2023-10-07 17:58:58
The cross : Hamas chose to launch its offensive 50 years after the start of the Yom Kippur War, on October 6, 1973. What symbols do you see behind this anniversary?
Frédérique Schillo: There is an obvious parallel likely to create a psychological shock in Israel. It is 50 years almost to the day later, it is also a Shabbat day, as at the outbreak of this Yom Kippur War, and it is the holiday which marks the end of the Sukkot holidays. This attack surprises by its intensity, with this massive barrage of rockets and these incursions by land, and in the air with drones. This 6 meter wall on the border with Gaza, which the IDF presented as impregnable, was pierced very easily with a bulldozer. We see images of terrorists roaming the towns and kibbutzim around Gaza, going from house to house to kill, brutalize and take civilians hostage.
It is a shock like in Yom Kippur for public opinion, but all things considered, because at Yom Kippur, the feat of Sadat and the Egyptian army was to cross the Suez Canal. It was the last major battle between conventional forces against Israel, the largest tank battle since the Second World War, we are not there yet: we are talking about ten terrorists who infiltrated Israeli territory. But the stupor, if not of the same intensity, is of the same nature. We see the residents calling for help, asking where the soldiers are, why there was no response from the air force, a counterattack.
Should we see this as a failure of the intelligence services and the army?
F. S. : This attack is also reminiscent of Yom Kippur from this point of view and the feeling of vulnerability that it generates among Israelis. There was clearly a military and intelligence services failure. Fifty years ago, the services thought that the Arabs had been so humiliated in 1967 that they would not dare. We find this same conception: Hamas does not want war, it does not know how to fight, it is not sophisticated enough… There is the same contempt for the Palestinians that there was at the towards Arab troops in 1973.
There is also a technical failure for the intelligence services: Hamas has carried out military exercises in recent days and in the same way, 50 years ago, Sadat was able to get his army across the Suez Canal because it had massed near the canal under cover of military maneuvers. The services apparently took these exercises lightly and did not consider that this could signal the launch of an offensive.
To what extent has Hamas “benefited” from the political weakening of the Israeli government, contested in the streets since January, including by former soldiers and reservists?
F. S. : Israel’s vulnerability is not that some reservists wanted to strike and threaten to no longer serve in an illiberal democracy. The vulnerability is also that those in power let down their guard and got stuck in a judicial reform led by a far-right government, with Jewish supremacists who added fuel to the fire, without understanding that society was in crisis. cracking. We are in an unprecedented social crisis, and it is this fragility that the demonstrators pointed out by saying: “Millions of us have been demonstrating against this reform since January, the State is weakened, economists are sounding the alarm; the start-up nation is relocating…” 169 former military leaders and security, defense and intelligence services had warned, saying that it was necessary to put an end to this reform and refocus on the real problems.
Israel’s enemies could take advantage of this fragility, as in 1973; Sadat and Assad were not looking for a war of annihilation, they wanted to recover the lost territories of 1967. Egypt wanted to cause a psychological shock, which stunned Israel and forced the Americans to intervene. It was a political operation to provoke negotiations. Today too, we are in a very tactical operation. This barrage of rockets is a way of diverting attention, taking hostages, and reestablishing a balance of power through fear. It’s psychological warfare like in 1973.
This operation, however, remobilized the reservists who challenged Netanyahu’s power. Is this a boon for the government which will find a form of sacred union?
F. S. : One would be tempted to believe that this is holy bread for Netanyahu, because he is never better than when he puts on the clothes of a warlord. The demonstrations, at the end of the religious festivals, would resume with a vengeance, as would the standoff between the government and the opposition. Obviously, he will be able to breathe on the internal level: immediately, the Brothers in Arms, these leaders of the protest of the IDF reservists, said that we had to stand up. Every conflict pushes to unify Israeli society. But the human toll is already so heavy, the military intelligence failures so great, and the calls from residents so strong that Netanyahu cannot escape scrutiny. His respite promises to be short-lived.
How does this operation resonate at a time of rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia with a view to possible normalization?
F. S. : This type of operation is a way of thwarting the Abraham Accords, with the so-called moderate Gulf States, and tomorrow perhaps with Saudi Arabia through the United States, to strengthen itself with the axis Hamas-Hezbollah-Tehran. The Abraham Accords do not prevent this type of operation; It will be necessary to scrutinize the reactions of the Gulf States to the IDF response.
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