues. Moscow can still hope to win, for many reasons, notably because the regime has been able to put its economy on a war footing, while the West is far from having put in place a system for producing military equipment to support Kiev. over a long period.
Whatever the fate of the weapons, any settlement of the conflict will include a share of sacrifices, at least territorial, on the part of the Ukrainians. Defeated, the Russians will want their revenge; Victorious, they will seek to go further in the re-establishment of their former empire. There are fears that in either case Russia will retain leverage over a weakened Ukraine. This will be a difficult problem for Europe to manage. The Moscow-Beijing axis, without being an alliance in the strict sense of the term, risks finding itself, again in either case, consolidated. China is biding its time less and less patiently; it now deploys a network of bases, amasses a vast military arsenal and tightens its grip on Taiwan.
A dysfunctional American policy
What about the West? It held up better than expected. As time passes, however, its position appears fragile: support for Ukraine will be difficult to maintain over time; and a return of Trump to the White House would worsen what is already dysfunctional in the mechanics of American politics. A populist mortgage also exists on the Old Continent – in France itself – while Europe has fallen behind, in terms of economic dynamism, from America and the major emerging countries. Furthermore, Joe Biden’s United States is trying to form a Europe-America-Asian allies continuum. This still hypothetical construction would certainly collapse in the event of Trump’s return.
Between the Beijing-Moscow axis and an uncertain West, the global South, if it has no coherence, is in a position to monetize its separate position. The major emerging countries, even when they condemn Russian aggression, continue their economic relations with Russia. The big difference with the era of non-alignment is that today these countries weigh in on the balance of the world.
A gap between South and West
The health crisis and then the war in Ukraine have widened a gap between the Global South and the West. This divide is now worsened by the war between Israel and Hamas. Western support for Israel is the matrix of this reproach of “double standards” which constitutes the basis of anti-Western resentment. Perhaps even more than in Ukraine, there is no “happy ending” to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. The risk of a regional conflagration is high; even if this is ultimately avoided, Iran will remain threatening, on the verge of accessing atomic weapons, and the Levant will find itself facing a very difficult post-war period to manage.
We would like to be able to qualify these gloomy predictions with a few corrective measures. The truth obliges us to say that, to the strategic earthquakes which have followed one another, others could be added: we have mentioned Iran, let us also mention a Chinese attack on Taiwan, possibly the day after a possible arrival of Trump in the White House to take advantage of the general state of disorganization in American politics.
A destructive Russia
In this context, who will lead the world in an unpredictable future? Most likely, Russia will remain a destructive factor in any world order, at least as long as Vladimir Putin is in power; it is more uncertain when it comes to China. If, however, circumstances allowed the Kremlin – with the help of Trump for example – to rally around a certain world order, it would be within the framework of a steering group made up of China, the United States, Russia of course and maybe from India. These are the countries that Russians consider to be the only “truly sovereign” ones.
This plan would be acceptable to a global South which respects the strongest and does not see why old Europe would keep a seat on the world’s governing council. An alternative could be a Sino-American G2. Xi Jinping’s declarations in San Francisco, “there is room for two in the world”, leaves this possibility open. Its achievement may take many years at best, as for the moment these are the reasons for tension which prevail between Beijing and Washington.
Between these two scenarios, there would need to be a real revival in Europe for it to retain a decision-making role. It is up to Europeans to equip themselves with the means to contain Russian ambitions on the Old Continent, within the framework of a concerted distribution of roles with America. Europe should also serve as a bridge with the Global South, to help ensure that at least some of the major emerging countries join the West. Thus, a vast coalition would be formed to deter the neo-imperial military adventures of Moscow, Beijing and their cronies. Failing to lead the world, Europeans would contribute, with others, to stabilizing it.
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