If we look at this week’s map of Ukraine, almost a year after the start of the invasion, we can come to a very relevant conclusion: despite the tens of thousands of lives lost in the fighting, the net territorial advantages that Russia has gained in this war, compared with the vast expanse of the Ukraine, have been very small. If we add to this the enormous Russian attrition in materiel and the failure of its two major offensives, the one to the north in the first days of combat and the one to the south towards Odessa, we can conclude that Russia has abandoned its initial goal of annexing Ukraine. Everything seems to indicate that the current Russian strategy would be based on occupying and annexing the two regions of Donbas and to maintain the conquests in the south to guarantee land communication with the Crimea, taking advantage of the natural border that the Dnieper river supposes.
The truth is there are large extensions of the front that remain unchanged since the summerhaving turned the war into a kind of World War I battlefield, with hundreds of kilometers of trenches, obstacles and mines, in which the movements are very scarce and there is hardly any exchange of artillery fire without any exposure. It is also significant that Russia has built two major lines of defense; one to protect the railway line between the east and Melitopol, parallel to the front that is located some hundred kilometers further north, and another, in the narrow land access to Crimea, which indicates that we should not expect a Russian offensive from the south, but rather it is intended to establish the current occupation.
The tremendous Russian casualties to occupy towns with hardly any strategic value in the east are the most palpable sign that this is how Russia can’t go on much longer.since the loss of lives, without appreciable tactical advantage as occurred in solderor is it happening in the zone of Bakhmut, they can be outsized in the next few months for next to nothing. So, if we can be sure of anything, it is that spring, or perhaps before, will bring important moves by the two contenders in order to blow up this impasse that benefits no one.
Let’s analyze a little movements on the ground and the political decisions that have been taken in recent weeks, to try to understand the possible next steps.
Russia has notably increased artillery action in the south, in the area of Guiliaipoleon a front that has remained static since the summer, where artillery fire has doubled in recent weeks with hardly any troop movement, while it is preparing to take Backmouth after the expensive taking of solder in the East. It is also moving mechanized elements from the Crimea to the donbas and has deployed an Arctic brigade to the dnieper estuary to contain a possible amphibious assault.
One element that may be decisive is that the Russian replacement material on the ground is older than the original from a year ago, particularly in reference to tanks and armored vehicles that will be decisive in the next phase, and is managing its missile reserves very prudently and rockets which is a sign of shortages or preparation for a major offensive.
The great discovered secret of this war is the clear Russian air inferiority. The modernization program launched in 2011 has been a resounding failure with delivery problems accelerated by the American embargo that has left the Russian aerospace industry unable to build or sustain its aircraft. Being a strategic factor in Russia’s defense, wearing down its air force in the Ukraine would have brutal strategic consequences for Moscow.
By boat we must soon remember that Russia has about five units of the SU-37, its only fifth-generation aircraft compared to the thousand that the United States has between the F-35 and the F-22; in planes that we call 4ª+, Russia has a total of about five hundred combat aircraft in front of to the more than three thousand that NATO has. Moscow has entered a war without the main element of modern combat, air superiority, and frightened by Ukraine’s meager defenses. Its 400 heavy combat helicopters are too vulnerable to anti-aircraft systems light enough to expose them in a war where the survival of the Russian nation is not at stake.
The appointment of Gerasimov As the person in charge of operations, a politician rather than a tactician, it does not bode well, taking into account his background in Chechnya, where various NGOs have located him as the author of the brutal repression in Grozny. My impression is that Putin wants a very high head to blame for the disaster, if it does happen.
Ukraine, for its part, continues with the accelerated process of training its men; It is estimated that more than 20,000 have received training in NATO countries, and it is taking advantage of this slowdown in fighting to increase its ammunition reserves and receive in operational conditions the numerous equipment that will be available by March, far superior in number and quality. to all those previously delivered.
By the spring, Ukraine will have systems of air defense and anti-missile, including Patriot; hundreds of tanks, much more modern and effective, especially for night combat, than the Russian T-72s, large-calibre self-propelled artillery, armored vehicles, anti-tank systems, field artillery, in short, an arsenal that is concentrated in about few points can reverse the course of the war.
In the last weeks, ukrainian special forces they are taking up positions on islands in the Dnieper estuary, while the United States is supplying riverboats to Ukrainian troops forming up in amphibious assaults. Undoubtedly, an attack from the Jerson areaIt would be the most extraordinary and unexpected coup the Ukrainians could pull off, away from Russian supply lines and in a fast direction to Crimea, a way to hasten Putin’s downfall, if they managed to break into the peninsula annexed by Russia in 2014. If they get bridgeheads east of the river and move the tanks, they could be in Sebastopol in a few weeks.
On the eastern front, the lines of defense remain strong, the Ukrainians not leaving their skin to maintain a square kilometer; they know that these skirmishes do not decide the course of the war but They are aware that Russian troops suffer great wear and tear in each actionwhich is incomprehensible.
The supply of battle tanks supports the thesis of an attack at some point on the front in the south to break the Russian lines, isolate them and reach the Crimea. But let’s not rule out that everyone play clueless and that the deliveries of the battle tanks could also be a ruse to distract attention from the main objective.
Analyzed the options, those of the two sides come together at some point on the line that goes from Guliaipolé to Kramatorskalthough it is most probable that where the two sides meet for the final battle is in the zone of Velika Novoselkawhich will be their particular Waterloo for the contenders.
If the Russian strategy is to recover the Oblasts of Lugansk and Donetsk, already considered their own territories, an attack from the south would seek to create a pocket on the eastern front, linking up with the troops north of Donbas, breaking the Ukrainian lines and recovering the integrity of the two pro-Russian territories while maintaining the south. It is not easy terrain to defend as there are hardly any natural obstacles between the Dnieper and the Russian border.
For Ukraine, attacking this point would allow it to break the front and reach the coast, recovering Mariupol and Berdiansk and 130 kilometers from the current front, two hours in a Leopard car, leaving isolated half of the territory occupied by Russia in the south and the Crimea. This scenario would mean a full blown Russian defeat.
For this reason, despite the skirmishes and dramatic blows, it is on this point that the Russians and Ukrainians will possibly set the final battle to determine the course of the conflict. Neither side is ready for several years of war and given the clear Western commitment to Ukraine, which has lost its fear of Russia and its arsenal, it would make no sense for Moscow to insist on continuing to lose battles, which would mean much more than losing Ukraine.