The Ukraine crisis may be “the” foreign policy test of the Biden presidency. Although the symbolism of the meeting held on Friday between US Secretary of State Blinken and Foreign Minister Lavrov at the President Wilson Hotel was obvious, the fact remains that the two diplomats did not manage to put a diplomatic lid on the Ukrainian pot.
The predictions of American military heavyweights are pessimistic – like Admiral Starvidis (who predicts an invasion at the end of January, when the frozen ground will allow the advance of Russian troops on the Donbass), or Alexander Vindman (former director of European Affairs at the Trump’s National Security Council, which believes that the diplomatic route is at an impasse).
In fact, while the likelihood of this crisis degenerating into a major armed conflict is slim, the implications of this escalation are of a magnitude that goes well beyond the regional issue, and this, on three levels.
Nationally
First, at the national level. All the parties involved are grappling with internal issues that shape their foreign policy discourse.
In Moscow, where due to the erosion of institutions and the personalization of the regime, President Putin bases his legitimacy on foreign policy and on the nationalists.
In Germany, the fact that the Russian president has his hand on the gas tap is particularly anxiety-provoking.
In France, a few weeks before the presidential election, President Macron’s European position could be tested by his inability to unite Europeans around Ukraine.
In the United States, foreign policy is weighed down by the blunders of Biden (who hinted that there could be a difference between a “small incursion” and an “invasion” of Ukrainian territory), but also by the blockage in the Congress: even if foreign policy is the responsibility of the president, the latter suffers from a lack of legitimacy which harms his ability to act and his credibility.
While the Democratic left and the Republicans had called for sanctions, Biden had asserted his ability to negotiate: it finally seems that he too does not really master “ the art of the deal ».
At the regional level
Then regionally. No matter the accolades, speeches and promises, Russia continues to mass troops and tanks on the Ukrainian borders, and the United States persists in equipping the Baltic States, which can now transfer weapons to Kiev. The escalation is undeniable on the pitch.
However, a conflict in this region would make the European Union vulnerable, in more ways than one, but if only because it would generate flows of refugees to the west: the migration issue is the Achilles’ heel of Europe, particularly in a context where Russia plays disinformation in an almost symphonic way.
Moreover, the stake that Ukraine represents for Europe – from the Baltic States to the Franco-German couple – is variable, and differs for the United States: these asymmetries are a vulnerability that Putin has taken note of.
However, the repositioning of Russia around its “near abroad”, from the Caucasus to Eastern Europe, via Central Asia (as evidenced by the recent deployments in Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Caucasus – in Nagorny Karabakh), is not insignificant. After several eastward enlargements of NATO, Washington’s withdrawal from arms control treaties, Putin drew a red line: Ukraine. It is worth mentioning that in 1994, Ukraine had handed over its nuclear weapons to Moscow in exchange for a guarantee of non-intervention – a decision then decried by Professor John J. Mearsheimer.
However, for Putin, the Bucharest summit which, in 2008, opened NATO’s arms to Ukraine and Georgia would be a betrayal of James Baker’s promise that NATO would limit its expansion. This is to omit two things: on the one hand, that NATO had opened the door to Russia at the time. And on the other hand, that last December, NATO indicated to Kiev that its entry into the organization was not for tomorrow. The red line is therefore appropriate.
Finally, globally. Biden inherited a very different geopolitics from the context of the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008, or in Crimea in 2014. Since then, Russia has made a comeback on the international scene, and Washington is paying the price for having strategically abandoned the ‘Russian Bear for the benefit of the Chinese Dragon. Putin, aware of the internal limitations of the presidency
Biden also sees those encountered by the United States on the international scene due to the disaffection of Americans for any military commitment and the erosion of alliances.
Similarly, he sees that Europe is crying out loud, but acting in a dispersed order: supporters of appeasement oppose support for a more muscular policy. Even the Russian financial markets barely reacted to the American threats, proof that no one really believes in the Americans’ rhetoric of firmness.
Yet the cost of an American retreat would be high. Because this net gain for Russia would mean the end of the liberal international system orbiting around Washington. But it goes further. Putin is betting, according to Michael Kofman, that Biden will have to choose between Ukraine or Taiwan, banking on the fact that the Pentagon has given up its ability to fight on two fronts simultaneously.
It is therefore understandable that in the stands, some States are watching the crisis with interest. Tehran, first, because any manifestation of weakness would indicate the course to follow. And then Beijing. Because China is Russia’s leading economic partner. And because any sign of weakness on Ukraine is one on Taiwan. And because Beijing and Moscow have a community of interests in rejecting the liberal democratic order, both seeking to reduce the magnetism of the West: Putin’s visit next month to Beijing during the Olympics could therefore see the deepening of a Sino-Russian alliance at the expense of Pax Americana, which this last round could in fact decree the defeat by K.-O.