The disconnection of the surveillance cameras at the enrichment site in Kashan by the Iranians, and their announcement of the start of construction of a new protected site in Natanz, make it clear that Tehran’s face is uncompromising.
According to various publications, Iran already has a low level of enriched uranium that is sufficient – if enriched to a higher level – to produce material for the first three bombs.
Bottom line – if Iran decides to start enriching uranium to high levels (60% or more) in the near future, Israel will face a challenge it has not known since the Six Day War, when in fact it will once again have to face an ideological rival with the potential to threaten its very existence.
What options are seemingly open to prevent this threat from becoming a reality? Some are talking about an independent military option, known as “blue-and-white.” According to reports, the IDF has even practiced a large-scale air exercise in recent weeks, which seems to simulate an outline of attack in Iran.
However, and without underestimating the capabilities of the Israeli Air Force, when it comes to an independent Israeli attack, it must be said, first of all, that Iran and its nuclear facilities are in a complex operational range.
Second, one of its two known enrichment facilities, the one known as Purdue, is located in the belly of the earth – making it very difficult to effectively hit this site from the air.
The question arises as to how many attacks will result in only partial damage to the enrichment system, the possible cost of which is a comprehensive military campaign, which probably involves significant damage to the Israeli home front.
It should be borne in mind that Iran has the ability to respond to an attack by launching a multi-frontal campaign, based on the capabilities of its own TK and UAVs, as well as the capabilities of its TMS, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza.
As for the option of a military attack in cooperation with other elements, and first and foremost with the United States, the likelihood of this seems extremely limited. This is in the face of the Biden administration’s approach, which strongly opposes the use of military force and adheres to a diplomatic-diplomatic course of action, as reflected in Washington’s policy toward the war in Ukraine.
Moreover, the war there, along with the subsequent rise in energy prices, are another brake on the Western international system in terms of their support for a military attack on Iran – which is a significant energy producer in its own right.
It should be emphasized that Israel does not need the Americans only in the context of an attack in the outline of cooperation, but also in the “blue-and-white” outline. This is in view of its dependence on the supply of American equipment for its protection, such as interceptors and more. In other words, Jerusalem is required to coordinate such a move with the current administration in Washington in advance – which casts doubt on the actual availability of the co-operation option, and to some extent also on the independent one.
The political, seemingly alternative, option also seems to stand on chicken legs. It is clear that so far the Biden and Western governments have failed miserably in their attempts to pressure Iran to accept a framework agreement, such as the one (JCPOA), and certainly to come to terms with a more binding framework that includes additions such as restricting export exports and developing platform platforms.
This failure stemmed primarily from Tehran’s success in developing routes to China, Russia, and even India, and in maintaining an economic relationship with them that is not affected by the sanctions. This relationship, along with the struggle between the United States and Russia on the one hand and China on the other, greatly weakens Washington’s power in the international arena in general and in the regional arena in particular.
In addition, the weight of pressure from other Western countries, including France, England and Germany, appears to be on the decline. This is mainly due to the struggle in Russia and its economic derivatives. Tehran seems to be very aware of this equation, and its current refusal reflects a sense of relative power, both due to rising energy prices, but no less so – due to the strategic relationship it has developed with its global rivals in the US and European democracies.
So what can Israel do? It seems that in the absence of a real military and political option, it is right for Israel to prepare for a strategy of deterrence. This is in parallel with the continuation of the integrated frustration policy that it has implemented so far. Nuclear deterrence was developed, researched and implemented during the Cold War and the nuclear race between East and West, and it seems that in view of the emerging trends, Israel must develop its own deterrent strategy. This is based on the reasonable assumption that Iran will continue to advance in the coming years to threshold capabilities not only in the field of material, but also in the field of weapons group and carrying platforms.
The principles of nuclear deterrence based on capabilities attributed to Israel in foreign publications require the formulation of a new and updated operational concept, and accordingly the development of an operational toolbox for its implementation. The strategy must be based on operational redundancy, on a second strike capability, and no less – on a system of consciousness that will make these moves an institutional element in the regime of mutual deterrence that must be prepared between Israel and Iran.
The regime in Tehran, whose continued existence depends on its oil economy and faces widespread popular opposition – even if occupied for the time being – must understand that it is up to Israel to inflict existential damage on it, so that for it the possible use of nuclear weapons will remain outside the game.
The intention is not to develop this sensitive debate here, but to call on the decision-makers in Jerusalem and the Kirya to abandon the slogans calling for the imposition of harsh sanctions as a means of curbing Iran or those that hint at an Israeli intention for military action independently.
It is better for Israel to prepare significantly and in a timely manner to build a strategic response in the proper profile towards the possibility that Iran will soon become a nuclear threshold state, by developing a concept of operational deterrence and all that this implies in terms of its overall security strategy.
The writer previously served as head of the World Division at the Israeli institution