“Not the time for tactical games”

by times news cr

“Fire walls” are relevant ⁣again today, but ‌they didn’t ​happen ‍back then. ‍How should conservatives act against the right-wing extremists against the backdrop of Weimar?

In Thuringia, the bourgeois parties had no problems accepting ‍the ​NSDAP into the state government ‌in 1930 ​- with the⁣ consequences already described. The ⁤CDU/CSU,⁣ on⁣ the other hand, has so far ruled out ⁣coalitions ⁤with ‍the AfD at‌ federal or state level. One can only hope‍ that she sticks to this principle. Because the example of Thuringia ‌shows what happens when the “fire wall”⁣ comes down. Once the ​taboo is broken, the consequences for the Union and indeed for political conservatism in ⁢the Federal Republic would be devastating.

The AfD is sometimes compared or equated with the NSADP. What do you think of it?

The AfD⁣ has some ideological overlaps with the NSDAP, and their mobilization strategies show certain similarities. However, there are some key differences: Fortunately, it does not have a charismatic leader like⁢ Hitler; It does not maintain a ⁣paramilitary civil war force in the form of the SA, and quite ‌apart ‍from the fact that it is not planning a ​war of conquest or genocide, it does not represent – at ⁤least not yet clearly – the goal of completely abolishing parliamentary democracy, but rather of transforming⁣ it into one “illiberal democracy”, for example along the lines of Viktor Orbán in Hungary.

Sometimes it ⁢is argued that the AfD will be “disenchanted” through integration and ‌participation: What should we make‌ of⁢ this historically?

The AfD would probably not be “disenchanted” by being involved in political responsibility; it would probably‍ become stronger rather than weaker. In 1933, the conservatives of Weimar also​ believed that ⁤they could ⁢”tame” the‌ Hitler movement by involving them in the “government ⁢of national concentration.” This ⁢turned out to ⁣be a major miscalculation. It only took Hitler a few months to outplay his conservative allies and establish his unrestricted dictatorship.

It‍ is ⁤a bitter irony of history‌ that Hitler came to power when the Nazi Party was⁤ already in decline.

By the end of 1932, Hitler’s star was actually on the decline. In ‌the Reichstag election⁤ at the beginning of November, the NSDAP ‌lost massive numbers of votes for the first time and the party found itself in a serious crisis. Many astute observers at the ​time ‍were of ‌the opinion that Hitler’s rise‍ was slowed and his decline was unstoppable. The fact that he finally came​ to power was not due to the lack of “endurance” of the Democrats, especially ⁣the Social Democrats, the ⁢actual ⁤state party of the Weimar Republic, which fought tenaciously and sometimes to the point of self-denial for the continued existence of democracy. The transfer of power to Hitler was the result of ⁤a‍ dark scheming behind the scenes, in which the camarilla around President Hindenburg pulled the⁣ strings.

Hitler was not an “industrial accident,” you write,‍ pointing out the importance of the decisions made‌ by individuals in specific situations. What⁤ is your advice​ to our ⁤current political leaders?

My first advice would be not to underestimate ⁤your opponent. Hitler also came to power because Hindenburg’s camarilla believed⁢ they could “engage” him ​for their own purposes. Björn ​Höcke may seem like ⁣a joke, but he is ⁤not harmless.⁢ Vigilance and a clear stance against opponents ‌of democracy‌ are needed. When it comes‍ to Donald Trump, you shouldn’t rely ‍on⁣ the fact that⁣ things won’t get that ⁣bad, but rather ‌prepare⁤ yourself for eventualities. My second ‍recommendation concerns cooperation between bourgeois and⁢ left-wing parties. The founding compromise of Weimar⁤ was based on the cooperation of the social democrats with ‌the moderate⁢ parties of the middle‍ class, i.e. the Center​ and‍ the DDP. In the so-called “Grand Coalition” between 1928 and 1930, these parties, together with ‍the right-wing liberal ​DVP,⁢ had the‍ chance of forming a government without the nationalists and the conservative opponents of the republic.

But in 1930 this was over, followed by the so-called presidential cabinets, which were solely dependent on‌ the goodwill of the Reich President?

The fact that Hindenburg’s camarilla was able to usher in the⁢ era of ‍presidential cabinets was also due‍ to the fact that the “grand coalition” ‌could not ‍agree on a few‌ percentage points on unemployment insurance. This really shouldn’t happen to the⁤ Democrats again. But the break in the traffic light coalition shows worrying parallels, even ‌if the consequences are not as serious as in ‌1930. Then as ​now, the ‌core issue was the question of the ‍financing and scope of the⁢ welfare state. And then, as now, the breaking point lay between social ‍democracy and ⁤a right-wing liberal party. In the interest of the whole, one must step over one’s own shadow in the fateful hour of a democracy and disregard petty party interests. The end of the traffic light ⁤makes it clear that this lesson ⁢has not yet been understood ⁤everywhere. In ​terms⁤ of ⁢the future, this means: Now is not the time for principled arguments or tactical games. Now ​is the⁣ time for ⁢courageous and pragmatic initiatives from all democratic parties.

It‍ will become clear in the next few months what role Wagenknecht and her party want to​ play in German politics:‌ that of the KPD in the ​Weimar ‌Republic, which together with the NSDAP formed‌ a negative ⁤majority and whose first goal was to close the Weimar Republic destabilize? Or ​that of a party that, despite everything, ultimately stabilizes the ‌system and helps to enable majorities against the right-wing populists.

Because then you overlook what scope for action and alternatives there were, and that‌ the outcome was more open than a perspective focused solely on the downfall⁣ would suggest. So, ⁢to put it bluntly, you are promoting ⁤a fatalistic attitude and missing the real lesson of the Weimar Republic, namely that it is important to fight for democracy. ⁤And, by the way, one would⁤ not do justice to the striking contradictions that this era contained. It was not only a time⁤ of crisis‍ and political instability,⁣ but also a brilliant era in culture and science that has lost none‌ of its​ appeal‍ to this day.

What are​ the historical lessons from​ Weimar ‍Germany‌ that can⁢ inform our understanding ‌of today’s political extremism?

Time.news​ Editor (TNE): Welcome, everyone, to this⁣ special interview on ⁤the ​lessons‍ of⁢ history and ‍their relevance to ⁣our current political⁣ landscape. Today, we have with us a distinguished expert in political history, Dr. Hans Müller. Dr. ⁤Müller, ‌thank you for​ joining ⁢us.

Dr. Hans⁢ Müller (DHM): Thank you for having me.​ It’s a pleasure to be here.

TNE: ‍ Let’s dive right in. The phrase “fire walls” has made a resurgence in conversations about political‍ extremism. Can you explain what ‍these “fire⁢ walls” entail and their historical ​significance, particularly in‍ the context of Weimar Germany?

DHM: Certainly. The ⁢term “fire wall” ⁢refers to ​the boundaries that established‍ political parties ‌set ‍against extremist movements to ‍prevent ‌their integration into mainstream ‍politics.‌ In Weimar Germany, in 1930, the bourgeois parties breached ‍this ‌fire wall by​ accepting the ⁤NSDAP⁣ –‌ the Nazi Party – into their‌ government, leading to catastrophic consequences ​for democracy. Today, we’re witnessing⁣ similar dynamics, specifically with ⁢the ⁣AfD in Germany. It’s ​essential for⁢ conservative parties like the ​CDU/CSU to maintain their​ stance ‍against coalitions with such extremist groups to safeguard democratic values.

TNE: That’s a⁢ sobering reminder⁣ of our history. There’s often a comparison drawn between‌ the AfD⁤ and ⁤the NSDAP. Can you provide⁢ your perspective on this?

DHM: The AfD does have‌ some ⁤ideological⁢ overlaps⁢ with the NSDAP, such as nationalist ⁣rhetoric and certain mobilization strategies.​ However, significant differences ⁤exist: the‍ AfD lacks a charismatic leader like⁣ Hitler and does not have the paramilitary structures that the Nazis ‍had, ⁣such‍ as the SA.⁢ While ⁢they may seek​ to transform​ parliamentary democracy into an “illiberal​ democracy,” at least for now, their goals ⁢don’t extend to‍ outright domination or genocide as the ‌Nazis did.

TNE: In light ⁣of these risks, some argue that integrating ⁣the ​AfD into political processes ⁣might⁤ “disenchant” them. Historically, ‍how valid is this argument?

DHM: Historically, such thoughts⁢ have proven to be dangerously misguided. The belief that the ⁢NSDAP could​ be “tamed” by involving them in government was a crucial⁢ miscalculation that contributed to Hitler’s rise. The AfD would ‌likely become more emboldened rather than less if given political responsibility. History teaches us to be⁣ extremely cautious⁤ of this strategy.

TNE: Reflecting on history, you mention that​ Hitler came to power during a period when the Nazi​ Party was perceived to ⁢be in decline. ⁤Can you elaborate on this irony?

DHM: Absolutely. By late 1932, the NSDAP was experiencing a significant electoral decline, leading to widespread belief ⁤that​ Hitler’s influence was waning. However, it was through a combination ​of political maneuvering behind the scenes – particularly by President Hindenburg’s inner circle – that ⁢he was brought ‌to power. This reminds us that the ascent of ​extremist movements often involves complex political​ machinations, rather than mere public support.

TNE: That’s an important perspective. Looking at our current ‌leaders, what would you advise them to ⁣consider‌ based on these‌ historical ‍lessons?

DHM: Firstly, political ⁢leaders must avoid⁤ underestimating ⁣their ‍opponents. Just as Hindenburg’s ‍circle fell into the trap of ⁢thinking they⁣ could control Hitler ‍for their own benefit, today’s leaders should recognize that‍ figures like Björn⁢ Höcke ⁣of the AfD, while they may ⁣seem laughable, pose‍ a genuine⁢ threat. Vigilance and​ a firm‌ stance against ‌undemocratic movements are essential. Secondly, cooperation among ⁣moderate parties—both bourgeois ⁢and​ left-wing—was‌ critical in the Weimar era. They must ⁤prioritize collaboration over partisan squabbles in moments of crisis.

TNE: You mentioned the “Grand Coalition” and its ⁢breakdown leading to the presidential cabinets in the Weimar⁤ Republic. How can we prevent a similar ‍situation today?

DHM: ‌That’s crucial. The disintegration of the coalition ​came‌ down to minor disagreements​ on unemployment insurance, which should ⁤never have overshadowed the need to preserve democracy.⁣ Currently, ‍we’re seeing troubling parallels ‍with ⁣the ⁤breakdown of ​the ⁢traffic light‌ coalition in Germany. The focus should​ be on unity, especially regarding⁣ vital issues like welfare state funding. Political leaders must rise above petty interests ‌during critical times.

TNE: ⁢ as we conclude, what emerging patterns should politicians and citizens keep an eye on to safeguard democracy for​ the future?

DHM: Individuals‌ must stay alert to the signs⁤ of extremist ideologies creeping into mainstream politics, as well as the tactics used by ⁤such groups to normalize⁤ their rhetoric. Active⁤ engagement in democracy⁣ and dialogue ⁢between differing political ‍factions remains crucial. ⁣History has taught us that complacency can lead to ‍dangerous outcomes. ‌We must learn and adapt, ensuring we don’t ⁢fall into the same traps that our predecessors did.

TNE: ‍ Dr. Müller, your ‌insights have been invaluable today. Thank you for sharing your expertise⁣ on these ‌crucial issues facing our‌ society.

DHM: Thank you for having me. It’s been a pleasure discussing​ these pressing matters.

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