2023-08-21 05:54:00
With political life gradually returning to its normal rhythm from today, the issues of domestic current affairs will return to the fore, as well as the great “bet” of the Greek-Turkish relationsas formed after the meeting Mitsotakis – Erdogan in Vilnius and the decision to investigate the possibility of referring the major dispute with Ankara, i.e. the continental shelf demarcation and EEZat Hague.
Given that around mid-September the prime minister and the Turkish president will meet on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, while the meetings of the foreign ministers of the two countries will precede Giorgos Gerapetritis and Hakan Fidan, the agenda of Athens and Ankara will in fact be dominated by the three major “milestones” from which it will be judged whether Vilnius will be a turning point in bilateral relations or another missed opportunity to resolve existing disputes. In particular, unlike what happened in the past during exploratory contacts, the “core” of the issue will be brought to the discussion table, namely:
– The agenda with which the two countries would be able to come to The Hague.
– The assumptions on which the required co-promissory note of the appeal will be formed.
– The timetable within which the Hague-centered discussions should be concluded with either a positive or a negative outcome.
The “package” of the three interrelated issues above, which constitute the so-called “political dialogue” between the two countries, will be managed exclusively by Mr. Gerapetritis and Mr. Fidan, assisted in technical, but not only, issues by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexandra Papadopoulou and Her Turkish counterpart.
Athens, as it is said, will come to discussions on the three above topics open to dialogue, but also with specific “red lines”, as has already been announced to the other side of the Aegean. In particular, as far as the agenda is concerned, it is clear that only the issue of continental shelf and EEZ delimitation can be referred to The Hague and not other issues that Ankara raises from time to time. It is also recalled that in the context of the multiple rounds of exploratory contacts in the past, Athens and Ankara had discussed at length the territorial waters that “entrain” and the issue of airspace, while it is estimated that in a scenario of a comprehensive settlement of the Greek-Turkish disputes they could to make moves that would at least partially satisfy both sides on issues such as the Muslim minority in Thrace or the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Regarding the admissions of the appeal, there should be an agreement not only regarding the jurisdiction of The Hague and the content of the co-promissory note – as Athens is naturally not going to accept a discussion on issues of sovereignty or demilitarization of the islands –, but also regarding how the A court will judge, if that is to be done on the basis of the Law of the Sea. Although the distance that theoretically separates Athens and Ankara in this field seems chaotic, it may turn out to be smaller in practice: as it is said, the basic provisions on the Law of the Sea are today also customary law, so from this point of view they already “bind” Turkey .
Regarding the agenda, it is clear that only the issue of the continental shelf and EEZ delimitation can be referred to the International Court of Justice and not other issues that Ankara raises from time to time.
The third issue that will concern both sides is the schedule of the discussions. In both Athens and Ankara, the prevailing view is that the existing momentum should be exploited, where both Mr. Mitsotakis and Mr. Erdogan have a fresh and strong mandate after their victories in the recent election contests in the two countries. In particular, it is estimated that, whether positive or negative, the “Hague case” should be “closed” by the beginning of 2024. Besides, Mr. Mitsotakis and Mr. Erdogan will not only meet in New York next month, but also towards end of the year in the context of the Supreme Cooperation Council of Greece and Turkey which will be held in Thessaloniki. The whole process will be launched immediately, as within August or the first week of September, the Gerapetritis-Fidan tete tete will take place.
In Athens, the difficulty of trying to get Ankara to accept the above framework is fully understood. On the contrary, however, it is considered that there is a “window of opportunity”, in the sense that T. Erdogan can make profits from the overall settlement of the bilateral disputes. In addition to paving the way for the utilization of important natural resources that in a few decades will no longer be of essential importance – and this also applies to Greece – Ankara can gain:
– A new cooperation framework with the European Union through the revision of the customs union agreement which seems to interest the Turkish president again.
– The definitive change of page in the difficult relations with Washington in recent years.
– An overall better landscape for the Turkish economy which continues to be under test, despite the continuous “injections” of support from the Gulf countries.
The lure
All of the above possibly make up a tempting package for Mr. Erdogan, who is also interested in his “legacy”, as with his current term he will probably complete his presence on the Turkish political scene.
Accordingly, the transition to a period of stable “calm waters” in the Aegean will be a crucial event for Athens. At the same time, the finalization of the territorial waters in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, combined with the corresponding adjustment of the airspace, effectively cancels the Turkish casus belli. Finally, the country will gain sovereignty in areas where it theoretically has sovereign rights, but which it does not exercise.
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